Anti-drone nets have appeared over roads leading toward Chornobyl in the Kyiv Oblast as Ukraine reinforces an area used by Russian troops during the opening stage of the full-scale invasion, according to a report published Wednesday, Sept. 9.
The barriers were documented by Ukrainian outlet Telegraf, which said they formed broader defensive preparations near Ukraine’s border with Belarus.
Similar structures have been previously used along roads in frontline regions to protect military vehicles, civilian transport, and pedestrians from Russian first-person-view (FPV) drones.
The nets are stretched between tall metal poles, creating covered sections for those on the road. An approaching drone can become entangled in the barrier or detonate before reaching its intended target.
They can be effective against both kamikaze drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) carrying explosives intended to be dropped from above. Nets can also obstruct reconnaissance drones used to identify targets and adjust artillery fire along logistics routes.
The report did not identify which Ukrainian authority was installing the barriers or disclose their precise locations.
Why Chornobyl?
The Chornobyl Exclusion Zone lies close to Ukraine’s border with Belarus, where Russian forces entered northern Ukraine in February 2022.
Russian troops occupied parts of the zone, seized the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, and used the surrounding territory during their unsuccessful advance toward Kyiv. They withdrew from northern Ukraine weeks later.
Telegraf, citing German newspaper Der Spiegel, reported that Ukraine had also established checkpoints, dug trenches, and defensive pits, along with constructed fortified positions across parts of the exclusion zone.
The reinforcements come amid Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russia’s political leadership instructed its military to prepare several possible plans for operations toward Kyiv and Chernihiv.
As Kyiv Post previously reported, Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Pavlo Palisa said the information had been verified through several intelligence sources.
However, Palisa stressed that the existence of contingency plans did not mean that another offensive was imminent. Ukraine had not observed Russia forming the strike force necessary to attack Kyiv or Chernihiv, he said.
Palisa added that the Ukrainian General Staff had already prepared defensive and counteraction plans.
Similarly, in August, Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR) Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitsky said that there were no current signs Russia had assembled the forces required for another northern offensive.
“Theoretically, yes, but in practice there are no conditions or indicators showing that they are ready for this operation,” Skibitsky said.
He warned, however, that Russia could potentially form a new strike group by February 2027 if the Kremlin launched another mobilization campaign following its parliamentary elections.
Nets cannot stop Shahed drones
The road barriers are intended primarily to counter relatively small FPV drones flying at low altitudes. They would not provide meaningful protection against larger Shahed-type attack drones carrying heavier warheads.
Russian drones have repeatedly flown close to the Belarusian border and the Chornobyl nature reserve while approaching Kyiv and other targets in northern Ukraine.
Some FPV drones are controlled using conventional radio signals or mobile networks, which can potentially be disrupted by electronic warfare. Russia has also expanded its use of fiber-optic drones, which remain connected to their operators by a cable and cannot be disabled through conventional signal jamming.
Therefore, physical barriers such as nets provide an additional layer of protection, particularly along roads and logistics routes where electronic warfare alone may be insufficient.