In recent weeks I’ve been preoccupied with the democratic and peaceful revolution in Belarus, and the brutal repression that has been applied against it by the Alexander Lukashenko junta. But, of course, I’ve also been following the continuing war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
And I have good reason to remain interested in, and concerned about, this long-standing conflict in the Southern Caucasus region.
When I worked for the United Nations, I not only visited Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1989 as a special advisor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, but in 2003, after three years as her Representative in Belarus, was transferred to Baku. I spent almost two years there.
Before that, as her senior policy adviser on former Soviet republics, Ogata had employed me as UNHCR’s liaison officer with the Minsk Conference process.
Long before the Minsk-based peace negotiations concerning the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbas were launched in 2014-15, an international effort with a similar-sounding name was made to end the conflict between post-Soviet independent Armenia and Azerbaijan over a disputed Armenian-dominated enclave.
Josef Stalin, employing divide-and-conquer tactics, had established this mountainous area of Nagorno-Karabakh as a de facto Armenian unit within Soviet Azerbaijan. As the USSR began to dissolve, against the background of tensions and mutual ethnic cleansing by both Azerbaijan and Armenia of one another’s ethnic populations, Nagorno-Karabakh sought to unite with the Soviet Armenian state.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, war between Armenia and Azerbaijan followed. With Russia’s military help, Armenia was able to prop up the Nagorno-Karabakh “republic.” The fighting lasted until 1994 when a ceasefire was reached freezing the conflict in Armenia’s favor.
Apart from securing Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan effectively seized some 17% of Azerbaijan’s territory and insisted on keeping it as a buffer zone.
Of course, Baku, has never reconciled itself to this. There have been no peace settlements and the conflict has simmered on. Buoyed by new oil revenues, and confident of Turkey’s backing, Azerbaijan has modernized and strengthened its armed forces until it was ready to regain by force what diplomacy, with Russia continuing to hamper progress, had blocked.
For me, as a British Ukrainian, and former UN official committed to international legal norms, this issue should not be about emotions and biases, but about principles and standards.
I have no illusions about the nature of the authoritarian political system in Azerbaijan.
In my UNHCR role, I met both Heidar Aliev, the Soviet high-flyer in Moscow, and KGB chief in Azerbaijan, who took control of Azerbaijan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and his errant son Ilham. The son was brought in by the ruling clans (he had been living in Turkey and had earned the reputation of an apolitical, hedonistic, gambler in the local casinos) to fill his father’s shoes after his death in December 2003.
When I was based in Baku in 2003-04, Azerbaijan was nowhere near a democracy. Dissent was barely tolerated and activists, let alone protesters on the streets, were treated brutally. But because of the country’s strategic importance geopolitically, and especially the oil factor – reserves in the Caspian had been developed largely by Western concerns and was about to flow in around 2004 and make the Azerbaijani state rich and even more important – Western states, it seems, preferred to overlook this significant blemish.
Having worked for the United Nations both in Belarus, where Lukashenko had applied similar tactics against his democratic opponents, and Azerbaijan, I was acutely aware of the double standards that were applied. The Belarusian dictator was an easy target and was more frequently castigated and ostracized by the West. It had less to lose.
But Ilham Aliev, seemingly because of the oil factor, was seldom reproached for Azerbaijan’s dismal record with respect to political freedom and treatment of political opponents.
Nevertheless, today, my sympathies are with Azerbaijan. I’m aware that it is closely allied with Turkey and currently is relying on all sorts of support from Ankara.
But, likewise, Armenia has for so long been dependent on Russia’s backing. Had it not been for Moscow’s support it could not have captured and held on to Azerbaijani territory for so long.
As a result of this dependence, Armenia has acted as Russia’s loyal ally. Yerevan has consistently backed Moscow in voting in the UN dealing with Russia’s annexation of Crimea or military aggression in the Donbas. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has supported Ukraine.
Armenia, given its large diaspora, particularly in the US, seems to be receiving more sympathetic coverage. Its alliance with Russia is downplayed, while Azerbaijan’s partnership with Turkey is usually highlighted.
At the end of the day, we are dealing with parallel situations for Kyiv and Baku. Russia has seized and occupied parts of Ukrainian territory, and Kyiv wants them returned. Armenia, with Russia’s help, military, diplomatic and economic, has done the same with respect to Azerbaijani territory.
In short, Ukraine and Azerbaijan have a common interest in restoring and safeguarding the territorial integrity of their countries. And in both cases Russia is the direct, or indirect, culprit and spoiler.
War is horrible and should be avoided. But in this case, Armenia should finally do the honorable and legally correct thing: give back to Azerbaijan the territories it seized with Russian help and has held as a buffer zone.
I know the human cost, because as UNHCR’s Representative in Baku in 2003-2004 and saw the 600,000 plus (Baku claims one million) Azeris displaced by Armenia as a result.
I was also in Yerevan and saw the 300,000 or so Armenians displaced by the Azeris. Ethnic cleansing is ugly and a crime. But so is seizing the territory of a neighboring state and holding on to it, in this case, with Moscow’s support.
Return occupied Azerbaijani territory, discuss a mutually acceptable status for the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and conclude an internationally brokered peace settlement. Allow the internally displaced people to return home if that is still their wish. That was, and remains, the only proper solution.
