On Sunday I crossed the Polish border at Przemyśl to board a train for Kyiv.
I stood two and a half hours in line before embarkation. Many waited up to four. The train left 90 minutes late because only three border guards checked the documents of some 500–600 travelers – and they opened late.
The passengers, mostly Ukrainians, stood exposed to the weather, sharing two mobile toilets meant for public events. At one point, there was real distress and unrest as people feared they would not reach the train in time.
Ukrainian railways do not leave their citizens behind. Hence the delay.
The process is a disgrace, and an example of how many Poles relate to Ukrainians. Their well-being is not a priority. Four and a half years into the war, with no end on the horizon, temporary solutions are no longer acceptable. Nor is xenophobia.
I do not understand Poland – and I am not sure it does either.
Perhaps “strategically ambivalent” is the better description. It wants to be European, yet fiercely sovereign from Brussels. It is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters, yet increasingly willing to challenge Kyiv over trade, history, and refugees.
It acknowledges that Ukraine is protecting Poland yet is willing to undermine its economy and make its EU and NATO membership politically conditional.
It is arguably America’s strongest European ally, while building European defense capabilities as Washington becomes unreliable.
It elects a pro-European Prime Minister, then turns around and elects an anti-EU president.
It wants Germany stronger against Russia, while wary of German dominance.
It wants to lead the region yet quarrels with the very partners it needs. It is restrictive on migration while heavily dependent on Ukrainian labor.
It is also divided against itself: east, rural, older, more Catholic and right-leaning against west, urban, younger, more secular, and liberal – each convinced it is the real Poland.
These contradictions are more than opportunism. Poland is trying to escape dependence on any major power—Russia, Germany, France, Brussels, or even the US. It wants the security that comes from alliances and integration while keeping the freedom of action of full sovereignty. For a medium-sized power, those ambitions collide.
They also breed nationalism and xenophobia. Polish society is becoming more polarized over Ukraine, and anti-Ukrainian hostility has genuinely increased. Polish police recorded 180 suspected hate crimes against Ukrainians in the first half of 2026, about 30% more than in the same period of 2025. And yet –the contradiction again – Poles march against the very hostility their politics feeds.
Having many Polish friends and welcoming Polish leadership, I am genuinely distressed by what I see and experience. Anti-Ukrainian hostility reflects badly on Poland while most of Europe looks to Ukraine with admiration and respect.
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