Ukraine president-elect Petro Poroshenko’s sending troops to
re-take the airport in Donetsk from pro-Russian separatists is understandable
in terms of political necessity, and it was applauded by much of the worldwide
media as good show, but it was no breakthrough in the escalating level of
fighting.

Remarkably, the event itself brought to some a leery feeling
of name similarity between the Donetsk and Danang airports, the latter the main
base of U.S. military presence in Vietnam at the time. No reason to get excited
in indignation, as some will when glancing at this writing. “Spokoyna glufka”,
don’t get overly excited, is a rough translation of a cute phrase I learned
from a Polish friend.

Moscow will match whatever force is required to keep control
of most of the Donbas under separatist control, by sending more weapons and
paid fighters with fanciful designations like Cossacks, Chechens and you name
it. The long and short of it is that Moscow expects to wear down Ukraine in Donbas
until Kyiv capitulates and implements decentralization towards gradual
dismantling of the Ukrainian state as demanded by the Kremlin.

Is that what the West is expecting? Save your bets, because
the answer is yes, regardless of the smooth talk coming from the US and EU
politicians and double-speak media. What else can square with refusal of
minimal military assistance from the West and urging Kyiv to negotiate with
Russia? Poroshenko has requested such aid, but none is forthcoming.                                            

An example of Western advice is a Financial Times editorial,
“Poroshenko opens a door for Ukraine”, May 28. “The restoration of order in the
east is an urgent priority….. Rather than pursuing the military option, Mr. Poroshenko
should pause and test the willingness of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president to
engage seriously in a joint effort to reduce tensions. The blueprint was agreed
last month in Geneva and signed by Russia and Ukraine.”

And what was agreed in Geneva? In “Windows on Eurasia”,
April 18, Paul Goble quotes Russian commentator Andrey Illarionov from his
“Betrayal of Ukraine in Geneva is worse than Munich”:

“In Geneva, Kyiv joined in opening the way for the
transformation of the internal arrangements of Ukraine regardless of what
Ukrainians want.” Under direct threat of Russian invasion on mainland and
two-faced acrobatics from the West, Kyiv had no “options” (love that word).  

And here is the Financial Times punchline: “Ukraine should
implement a degree of decentralization which gives pro-Russian communities some
autonomy without dismembering the state.” If that is “a door for Ukraine” it is
also called nuanced equivocation.

Putin cannot be
expected to “reduce tensions,” when exacerbating them is his principal means of
achieving the objectives.  

Poroshenko is travelling a difficult path. In line with
quiet expectations of wise guys  — this
should be shocking to voters who elected him 
—  he has requested the European
Union to delay the economic and political agreements with Ukraine (Wall Street
Journal, May 28). He probably expects to talk with Putin before signing
anything with the EU.

But at the same time Poroshenko finds it politically
expedient to demonstrate some bravado in Donetsk, a clear indication of sinking
deeper in Donbas swamp.

Disengaging from Donbas will require political courage, but
it seems the only way to stop the bleeding, deprive Mr. Putin of his pressure
engine, and deal first with the European Union rather than  checking with the Kremlin.  

The status quo is degenerating into more destabilization and
bloodletting. The quasi-military tactics employed  by Ukrainian side, with a sparse network of
extremely vulnerable roadside checkpoints manned by a few dozen fighters, some
of them with marginal training, are 
utterly inadequate if the separatists are to be “crushed”, as recently
promised by some government officials.

Petro Poroshenko’r vowing of revenge for the loss of lives
in the downing of Ukrainian helicopter on a transport mission near Donetsk
shows the absence of a coherent plan for dealing with the messy trap in Donbas.
It is because no sensible plan is feasible, except to extricate from this
conundrum.

Ukraine is in no position to pacify Donbas by force. It
would require sending an army of occupation (call the spade a spade), many
thousands of troops to secure large cities and the countryside, even if Russia
stayed out. The argument that the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are mostly
ethnically Ukrainian, and therefore can be coaxed to reason with a mix of
checkpoints and some poetic approach is outdated.   

 Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.