The front
There were no major changes in ground ownership over the past week. I’ve read several reports that the density of Russian infiltration attempts is falling off. The general opinion is that this is because the Russian command has run through the men that were committed to the summer offensive.
On the Russian side, there seem to have been some minor Russian gains in the northern Kharkiv region and in the Kostiantynivka-Druzhkivka area, with the Ukrainians posting minor gains in the same area. This is probably the sector with the most intense combat, but firing and contacts are falling off. However, the Russians are still hitting all around with glide bombs; again, around Kostiantynivka seems to be the center of that air effort.
Russia bombards Ukraine
Kyiv had already taken a big hit Saturday (Aug. 1), when Russia launched 35 missiles – 27 of them ballistic – plus 185 attack drones at the capital and surrounding region. Only one ballistic missile was intercepted; Zelensky said that’s simply because Ukraine has no interceptors left for the Patriot system. At least 10 people were killed and more than 30 wounded. Damage was spread across seven districts: 18 residential buildings, a school, the Lithuanian Embassy, and assorted infrastructure were hit, along with a city ambulance facility that was struck twice, destroying five ambulances and partially wrecking four buildings. Seven people died in the Darnytskyi district alone.
Then there was another strike overnight Tuesday-Wednesday (Aug.4-5), with the Russians taking full advantage of Ukraine’s total absence of Patriot interceptor missiles, this thanks to the US starting a war with Iran and depleting its own Patriot reserves, and also President Donald Trump’s strategy of forcing Ukraine to surrender to Russia by helping Russia blow up things in Ukraine.
Russia launched 24 ballistic missiles, all from the Bryansk and Kursk region, as well as four Oniks supersonic missiles. None were intercepted. There was only one target: Kyiv.
There were several reports that North Korean ballistic missiles had been in the mix and later in the day that supposedly North Korea is in the process of handing over 100+ ballistic missiles to Russia. The source of that is Ukraine’s military intelligence – HUR. It’s possible it’s true and it’s possible HUR made that public to try and shame Ukraine’s Western allies into squeezing some more Patriot missiles out of the Americans.
The worst killing hit the Kvitneve railroad station in north Kyiv near a logistics warehouse; a missile exploded and scattered cluster munitions. Seven dead there, 17 killed overall. In the Sviatoshynskyi region, something hit a 20-story apartment building and set it on fire.
If the Russian objective was demonstrative retaliation, OK, mission accomplished. Use of cluster munitions is an argument that the goal was terror and creation of content to make Russian media consumers feel better, not military effect. I read in the news that Germany, France and the UK are “secretly meeting” with Russia on the war and ceasefire possibilities; if that was the case, then it would be standard Russian negotiating tactics to make bloody attacks killing maximum civilians while those talks were in progress.
The Russians claimed it was all military targets including a drone manufacturing company, a Nova Poshta warehouse, and three other warehouses. One of them was an Epicenter super-store, which is just a big all-under-one-roof construction materials store, not logistics, but the Russians blasted it anyway. The others, well, probably there were some drone components in the distribution center, but by that logic it would be reasonable for Iran to blow up every UPS distribution in the US, on the grounds that tactical clothing and so forth sold to the general public is probably in the UPS distribution center, so blowing it up is really attacking the US military.
To be clear, this is the same as in plenty of wars in the past; when the warring armies decide they can’t really hurt each other with long-range strikes, they attack each other’s civilian population, because that way it looks like they’re still doing something useful.
Final note: the information “leaked” to Reuters is that Ukraine actually attempted to obtain Patriot manufacturing licenses from the Biden administration, and the request was ignored. I have no idea if the report’s source is telling the truth, but certainly it fits neatly into a Ukrainian messaging campaign trying to shame the West into helping more with Patriot missiles, if of course there is a campaign like that actually in progress.
Trump, during the week, reversed his previous semi-commitment to help Ukraine out by graciously selling Patriot missiles at a 10% markup over retail, explaining that the US has unlimited munitions but on the other hand it needs them so it probably has none to give away.
Ukraine long-range strikes
HUR on Tuesday, Aug. 4, released “late July” footage of Magura drones acting as aircraft carriers to launch strikes against air defense sites in Crimea. Group 13 was the operator unit. This is significant in several ways; first, if Ukraine is to the point where it can operate sea drones freely enough off Crimea to get close enough to launch a heavy drone, then that is a bad sign for Russian shore defenses. Next, this is about the second or third confirmed time, ever, that an effective drone aircraft carrier strike was launched by anyone; this is the state of the art.
I read last week Poland, which is one of the more on-the-ball NATO members, has gotten serious enough about drones that they are now fielding a single mechanized infantry battalion that experimentally have one company converting from riding in APCs to operating drones. This is roughly analogous to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) practice first instituted in late 2024. Don’t ask me how far behind the Americans are.
In naval news, on Monday, Ukrainian drones hit the Russian ro-ro ferry Nadezhda off the coast of Novorossiysk. At least two bridge hits left her drifting; the crew had to abandon. Logistically, this is a disaster for Russia as the Nadezhda was one of two (or three, depending on repairs) ferries operating between the Russian mainland and Crimea.
This followed the Saturday, Aug. 1 sinking of the container ship Yanina following two sea drone hits about 130 kilometers (80 miles) offshore from Novorossiysk. The ship and cargo were owned by Rosatom; Russian state media called it unprovoked piracy.
Ukraine hit all five Kerch Strait ferries in July. Three are out of action; the remaining two (Lavrentiy and Panagia) are now towed as barges. Final note: MarineTraffic on Wednesday showed no – as in zero – ship traffic in the Azov Sea, not moving, not anchored, all gone. Some ships clearly are hiding out in Rostov.
The funniest naval development of the week was courtesy of 13th Group HUR, Ukraine’s naval special operations people. As recorded in the screen grab and observed by probably thousands of Russian tourists in Yalta, bright and early Friday morning, offshore Yalta, Ukrainian Magura kamikaze boats appeared. This is already embarrassing; there was a time the Russian air force launched helicopters and even strike jets to suppress Magura flotillas well out to sea, but then the Ukrainians started putting anti-aircraft missiles on the Maguras, and after that air interdiction of Russian special ops robot boats fell off.
From the morale point of view, Yalta in the present Russian mindset is something like the French Riviera and the Amalfi Coast combined; it is the be-all, end-all place to go and be seen when summer holidaying.
What was going on was a sea raid on something the Russians had inside Yalta port, possibly a ferry or some kind of minor ship. The attack took place in front of probably thousands of tourists whom authorities chased off the beaches, so the explosions in the port were witnessed from a better angle from the promenade above the seashore. But that was only part of the attack. HUR published video documenting the boat sailing back and forth off the tourist resort shore, pretty much at whatever speed and direction it chose, without much interference. All the tourist must-sees in Yalta, including the tacky faux Greek Galley/Restaurant, got a close-in visit by the drone before it finally went off to blow up whatever it was supposed to blow up.
If you’re not from Ukraine and Russia, then who cares. But if you know the region, what’s going on here is hugely embarrassing for Russia and Russian seashore defenses; it’s the equivalent of Xi Jinping sailing an explosives-packed robot cigarette boat back and forth past Mar El Lago while Trump was entertaining some of his business buddies, and the US Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard not even showing up to try and interfere with it.
Reform the AFU
As predicted, I think two reviews ago, General Oleksandr Syrsky’s assault regiments are probably going to be the losers in new Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapaty’s overhaul of the AFU and how it is run.
On Tuesday, Aug. 4, the news came out that Drapaty had instructed the military police/investigator’s office to investigate claims that in the 225th Assault Regiment, command had attempted to keep attacks moving by deploying machine gun detachments behind attacking troops with orders to fire on anyone who retreated.
The independent platform Texty.org.ua, two weeks ago, published testimonies of servicemen and their relatives about threats with weapons while leaving positions, illegal detention, and beatings in the 225th separate assault regiment. The regiment’s command denied that was the case and said that combat teams deployed behind attacking units were in place for road control and to inhibit Russian sabotage operations. The Texty report also said soldiers were beaten for refusing to attack and that a couple of sergeants found doing that by the 225th were quietly transferred out of the regiment to – wait for it – the military police.
On Friday, news came down the pike that the 425th Separate Assault Regiment got its reserve/replacement soldier pipeline shut down, and further, that the commander, Yuriy Harkavyi, is relieved from command pending the outcome of an investigation into his command style (soldiers have claimed brutality).
Also, this week a court overturned criminal proceedings against Oleksandr Shyrshyn, former battalion commander in the 47th Brigade, who got drummed out of his unit last year after criticizing Syrsky and his command style, and demanding top command treat his soldiers better. Syrsky got Shyrshyn yanked essentially for refusing orders.
A small extra item: Ukraine’s new defense minister, Yevhen Khmara, hired Ukraine’s best IT-corporate audit company to give potential army contractors the once-over. Sure, maybe this is just Zelensky and Drapaty trying to trick the West into handing over more money to finance their corrupt schemes. But there is a war on, and at face value this is what the AFU has been needing for a long time. Here’s the article with some more detail.
And finally, General Drapaty’s number two – Serhii Sobko – was appointed; he is another new generation/non-Soviet general with plenty of combat experience and, in his case, a lot of foreign service as well. The second-in-command of the AFU completed the US Army’s 9-month infantry officer’s course at Ft. Benning, among other schools.
So, all in all a week of indicators that army reform is being pushed by the new command group.
Last week it was a Russian arms tech executive, this week a general involved in Bucha
On Saturday (Aug. 1) someone bombed a ritzy Moscow restaurant, killing at least five and injuring dozens. The main target appears to have been Colonel General Alexander Chaiko, Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, who reportedly was celebrating both his birthday and his promotion to the highest possible rank in the Russian military unless you are Stalin. A woman reportedly delivered the bomb in a gift box; door guards stopped her, and the thing blew up. According to late reports, Chaiko’s daughter was severely injured with brain injuries, and her husband Danylo Peredrii was killed.
The Russian internet gratuitously recorded limbs blown off bodies. Russian Lieutenant General Igor Yerusalimov was a guest and reportedly killed. His funeral was said to be secret, and the Russian internet outed him. Apparently, he too had recently been promoted. However, this is now in doubt – a journalist who called Yerusalimov reported that he personally answered the phone, sounded confused, and told her not to write anything about him; official records don’t show him as dead, and his daughter hasn’t said anything about a death either.
Chaiko’s status by the end of the week wasn’t clear, with some reports saying he survived and others saying he was buried, same as the Yerusalimov situation.
A Friday report said that another general, Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk, was killed in an explosion at a Moscow restaurant, but it’s not clear if this was a new and different attack or more detail about the Saturday attack.
Chaiko is absolutely a logical target for Ukrainian state assassins, for two reasons. First, in February-March 2022, Chaiko commanded a Combined Arms Army that invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. His troops killed about 700 Ukrainian civilians in cold blood, some by just shooting them on the street and others by arresting them as possible sympathizers to the Ukrainian government and executing them in detention. He is wanted for prosecution.
Second, General Chaiko’s present job as commander of Russia’s bomber and missile forces means he is the man signing off on all missile, bomb, drone, and rocket strikes on Ukrainian homes and businesses; he is the Russian Curtis LeMay, the general who oversaw the US firebombing campaign against Japan. LeMay is famous for pointing out after the war: “I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal… Fortunately, we were on the winning side.”
Since Ukraine doesn’t consider itself on the losing side – not even close at this point – Ukrainian Mossad-style assassinations and arrests of Russians thought to have committed war crimes in Ukraine will probably continue for decades longer than most people reading this will live. The Ukrainians are going to be like the Israelis; when peace comes, they are not going to let the rest of the world sweep this under the rug.
Speaking of sweeping under the rug, the Russian media has covered the “terrorist” attack closely and made much of the civilian casualties. What we have not seen, in the Russian media, even independent media, is any mention of the math: a Russian general’s official salary runs roughly $1,300-2,500 per month (base rank + position + typical allowances/seniority; higher for elite posts or combat zones), with annual official totals often falling in the $20,000-40,000 range.
No Russian media except the rare independent outlet has really bothered to point out that a Russian general on that salary probably could not afford a 100-110-guest banquet dinner at one of Moscow’s highest-end restaurants, where a basic meal for one without drinks will probably set you back about $40, and if you’re living large, four or five times that.
If Chaiko’s wife (or adjutant, or supply officer, or Moscow-based lover, whoever it was that cut the deal) managed to haggle down the Balzi Rossi manager to $50/plate, then we’re looking at a birthday party that cost Chaiko – we know the banquet hall holds 120 people and reports are it was full up – something like $6,000 before drinks, minimum.
I hope no one will be offended if I observe that it is difficult to imagine a Russian general’s birthday party without plenty of strong drinks.
So one might ask (1) how credible is it that a humble Russian general might have three or four months of pay lying around, to blow on a one-night birthday party? And (2) how appropriate is it, really, for a Russian senior officer to step out like that, when frontline Russian soldiers sometimes eat birds (and supposedly dogs) and are forced to forage farm fields to supplement their diets, or loot civilian homes because Russian army logistics can’t supply them reliably with normal food?
Of course, one might speculate that General Chaiko’s career has not been squeaky-clean or corruption-free – and if that were the case, his otherwise peculiar spending power becomes more understandable. As a senior officer in the Aerospace Forces, by typical Russian army practice, Chaiko would be the logical senior officer to sign off on all manner of potentially chiselable projects: airfield construction, vehicle purchases, fuel supplies, spare parts sourcing, etc. Were he willing to be dishonest, the scope for corruption for a man in a position like that is basically bottomless.
However, since Russian state media deemed the bombing a terrorist act and the funding of Chaiko’s expensive birthday party not newsworthy, he’s probably just wounded, but not in trouble for filching taxpayer resources.
Managing Wildberries
Wildberries on Sunday, Aug. 2, banned the usage of smartphones in their warehouses on the grounds that those can take pictures of the site and nearby air defense. Only phones without cameras will be allowed from now on at their facilities. This is so people can’t see their warehouses burning.
Also on Friday, July 31, Tatiana Kim, the extremely well-connected CEO of the Russian “Amazon-similar” company Wildberries, published a video telling sellers storing product at her warehouses (for a fee, obviously) that the company has the Ukrainian drone situation under control and that business will continue normally.
The Russian internet has been its characteristic ironic, snide snarky (but never empathetic) self and pointed out that perhaps Ms. Kim is telling the truth, and perhaps she is allowing sales to continue in order to keep funding the company, and using Ukrainian drone strikes as a justification not to pay the goods’ owners (unlike Amazon, Wildberries doesn’t own a lot of the stock it stores and ships, it depends on sellers large and small to buy the goods and pay for its storage and shipment), as has not been the case pretty much every time a WB warehouse has been torched. The thinking is that when money runs out for (other peoples’) goods sold and shipped, WB will close up shop and the sellers will just be screwed.
Forbes reported on Monday, Aug. 3, that Wildberries’ losses, thanks to Ukrainian strikes, was $3.5 billion; this is almost DOUBLE the estimate last week.
But sure, Russia is winning, and Ukraine is losing.
Russian oil and gas is still being hit and lots of other stuff
Here are some details about the Yaroslavl oil refinery strike this week. This is a facility that’s been hit at least six times this year. According to reports, it is Russia’s fifth largest.
According to industry reports, Russian petroleum products production is down 40% (!) from pre-war volumes – this, thanks to the Ukrainians.
Early Thursday morning strike packages flown by operators of the 1st Center, the 413th Regiment “Raid” and the 412th Nemesis Brigade hit the refinery again. As is traditional and already long-established AFU standard operating procedure (SOP), Ukraine’s sneaky-deaky agencies – the Special Operations Forces (SSO), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and HUR had overall command and management responsibility for the operation.
Reports are that three flights of at least 10 aircraft each approached the plant, six visible hits were scored, and fires were substantial and solidly recorded by the local civilian population notwithstanding Russian law banning that sort of social media content.
In one case, at least a smoke plume next to a cracking tower was observed. The next day, the trade news agencies reported the plant will probably be offline until fall. That was one strike on one plant. Here’s the whole week. If you multiply the Yarsolavl raid times the entire list, you will start to get a sense of the scale of the long-range air bombardment Ukraine is inflicting on Russia.
Which, the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Major Robert Brovdi, pointed out this week, is less than 5% of ALL Ukrainian drone operations at any given point in time. One thing the world is missing is the size of the Ukrainian air effort and its complexity, and the sophistication with which the Ukrainians are carrying out the attacks.
The Ukrainians have been at this pace since mid-June, and they don’t seem to be slowing down.
In Russia/Russia-controlled Ukraine
- Sellers pushing product through the WB competitor Ozon are complaining that, as of Tuesday, the company is refusing to ship goods to Crimea because means to do so don’t exist. This is a pretty good market indicator of the effectiveness of the middle-strike campaign, no matter what the official line is in Moscow or Simferopol.
- Officially, the Russian government sold on international markets 44 tons of gold, of which 9 tons were sold in July. This is not the behavior of a state with confidence in the stability of its currency, or in its ability to export marketable goods.
- I am now seeing reports that thanks to drone strikes against both refining and storage, Russian petroleum products production nationwide is down about 40% from pre-war. Not confirmed.
- The longest blackouts in Crimea are now near the three-week mark; officials are refusing to say when supplies might be back to normal, and on Sunday they declared even setting up a reliable planned blackout schedule – trust me, this is critical to keep taxpayers from getting irate if you can’t deliver electricity 24/7 – is impossible.
- In the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR), authorities created a new office/division inside the Donetsk university responsible for “Extremism Prevention.” This is tightened police control on youth, which, local news platforms said, is a forerunner to intensified draft for the armed forces.
This was prior to the boat run by Yalta. In a village near Sevastopol, a Russian soldier opened fire on a group of people in the street, killing one fellow Russian soldier and three civilians, and wounding another soldier and three civilians. The civilians killed were two men aged 71 and 59 and a 64-year-old woman. Reports are that the soldier was unhappy in the service.
Reprinted from Kyiv Post’s Special Military Correspondent Stefan Korshak’s blog. You can read his blog here.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.