On May 15, the United States halted the ongoing rotation of 4,000 soldiers out of the roughly 10,000 American troops stationed in Poland. The reasons behind the decision remain unclear. Pentagon officials describe it as a planned force review, while other sources claim the process was interrupted mid-rotation. Soldiers reportedly learned about the changes in real time, and some equipment had already begun moving.
Public reaction was immediate. A debate quickly erupted over the credibility of American security guarantees. Poland had long been portrayed by Donald Trump and his circle as a model ally of the United States. On Thursday, May 21, the US president, citing his relationship with President Nawrocki and endorsing him in the election, announced an increase of 5,000 troops in Poland.
At this point, however, it is still unclear what form this will take – whether these are additional forces or a replacement for the 4,000 troops whose rotation was suspended. The majority of the American military presence in Poland is rotational rather than permanent, making it significantly easier to withdraw. As the weaker ally, Poland fears abandonment. The United States, meanwhile, may not want to become entangled in Poland’s security problems with Russia and Belarus – especially amid warming relations between Washington and Minsk, and the possibility of future rapprochement with Moscow.
Also, Poland has recently announced the opening one of only a handful of Abrams tank service hubs outside the US. On Friday, May 22, the first Polish F-35 fighter jets are also expected to arrive in the country. Despite the political tensions and uncertainty, the situation has ultimately turned out favorably for Poland, but the chaos surrounding it is not good. Security depends on predictability.
Nuke o’clock?
One of the main themes of debate in Poland is defense – unsurprisingly so. Military modernization is advancing rapidly, while society is also driven by strong aspirations for development and modernization. Poland, now the world’s 20th-largest economy, has been undergoing a massive transformation project for years. Given both its ambitions and security concerns, the subject of nuclear deterrence capabilities has inevitably emerged. Yet the issue is far more complicated than it may appear.
Rumors suggest that Poland aspires to participate in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing program. The obvious association is American nuclear weapons. Polish media have also speculated about potential cooperation with France and reliance on French nuclear capabilities, particularly in light of growing ties between Warsaw and Paris. Other voices go even further, calling for the development of Poland’s own nuclear arsenal.
It’s not going to happen
American nuclear sharing within NATO, cooperation with France, and the creation of an independent Polish nuclear capability all remain extremely difficult – if not impossible – to achieve.
Nothing suggests that the United States is willing to move its nuclear assets east of Germany, even if the NATO-Russia Founding Act is effectively dead. Media reports in Poland regarding nuclear cooperation with France also appear unrealistic. In practice, such cooperation would most likely amount to joint military exercises, something Polish forces have already participated in for years.
Even more obstacles stand in the way of developing an independent nuclear capability. Poland is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While several countries have managed to acquire nuclear weapons, far more have abandoned them – either relatively quickly and smoothly, as Belarus and Kazakhstan did after the collapse of the Soviet Union, or through a far more complicated process, as in Ukraine’s case. South Africa also voluntarily dismantled its nuclear program.
In the 1990s, Ukraine pursued a more assertive foreign policy than Belarus or Kazakhstan, yet it still agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. Had it refused, it might ultimately have been forced to do so anyway.
The obstacles
If a democratic middle-sized state decided to acquire nuclear weapons, it could encourage other countries to pursue similar ambitions. That would contradict the current logic of global security and the international non-proliferation regime.
The United States, China, and Russia would all oppose such a move. Russia, in particular, would have a strong incentive to intensify hostile actions against Poland. Western allies, meanwhile, could weaken cooperation or even threaten sanctions.
Infrastructure presents another major problem. Poland has no domestic uranium mines, and obtaining nuclear material would be difficult. It also lacks the infrastructure necessary to produce, store, and deploy nuclear weapons. Beyond the Maria research reactor near Warsaw, Poland has no significant nuclear infrastructure. The country’s first nuclear power plant remains in the early stages of development.
Moreover, building such a program in secrecy would be virtually impossible given the intelligence capabilities of major world powers.
Would nuclear weapons benefit Poland? Certainly, they would strengthen deterrence. But given current political and strategic realities, such ambitions remain unrealistic. Poland – a medium-sized state with a strong economy, a large though declining population, and massive investments in conventional military capabilities – does not necessarily require nuclear weapons to project strength.
Warsaw already demonstrated its geopolitical influence in 2022, when it transferred hundreds of pieces of military equipment to Ukraine without waiting for broader Western consensus.
In light of recent events, Poland now faces a different dilemma: whether it wants to remain primarily a consumer of security or also become a provider of security, given its growing military potential. Even without nuclear weapons, a strong conventional army remains a powerful political and diplomatic tool.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.