Mykhailo Fedorov calls himself a visionary and constantly talks about strategies, missions, and visions of the future, but without concrete action, these words neither heal nor create added value.
Back in the era of open press conferences, Volodymyr Zelensky once said that everything was moving so fast that he had no time for strategy. And through his actions, he has been proving this for two Julys in a row.
The political crisis is obvious, and unless a compromise is sought, all sides will move towards escalation. Both have substantial resources that are largely unavailable to their competitors.
It is enough to consider that Fedorov is a genuine insider in the Zelensky team and therefore knows everything about its mistakes and abuses, and that, politically, he must also share responsibility for them.
His connections with Elon Musk, his strong understanding of political technologies, his willingness to invest substantial resources in his campaigns – which is rational for part of the defense sector and beyond – active support on the streets, and the presence of an informal team that at first glance may be larger than the president’s own. After all, the presidential ranks have thinned considerably, while officials and bureaucrats either leave or immediately begin to obstruct once the leader loses political weight.
By contrast, Zelensky has enormous resources at his disposal through the state’s law-enforcement and security apparatus, as well as substantial financial resources, a legitimate level of public support (though it comes with some caveats).
He has approval ratings that are still higher than his own figures in January-February 2022, global name recognition, and political capital built during the first years after the full-scale invasion, as well as the absolute loyalty of parliament and the government.
And, of course, there is the Kryvyi Rih character. Those who know what that means will understand.
Both have plenty of vulnerabilities. But neither of them has done anything substantive to prepare the security system for the most difficult and most important elections in Ukraine’s history.
I will not once again describe the work of the Verkhovna Rada working group on preparing legislation for such post-war elections, without which there is no chance of moving forward with rebuilding the necessary infrastructure.
It is 65% ready, but the group stalled when the EU negotiation process halted in April. When we invited at least the deputies of Fedorov from the Ministry of Defense to engage in dialogue on the electoral rights of servicemen and women, we received a silent refusal, as this was not a priority.
Yet without the Ministry of Defense, it is impossible to create special polling stations or ensure effective mechanisms for exercising active and passive voting rights, and the political level simply ignores this issue.
Around 50% of citizens do not live at their registered address (29% in Ukraine and 20% abroad), and the State Voter Register urgently needs a creative approach to data verification, mobilizing citizens to actively register, check their records, and update their electoral addresses. Here, the Ministry of Digital Transformation should have played an important role in public awareness, as voters see it as a key instrument. But this was not a priority either.
In Kyiv, we have one shelter built over five years of civil protection efforts. So we have a chance of holding voting in basements – or in Diia (which, as of now, would mean under the President’s full control).
Do we want to vote in a way that makes people afraid to come to a polling station, or in a way that allows the state to know the content of a secret ballot? Probably not.
And let me remind you once again that elections are about political competition and a huge number of organizational measures, not simply voting day. Voting day is irrelevant if all the other stages were non-competitive, votes were bought and sold, communication and campaigning were restricted by resources, and Russians were playing with our minds through cognitive warfare and an unprotected information environment.
I have hundreds of scenarios and actions that Russia could use to delegitimize an electoral process once it has begun, or completely derail it during the campaign or on election day. And that would mean collapse and ruin.
I agree with Fedorov that Russia should not determine when we hold elections, because if it could, elections would have taken place long ago. One can look back at statements, various points of peace plans, and the Minsk protocols, because all of this has happened before.
But I am firmly against elections being held for the sake of political interests, without regard for the actual state of the infrastructure, risk analysis, and proper preparation.
The first missed elections were the Verkhovna Rada elections. And the first post-war elections should also be for the legislature, so that we can exit the war calmly, ensure a smooth transition of power, create a competitive environment primarily for the governing institution of peacetime, and form a government based on programs of action rather than rearranging chairs in offices and devaluing competent and effective bureaucrats as such.
What needs to be done technically
A special law + five other legislative acts that need to be amended or adjusted (the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offenses, the Law “On the State Voter Register”, the Law “On the Central Election Commission”, a special law on the impossibility of holding elections in certain territories, etc.);
Updating the State Voter Register, active voter registration, and allowing sufficient time for information and voter-education activities;
A complete review of the mandate of law-enforcement agencies regarding the prevention, response to, and investigation of factors that could become dangerous and scalable through Russian funding and our own stupidity: terrorist threats, political violence, cyber threats, cryptocurrency in elections, etc.;
Geopolitical work to organize elections in the overseas electoral district, which requires significant investment and diplomatic efforts;
A plan for the transition of power from a military to a civilian governance system, etc;
Resources – and a great deal of resources – as well as preparation of people for the process of co-organizing the elections.
Strategically, we also need an effective Constitutional Court of Ukraine, because this is on the edge, and there is a great deal of personnel work to be done here as well.
Every issue concerning the constitutionality of decisions affecting constitutional rights must have a chance to be assessed and decided through this mechanism.
But who needs all this? It is much easier to remember elections when the President’s approval rating has risen, or when someone sees no other way out of the situation.
Elections during wartime would not be fully democratic, and we would pay a high price for that.
Yet both President Zelensky and former Minister Fedorov are thinking about elections precisely during wartime.
There is something they do have in common.