Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych
probably has followed this script when he released from jail one of a score of
political prisoners, former minister of interior Yuriy Lutsenko, and made a
gesture of sorts to Georgy Filipchuk, another victim of persecution of Yulia
Tymoshenko’s associates.
But the squeeze on democratic freedoms in Ukraine under the Yanukovych regime is
continuing, with more chicanery under way against freedom of speech, and
with plans for systemic changes that would make presidential elections a farce,
as it was in the Soviet Union.
Although the opposition in the parliament
can block some of the government’s outrageous moves, the ruling Party of
Regions with the help of its Communist allies is able to approve legislation to
its liking in separately held parliamentary sessions.
If presidential elections are held at all
in 2015 under the existing constitution, or under any other arrangements made
by the ruling party, the official vote count will predictably make Viktor Yanukovych
the winner.
Although recent polls (the Democratic
Initiatives/KMIS) show Vitali Klitchko leading with 39 percent against Viktor
Yanukovych’s 26 percent in a runoff election, the uncommitted 35 percent can do
miracles when the current election commission is in charge.
If the president gets only half of the undecided,
he would be losing by 13 percent.
To win by 1 percent, Yanukovych would have
to get 25 out of 35 uncommitted voters. This may seem to be a problem, even if
the election machinery is as perversely efficient as it was in last October’s
parliamentary elections.
However, a disappearance of the president’s apparent 15 percent deficit could be aided by
an unpredictable disenchantment of the electorate with Vitali Klitschko between
now and then.
Improbable? What if Klitschko’s projected
lead doesn’t actually exist to begin with? Is it a coincidence that polls also
show an over 50 percent lack of political support for the former prime minister
Yulia Tymoshenko? Isn’t it roughly the same “over 50 percent” that elected
Yanukovych in 2010?
And
— here is the rub — wouldn’t Klitschko have to peel off some numbers from the same over 50 percent in
order to overcome Viktor Yanukovych in a runoff election? Even if he does, the
latter will still win, although it will be with the usual fraudulent techniques
– unless he is stopped in the streets.
Klitschko had barely scratched the surface
of the Regions Party’s core support in parliamentary elections last October,
although he had counted on some hits. His Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms party winnings came almost entirely
at the expense of other opposition parties. Remarkably, UDAR was practically wiped
out in single-mandate districts. Its showing was stronger in preliminary polls
than in actual elections.
It could be that at some point Klitschko will turn out to be sharper and more effective orator, create a
stronger image, and tell a better story than Tymoshenko could.
But Yanukovych surely has his own
preference as to which one of the two he would rather face in an election. The
answer as of now is fairly obvious. This Viktor is sensitive to what he sees as
the main threat to his hold on power. He would keep Tymoshenko in jail, off the center
stage, even at the cost of freezing the relations with the European Union.
If Klitschko were a greater danger than Tymoshenko
to Yanukovych’s re-election bid, why
would he not release Yulia Tymoshenko to stir up some friction between the two
potential opposition rivals?
Many Ukraine’s voters tend to have short
memories and poor judgment. Confusion and random impulses proved to be a big
part of decision 2010.
Voters showed little patience with the 2009
economic downturn that was part of a worldwide recession, and too many had
misjudged the motivation and personalities of the two candidates for president
in the 2010 runoff elections, despite evidence galore.
Values taken seriously in the European
Union’s mainstream get only marginal respect in Ukraine. For the average voter, sensibly
rating a politician is beyond his ability when grading criteria are nebulous.
Perhaps it will dawn on better minds in the
next generation — if such will exist
within the Ukrainian coloratura – that the likes of Tymoshenko do not
often appear in a nation’s history. Judging
by what she has already done for Ukraine and how she has behaved in this
debauched era, gives her a special place
— even if a large mass of “the uncles of a foreign land” (in Taras
Shevchenko’s words) that lost its Ukrainian outlook some time ago does not trust her.
When the opposition is calling, in one
voice, on the people to rise against the regime and is getting less than an
overwhelming response, the landscape is indicative of a state of “zastoika”
(stagnation).
Historically in Ukraine,
as in Russia,
stagnation has been a geopolitical constant over
long time periods. Banking on presidential
elections in 2015 is somewhat like relying on a Plan B when exhortation to
“rise up” runs into a cul-de-sac.
No one can predict whether Plan B will not
lead to another mousetrap. The last three years showed that the Yanukovych
regime has been highly energetic, self-confident, and resourceful in the
pursuit of its repressive agenda.
One can wonder whether the people — yes, the people — are able to comprehend at some point that they are being rolled and chained
again, and whether or not they are able to break the chains as called upon in Taras Shevchenko’s
Testament. Opposition activists alone,
no matter how capable and dedicated, cannot always pull rabbits out of a bag.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
