Some will credibly argue that there was no real independence until the victory at the EuroMaidan in February.
The siege at Maidan that had started as a mass protest against the decision to trash the association agreement with the European Union and turning instead towards Moscow by President Viktor Yanukovych, became a revolution against his authoritarian regime and against massive corruption in the government.
Victory was achieved by democratic forces when the mainstream nationalist Right Sector and other self-organized defense groups tipped the outcome by standing up and fighting against the government’s riot police.
The subsequent invasion and annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the counter-revolutionary power grab by pro-Russian militants in eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions is the now existing background in the presidential election slated for May 25.
The genuine nature of post-revolutionary independence of Ukraine from Moscow can be gauged by the degree of hostility shown by the neo-fascist Russia towards Ukrainian government. Unfortunately, this independence will be dissipated if Ukraine makes concessions demanded by Russia and pro-Russian politicians in eastern secessionist regions as the price of their staying within the Ukrainian state.
Such concessions would, at best, re-establish the same regional divide in Ukraine that enabled the Donbas pro-Russian gangster elite to take power in Kyiv in the 2010 presidential elections, with all the ramifications that followed. Even more blatantly, Russia’s fifth column is now pressing for “devolving powers away from Kyiv” towards federalization.
It is a mystery why so many Ukrainians (including the diaspora ideologues) are obsessed with cuddling that rust belt, seen by others as Soviet slum. Donbas should not be encouraged to either stay or secede.
The treacherous demands of its politicians for concessions should be paid lip service at most. Ukraine would be economically better off without Donbas, and less dependent on Russian gas.
Putin can ratchet up the pressure by sending more well trained goons to attack Ukrainian security personnel and inflict more casualties, but this will also increase frustration with the lawlessness, looting, and breakdown of basic government services in Donbas as more buildings are seized. Someone will blink, and it must not be the government.
Attempted concessions will be the most critical, externally imposed issue in the early post-revolutionary phase, in the standoff between Ukraine and Moscow that manipulates the Donbas secessionists.
It must be noted that Ukrainians never had (nor will have) a power base in the Donbas. The air there is very much like Russia — unless your own eyes don’t believe the images and events unfolding this year. Pro-Ukrainian activists have been assaulted by much larger pro-Russian crowds, and forced into hiding. Gunmen opened Kalasnikov fire and launched rocket-propelled grenades at Ukrainian security forces.
The proactive majority there may be mostly ethnic Ukrainians, but they feel Russian, adore Russian heritage (including its Soviet legacy), wave Russian flags and want to be part of Russia. Remarkably, it is equally obvious that Mr. Putin wants them to remain part of Ukraine as a fifth column and a bedrock of pathological ukrainiphobia, to seed turmoil and sap the country’s energy.
The second most important angle — Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and Russia — will be rocky encounters with the latter, even when Petro Poroshenko, with whom Moscow seems prepared to deal, is Ukraine’s president.
As for military blocs, NATO membership for Ukraine is off the scope, for two reasons. First, NATO doesn’t want it. Secondly, NATO has become a paper tiger unable to defend its eastern members against Russia. NATO has no troops under its command east of the Elbe River (mid-Germany), and only a small number of battle-ready troops overall. No comparison with Russia’s 250,000 active army manpower and 2,550 battle tanks. Russia’s total active military service personnel is 850,000, with 1,660 fighter aircraft.
In effect, NATO relies on nuclear deterrent, as it did during the Cold War. Recently 600 US airborne troops were rushed to the Baltic states and Poland, after a major panic. Europe sent no troops, other than a small number for week-long maneuvers. Steven Pifer, former US ambassador in Kyiv, takes a dim view of NATO capabilities and Europe’s foot-dragging, and he questions the viability of NATO commitment to defend “the eastern flank” of the alliance: “If Congress perceives US allies as unready, it may question whether America should pay much attention to Article 5.” (Financial Times, May 20).
A third reason for NATO’s Ukraine exclusion is Russia’s reaction. Business lobbies of major EU members want trade with Russia, not confrontation.
If much of this sounds surreal, there is more. The US outspends Russia 21 to one for its military, but could find no practical options for military help to Ukraine when Russian invasion on mainland appeared imminent. In January 2012, the US Army active personnel was 541,000, and Marine Corps had 195,000.
Total personnel in active service was 1,430,000. The US air power is awesome, with over 4,000 fighter and bomber aircraft, not counting large numbers of reconnaissance, transport, training, electronic warfare aircraft, etc.
From this overall perspective, a recent proposal by Yulia Tymoshenko for a referendum in Ukraine about NATO membership is not a clever presidential campaign move. Nor was her “promise” to get the Crimea back a few weeks ago. She is losing some credibility. Interestingly, when a similar rumbling about the Crimea came from Petro Poroshenko, it was received more like an expression of a sense of humor.
One thing Ukraine needs for sure is its own capable military force. With its government run by thugs in the last four years, funds needed for defense were stolen and off-shored.
Boris Danik is a retired UKrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
