Afraid or not, the acceptable conventional symphony mimics
the poetic version of Ukraine’s aspirations.
It is understandable that in the current dire predicament
the overall mood is one of dejection. Those who are willing or obliged to say
something (the latter are mainly the country’ leaders) can easily miss the
proverbial forest behind the trees.
In the latter category is a recent statement by Ukraine’s
interim President Oleksandr Turchynov, as reported by Reuters (“Kyiv tells east Ukraine
rebels vote for self-rule would be catastrophic”, May 10), in reference to the
referendum in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on May 11 to secede from Ukraine:
“Secession from Ukraine would be a step into abyss for these
regions….. It would mean complete destruction of the economy, social programs
and life in general for the majority of population”. Reuters then injects its own comment: “The
loss of Ukraine’s coal and steel belt, which accounts for some 16 percent of
national GDP would be a severe loss for Kyiv.”
Turchynov may be right if he means specifically abyss “for
these regions”. These regions may indeed
become principal losers at the end of the day, but they would have only
themselves to blame. “Frustration with Kyiv’s rule” has been the main gripe
mouthed by their self-appointed leaders, ecstatically supported by huge crowds
waving Russian flags, and not only by face-masked gunmen.
But weren’t those leaders and those crowds the same as the
voters who went wholesale for former president Viktor Yanukovych, who imposed
the rule of the gangster Donbas elite over Ukraine and made his government more
subservient to Moscow?
Or, if Turchynov’s concern is more broad-based
than the fate of Donbas, he probably like most democratic politicians, has lost
sight of an objective cost-benefit tradeoff for Ukraine arising from the loss
of Donbas. It is claimed by some, including myself that Ukraine is better off without
Donbas.
Those who agonize over the loss of 16 percent of Ukraine’s
GDP from Donbas should perhaps consider: Getting rid of a debilitating disease
isn’t worth 16 percent of one’s earthy possessions?
Actually, these 16 percent, powered by imported gas, is a
hefty contributor to Ukraine’s energy-dependence on Russia — a
lever in Moscow’s pressure arsenal which Russia’s president is unlikely to
trade in for the annexation of Donbas. As the Financial Times pointed out, a
repeat of annexation in Crimea is unlikely. Russia already has a lot of loss-
making coal mines across the border in Rostov region (FT, “Fears over self-rule,
May 12, 2014).
“But the vote (for secession in Donbas) is likely to play
into Putin’s hands , giving him more ammunition as he pushes for Ukraine to be
federalized — a strategy that Moscow has relentlessly
pursued a it tries to weaken central government in Kyiv and bring large swaths
of Ukraine under its influence.” (Ibid, “Future of Donbas remains uncertain”).
Remarkably, the Reuters piece of May 10 (above) is hung up
on the same federalization theme: “Acting president Turchynov is attempting to
bring eastern political forces into round table to discuss federal devolution.”
It is not clear who is smoking what, but there
is no evidence that Ukraine’s president is eyeing such a “devolution”.
But there is plenty of evidence that Ukraine’s government is
in a bind. As the prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk told the Financial Times,
the government is in a “trap”.
Actually, the government can use a powerful and very obvious
gambit to demolish that trap.
Given the reality on the ground in Donbas, with all the exhibition
of Russian flag waving, arrogance and belligerence of its excited masses
against the democratic Ukraine, one must be more that naïve to pretend that
much could be discussed between Kyiv and the leaders of the “people’s republic”
of Donbas. Ukraine’s government would do best if it shows
no interest in having Donbas back into the fold. Note that if that’s the
position Kyiv takes (as it should), the monkey of negotiations about
“constitutional changes” flies away into the outer space. And, to boot, Ukraine
becomes a more “normal country”. The
lingo about “the split in two” is utterly misleading. It should not compel
Ukraine’s government to apologize. The Donbas never had a sustainable Ukrainian
substance, and is territorially marginal.
The ball then would be back in Putin’s corner, to plot his
next move. He would have to decide what
to do with the Donbas headache. Would he also contemplate to try to play the
same game in another of Ukraine’s regions? Unlikely if he is in a quandary what
to do with what he has already cooked up.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
