Winter has supposedly ended in Ukraine and spring arrived. But last week the country experienced an unexpected freeze of the political kind. Some are even warning that the thaw is over and we are returning to an ice age.

Instead of an exercise in political spring cleaning, what occurred was not even a do-over but a virtual gutting by President Volodymyr Zelensky of the top echelons of government and the general prosecutor’s office.

Ukraine’s youngest government, which had been associated with the hopes for fundamental change generated by the Ukrainian leader himself, was unceremoniously dismissed within the space of a few hours and thereby earned the dubious distinction of also being the most short-lived one.

The officials whom Zelensky removed so abruptly were not opponents or discredited colleagues, but the very kindred political souls he himself had handpicked for the task.

A case of “Beware the Ides of March,” or of the recent popular revolution via the ballot box devouring its children? And in the name of what?

Few have been convinced that the new ministers brought in so far into the government are more credible and will ensure improved performance.

So what’s going on and what does this latest unpleasant upset in Ukrainian political life signify?

A loud hiccup stemming from impulsiveness and lack of experience, or a moment of crisis reflecting something more worrying and marking a turning point?

Certainly, the domestic media are flooded with speculation that the oligarchs, and particularly Ihor Kolomoisky, are once again calling the shots, and Ukraine’s foreign friends and creditors are in a cold sweat.

Reformers and investors also bracing for the worse.

As we wait for the dust to settle, Zelensky would have us believe that he was dissatisfied with the results and the pace of change and intervened in the parliament through his majority Servant of the People Party to improve matters. To deliver a kick-start! Perhaps? But what CEO sacks two-thirds of his entrusted senior team when they have hardly started the job assigned to them, let alone overcome the bureaucratic and political obstacles they inherited?

Clearer guidance and reinforcement were called for, not a self-defeating public expression of no-confidence in the country’s senior management. If the sacked ministers and general prosecutor were indeed “underperforming,” who is to blame if not the president who appointed them? Why did Zelensky not lead by example, as he says he likes to do, swallow his pride and in a sensible candid way make an attempt at damage management. But this would require acknowledging that despite his avowed good intentions, he himself has so far botched things, but perhaps drawn the necessary lessons.

Zelensky has plenty to reflect on.

Indeed, although it is difficult to know with any certainty what is actually going on behind the scenes, it is clear that he faces a crisis on several levels and a moment of reckoning may well have arrived. The president-elect’s apparent naivete last year and dizziness with success resulted in the perpetuation of vagueness, reliance on a small group of trusted but also politically inexperienced and seemingly inept advisors turned gatekeepers, and the lack of a clear program and experienced professional team.

Moreover, the shortsighted disinterest in forming working arrangements with other acceptable political parties and the attempted transformation of the parliament into a would-be rubber-stamping vehicle operating in a turbo regime have backfired. Zelensky has politically isolated himself and his majority Servant of the People party is itself in trouble.

In the parliament it has become increasingly unwieldy, prone to scandals, and allowed itself to be stymied by the filibustering tactics of the other factions over the land reform bill.

If Zelensky were to be taken at his word about placing a premium on results, he would also be replacing the head of his parliamentary faction David Arakhamia, who appears ineffective as the party’s whip, and even the speaker and deputy speaker Dmytro Razumkov and Ruslan Stefanchuk.

In this situation, with economic difficulties mounting, no end to Russia’s war in the Donbas in sight, local elections scheduled for the fall, and falling ratings in the polls, there are no obvious quick fixes.

Some of the representatives from parties in opposition to the Servant of the People have even called, rhetorically perhaps, for a government of national unity to be formed. While some reconfiguration of political forces in the parliament can be expected in the coming months, there is already talk of new elections in the air.

Zelensky himself has previously mentioned the possibility of early elections if the situation requires it, and given his impulsiveness, this option cannot be ruled out. The president and his core team realize that the overwhelming majority of voters who backed him last year may indeed be disappointed or are becoming disillusioned and something will need to be done about this.

But they are also aware from the opinion polls that, in the meantime, support for Petro Poroshenko, or for that matter Yulia Tymoshenko, remains fairly low and static, and therefore is not threatening. Even if the Servant of the People’s party is forced to purge its ranks, under the new conditions anticipated for the next elections – the number of constituencies reduced from 450 to 300 and open party lists in a proportional electoral system – it could still expect to hold its own.

However, today’s crisis goes a lot deeper and is not as much about Zelensky, his style, and real intentions. Rather it is about the system itself, the state of democracy in Ukraine and the condition of its political culture.

Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic, but in reality, as last week’s dramatic events once again demonstrated, this has become a legal fiction, if not farce, as power remains concentrated very narrowly in the hands of the president and is dependent on his whims.

Zelensky has a majority in the parliament which even if not entirely reliable will do his bidding when it comes to replacing the prime minister and other key officials. In the absence of a genuinely independent judiciary, the traditional checks and balances among three traditional branches of democratic government – executive, legislature and judiciary – are missing. In Ukraine, this has somehow become accepted as tolerable if the president and his closest aides proclaim themselves to be patriots and democrats. But, as we know power corrupts and blinds.

Let’s face it. Ukraine has not been particularly successful with its choice of presidents and such a system has invited abuse and discreditation. As the Ukrainian vessel of state flounders yet again, its newest and most unconventional captain has been put to the test, especially his credibility. His handling of the purge last week was a PR catastrophe and prompt damage containment is vital. From his next decisions and actions, we will learn if for him this is the end of the beginning, or the beginning of the end.