You're reading: German expert Andreas Umland: Germany’s Russia-first policy ‘turned out to be a dismal failure’

Editor’s Note: Olena Tregub, a freelance contributor to the Kyiv Post, conducted a series of interviews with German experts on Ukraine. The following is one of them.

Andreas Umland is DAAD Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,” and editor of the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society."

Kyiv Post: How would you assess the results of President Viktor Yanukovych’s first year of presidency in comparison to those of the previous Orange Revolution leadership of ex-President Viktor Yushchenko and ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko?

Andreas Umland: Overall picture is bleak – and perhaps even worse than a year ago. The previous Orange leadership largely adhered to democratic standards, but damaged Ukraine’s development and image by its constant infighting. The current one has done away with structured political conflict by way of simply curbing democratic institutions. The creation of the Azarov government in spring 2010 was only possible by a de facto revision of the 2007 parliamentary elections results, i.e. through defection of numerous MPs, who had been elected on the Orange ticket, to the Party of Regions.

KP: Should the EU use the association agreement, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and visa-free regime negotiations as a leverage and conditionality factor to promote political and other reforms in Ukraine, or should these agreements be signed as soon as possible?

AU:Clearly, if concluding these contracts between Ukraine and the EU stabilizes or even strengthens the current semi-authoritarian regime, it would be detrimental to the core interests of the Union (and of Ukraine) to have them unconditionally signed. In this scenario, the EU should use the leverage it currently has in order to limit authoritarian tendencies, and make further EU-Ukraine rapprochement conditional upon democratic improvements. If, however, one believes that an implementation of these agreements’ provisions would by itself promote a re-democratization of the Ukrainian political system, then, obviously, the respective treaties should be signed and ratified as soon as possible.

KP:Could and should the current pro-Russian German position be replaced by a pro-Ukrainian position? To which degree may domestic political changes in Germany play a role for its future Eastern policy positions?

AU:Germany’s pro-Russian policies over the last 20 years were understandable, but eventually turned out to be a dismal failure. The German government has, over the last years, all too often provided international legitimacy for a regime which, in democratic terms, is fundamentally illegitimate. In as far as Russia has been recently more and more engaging in supporting authoritarian tendencies in the former Soviet republics (for instance, via CIS election monitoring missions), Germany’s support for the current Kremlin leadership looks increasingly dubious.

Berlin’s best option to support Russian re-democratization is to focus on Kyiv. A successful return of Ukraine to its democratic foundations of 1991 and 2004 would make an impression on the Russian elite, and could trigger a rethinking, among the intellectual and political leaders of Russia, of the path that the country has taken during the last decade.

There is a chance that Germany’s Eastern Europe policies could somewhat change, in the future. That will happen, if the German Foreign (or Chancellor’s) Office comes under the control of the currently rising German Green Party, after the next Bundestag elections. Over the last years, the Green Party has, under the influence of such experts as Marie-Luise Beck, Viola von Cramon, Werner Schulz or Ralf Fuecks, developed a relatively sharp foreign policy profile concerning Eastern Europe.

KP:Do you have any specific advice for the Ukrainian government to change Ukraine’s image in Germany for the better, and improve Ukraine’s attractiveness for German investors?

AU: There is a common misperception that the German economy has been relatively successful largely because of such big companies as Siemens, Daimler-Chrysler, Allianz, Deutsche Bank etc. The backbone of the German economy are approx. 3.6 million small- and medium-sized enterprises. This is where most of the innovation and dynamism of the German economy comes from. Ukrainian government, law-makers and economists should think hard about how to make Ukraine’s economy attractive to these partners in Germany. Potentially, there could be tens of thousands of such small German traders or investors that could help Ukraine to fundamentally reshape its economy, on the ground, and help creating new work places. The demands of these smaller potential partners of Ukraine are somewhat different from those of the big companies. What they need in order to be attracted to Ukraine is, of course, well-known.

Ukraine should work far more intensively in the field of tourism. The country has attractive tourist sites in the Carpathians and on the Black Sea. In terms of political image, Yanukovych should be careful not to slip in the category of such post-Soviet leaders as Lukashenko, Putin or Aliev.

KP:Did the decision of Viktor Yanukovych to prosecute the former president Leonid Kuchma for the 2000 murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze add credibility to the current government and improve its image in the West? What are your expectations about how this case should be resolved?

AU: While the persecution of Leonid Kuchma has obviously political reasons, his eventual trial could indeed somewhat improve the credibility of the current Ukrainian government and legal system.

6. Do you think Ukraine will ever enter the EU, and, if so, under which conditions and when approximately?

AU: The question is: When? Depending on developments in both Ukraine and the EU, the time frame for an eventual accession is probably somewhere between 15 and 30 years. In a best-case scenario, one could imagine a candidate status for Ukraine already in 10-12 years. However, that would demand considerable adjustments of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policies. Currently, I do not see the reforms necessary for such a re-direction happening. There is – like in the past years – lots of idle talk and superficial activism. But so far little substantial improvement has happened or is foreseeable.

Olena Tregub is a freelance journalist who regularly contributes to the Kyiv Post.