'Soldiers don't fight standing still'
rated war veteran. Born in Russia in 1960, he was educated in Kyiv before entering the military at the age of 18. Tours of duty included Kaliningrad oblast, the Russian Far East, and Afghanistan from May 1985 to June 1987.
After returning to Ukraine in 1993, Polyakov worked for Ukraine’s General Staff of Armed Forces for five years and at the Analytical Service of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council.
Following the death of the council’s deputy secretary, Oleksandr Razumkov, in 1999, Polyakov retired from the military to work full‑time at the Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS), where he recently co‑authored a report on Ukraine’s military relations with NATO in the context of European security, which appeared in the center’s prestigious National Security & Defense journal.
Q. How would you assess the morale of soldiers serving in Ukraine’s armed forces?
A. It’s still a time of transition, and Ukraine has not yet reached the point where it has a combat‑capable national military force ready to accomplish its tasks.
It’s hard for officers who know that the state has difficultly fulfilling its obligations – providing housing, benefits, salary – and they worry about finding a decent job after retirement.
For enlisted soldiers the case is somewhat different. Yes, they are relatively well‑fed. But you should keep in mind that only 10 percent of all young men eligible to be drafted actually serve.
Many draftees are uncomfortable when they think about their friends who are out looking for a job and carousing, while they are performing their universal duty, which, in essence, is not that universal.
Here there is another important point. If soldiers were busy training for combat, they would be thinking less about non‑military activities, which are bad for morale.
Q. Are Ukrainian military traditions still alive today?
A. It’s difficult to tell, but I tend to think they live on. Not much time has passed since the time when almost every man saw military duty. Before that, either his father or grandfather fought in some kind of war. That explains the psychology of [Ukrainian] males, who are viewed by society as armed defenders of the country. This also explains why institutions like the military and church are much more respected than other state institutions.
With the exception of about 11,000 Ukrainian peacekeepers, Ukrainian soldiers have not been in any war. It could be that military traditions are dying off, and it is a question worth pondering.
Q. The sociological survey results presented in your recent report indicate that almost 46 percent of Ukrainians perceive NATO as an aggressive bloc. Why?
A. Let me say first that this has not always been the case. Surveys conducted over the years have produced different data. For most of the 1990s, right up until NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, 20‑30 percent of those surveyed questioned NATO’s aims. Taking into account the pervasive influence of Russian media in Ukraine, such a result could be predicted. It’s still far lower than the 56 pecent of Russians who still distrust NATO.
Ukrainians’ opinion of the alliance underwent a sea‑change last year. Evidently, the average Ukrainian was not entirely convinced that the main purpose of NATO’s involvement in Kosovo was to defend Kosovars, rather than to punish “disobedient” Serbs.
When NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson traveled to Kyiv several months ago, he was concerned about this indicator [of public sentiment].
Q. Why does half the population think NATO has a hidden agenda, and what might change their opinion?
A. Our survey also indicates that people who receive objective information about NATO are far less distrustful of its intentions. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not have its version of Zycie Warshawy, Neue Deutsche Zeitung, Time magazine, or the like.
I asked NATOspokesman Jami Shea if it wouldn’t be a good idea to increase tenfold the amount of information circulated by NATO’s information and documentation center in Kyiv about the alliance and its activities. This could be accomplished simply and inexpensively by translating more materials into Ukrainian and making them available to Ukrainian media.
Q. Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksandr Kuzmuk recently reacted negatively to a certain “Madam’s” recent criticism of the slow pace of reform in Ukraine’s military. How does Ukraine’s political and military elite view the alliance?
A. Of course, politicians and their appointees represent the interests of the people they serve. Following the interchange to which you referred, Kuzmuk traveled to Brussels and reaffirmed Ukraine’s desire to press on and deepen its relations with NATO.
Q. How would you evaluate the military preparedness of the Ukrainian armed forces?
A. Limited. Take the air force, for example. Pilots fly very seldom and rarely participate in joint maneuvers with ground forces. Consequently, as an integrated force, overall military preparedness is low. There is not enough money to buy the amount of fuel that branches of the military require to train. Target practice from a tank standing still does little to prepare soldiers for real combat. As you know, soldiers don’t fight standing still.
That’s one side of the picture. Through its participation in joint maneuvers and peacekeeping operations, thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have become increasingly adept at tackling concrete tactical missions.
Q. If we assume that the amount of money spent on the military will decrease and not increase over the next several years, can we expect overall military preparedness to improve?
A. The quantity of hryvnas will no doubt increase in absolute terms. According to Ministry of Defense estimates, the minimum requirements of Ukraine’s armed forces are Hr 4.6 billion, almost twice as much as the Hr 2.4 billion budget actually approved. So the government finances only 52 percent [of the minimum amount actually needed].
The shortfall, about Hr. 900 million, is compensated through quasi‑commercial operations, such as air transportation services, medical care, other services, etc. In that light, what kind of military preparedness can we talk about?
Q. Is it a good policy for military officers to be engaged in commercial activities?
A. Not necessarily. It would be better to reform the military and attract civilians for dealing with commercial activities, financial, and logistical administration issues. The job of officers in the military is to defend their country, teach soldiers how to fight, and lead them into battle. To accomplish this, high moral standards are necessary.
Q. Are there plans to switch to a professional Ukrainian armed forces?
A. Plans are on the drawing board to limit time in service for draftees to one year by 2005 and increase to 30 percent the number of soldiers, who serve on a contract basis. But this issue is a political one. Because if Ukraine is to remain a neutral country, then switching to a fully professional (non‑volunteer) military will be a very costly endeavor.
Q. What are the major positive and negative developments for Ukraine’s armed forces over the past five years?
A. Proclaiming [under law] civilian control over military affairs, broadening the participation of Ukrainian servicemen in peacekeeping operations, improving the system for military education, and preserving the military’s medical system are all pluses.
Of course there have been many negative developments as well. If qualitative improvements are not made in the years ahead, Ukraine’s military forces will further degrade. I think if the government remains in one piece and continues to pay its bills, the situation will remain stable and could improve somewhat. But that depends on the economic and political situation.
