EXPLAINED: Why Ukraine’s New Civil Code is Stoking Critics

A new wave of protests have begun in Ukraine over the draft new Civil Code. What has actually changed from the 2003 iteration and what problems lie inside? Kyiv Post investigates.

Ukraine has seen a new wave of protests emerge. Not on the scale of those seen in Kyiv and other cities last summer when the authorities attempted to thwart the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies – but protests nonetheless.

These latest demonstrations took place against the new version of Ukraine’s Civil Code, which passed its first reading on April 28. Hitherto, Ukraine operated under the 2003 Code which at the time adopted many Western norms.

The protests in various cities against the recent draft law 15150 have brought together representatives of various organizations and hundreds of people – seemingly not that many – but still unusual for a country at war.

At the same time, numerous amendments have been submitted to the Code prior to its second reading. As of May 22, these amounted to more than 3,500 revisions, while civic organizations submitted more than 100 pages of their own proposals and comments.

In practice, this delays its adoption by several months.

So, what is the problem?

Too “conservative” or too “unclear”

One of the main points of criticism is the Code’s excessively strong “conservatism.” Critics say it severely restricts the rights of women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and others.

In particular, critics point to Article 1473 of the draft Code, which defines “marriage as a union exclusively between a man and a woman.” This point has become one of the contentious elements among opponents.

In reality, the draft Code introduces nothing new here. It duplicates Article 21 of the current Family Code, which states that “marriage is a family union of a woman and a man registered with the state civil registry office.”

Lawyers interviewed by Kyiv Post emphasize that the inclusion of the word “exclusively” emotionally intensifies the wording, but – legally – the formulations are the same.

Another provision sparking outrage is the practice of “reconciliation” in divorce proceedings. That is, the court would not immediately grant a divorce initiated by one party, but would provide a certain period of time for “reconciliation” – in other words, a chance to save the marriage. By mutual consent that would apply for one month, and without mutual consent for six months.

Critics say this merely prolongs a painful process for the party that does not want delays.

“When people divorce, they are given six months to ‘think it over’ – this is a Soviet practice. It only complicates the process and requires the involvement of mediators, psychologists, and lawyers,” notes one critic of the draft law, MP Oksana Pipa.

But this is not new either. This norm already exists today in the Family Code. Statistics from Ukrainian courts show that, on average, they assign reconciliation periods of three months when there is no agreement between the parties. However, there are cases where six months are assigned.

“This Code sounds like it was written by some Trumpist!” one participant in the protest rallies said. However, many of the norms criticized as outdated and “ultra-conservative” are, in fact, already present in current legislation.

And the main problem, according to lawyers, is not that the draft Code “turns things backward.” It simply copies old models without changing them in any meaningful way.

“Dobrozvychainist” – what’s in a word?

The new Code, unlike the old one, feels more conservative in spirit.

For example, it uses the term “dobrozvychainist,” meaning something akin to good moral character. A court for instance might reject a person’s request for adoption if they do not have good moral character. However, rather than being tied to clear criteria, such as no previous criminal convictions, its usage in the new Code is less well defined.

“Dobrozvychainist” is defined as “a set of moral norms, principles, standards of ethical behavior, and generally accepted ideas of goodness and justice,” according to one of the co-authors of the draft law and one of its main defenders, Ruslan Stefanchuk.

“It is a replacement for the Soviet term ‘moral foundations of a society building communism,’ which came to us from the old Soviet Code. A linguistic group is working alongside the working group to create specifically Ukrainian substitute words,” Stefanchuk says in defense of the Code.

On the one hand, this introduces nothing fundamentally new – it is merely a substitute for a more outdated Soviet definition.

But there is a difference. The term “dobrozvychainist” appears more than 40 times in the draft law – much more frequently than previous Soviet versions, while remaining extremely vague in legal terms.

Critics’ main dissatisfaction lies in the fact that the draft law does not provide an exhaustive list of strong and tangible criteria for “dobrozvychainist.” This creates risks that, in judicial practice, each judge may interpret the concept subjectively; furthermore, Ukrainian, post-soviet courts do not tend to be widely trusted en masse.

Questions surrounding property and digital rights

Certain provisions regarding information property rights have also stirred concerns. For example, the “right to be forgotten,” allows individuals to demand the removal of personal information where it is no longer deemed relevant or in the public interest. Stefanchuk emphasizes that this is also a continuation of European practices.

However, others, including lawyers, have raised questions.

One MP who voted for the new Code in the first reading but believes it requires substantial revision in the second – told Kyiv Post:

“How can one determine the irrelevance of information if relevance is a changing rather than constant factor? Something may be irrelevant today, but tomorrow it could attract interest again because there will be a reason and people will remember it. The same applies to the loss of public interest – another vague concept. How do we determine when public interest remains and when it is ‘lost’? This should be further defined,”

Article 321 pivots away from traditional property rights to regulate the digital sphere. It establishes that a physical person has the right to their own digital image, representation and identity. A “digital image” in this respect means a person’s representation on the internet, explicitly covers social media profiles, electronic government accounts (like the Diia app), electronic signatures, and digital seals.

Article 321 clearly states that “A person has the right to freely create and use their digital image, as well as to authorize its use by others.” However, this has sparked controversy since it leaves room for rights to be limited “on grounds and procedures determined by law,” leading to fears around state censorship or arbitrary digital restrictions.

Article 345 guarantees businesses’ rights to “their own digital image,” while Article 543 states “Data related to a legal entity’s digital image may only be processed with the entity’s consent and in compliance with the law.” There is a perceived risk that the new clauses may allow companies to proclaim such “data processing” illegal, i.e. without their consent.

Such clauses could be used as pressure on the media through court demands to remove investigative reports or journalistic publications by individuals involved in such cases. These individuals may be wealthy enough to afford highly qualified and expensive legal representation.

Questions remain

Whilst the draft of the new Civil Code is indeed conservative in spirit, it does introduce very little that is new and essentially offers old norms arranged in a somewhat different structure.

Widespread dissatisfaction stems not so much from the fact that it worsens anything, but rather from the fact that, like the old Code, it does not correspond to modern realities.

Is it possible to define marriage not only as a union between a man and a woman, and how critical is this issue?

Where is the broader regulation of the status of same-sex couples (whether through granting family status or another form of recognition), which many may dislike but which nevertheless exist?

Where is the regulation of civil partnerships and the rights of parents of children who are not officially married?

Supporters of traditional marriage values may not like this, but society is diverse.

And why do many definitions appear vague in their wording? Will this not create problems during court proceedings?

These questions could have been answered earlier, but now they will have to be answered during the second reading, after the Code has already become the object of criticism.