This vacuum, of course, is a result of an
extended occupation of Ukraine by its own 5th column of traitors and personalized by the presidency of the overthrown Viktor Yanukovych.
Of prime
importance now is the building up of defense forces —
mainly by own bootstraps.
Help from the West is not in the making.
Noted in the Kyiv Post opinion piece by chief editor Brian Bonner (“Are Ukraine and
Russia at war or are they not?” March 25): “As the leaders of the G7 nations showed on
March 25, the West is in not only in no hurry to help Ukraine. Western leaders
are also in no hurry to help the world get rid of the cancer of Putin”.
High-winded declarations from the same
leaders are focusing on punishments (mostly sanctions) that will fall short.
Western media are full of explanations why
Ukraine should not get military help. Here is a view from The New York Times
(“Russia without illusions”, March 23): “Yes, for today (we are) for sanctions
on Putin’s cronies and economic assistance for Ukrainians. But no to sudden
over-commitments that would give Putin what his domestic propaganda effort
needs —
evidence of encirclement (of Russia), justification for aggression….”
And: “Unless we are prepared to escalate
significantly over the fate of eastern Ukraine we should not contemplate
sending arms and military advisers to the unsteady government in Kyiv.”
In other words, it would be unwise to help
arm Ukraine for its own defense when it is invaded by Russia because such help
would be seen as encirclement of Russia. To feel safe, Russia needs to keep
Ukraine in its orbit.
Here’s more in The New York Times the next
day (“After buildup of grievances, Russia drew a line in Crimea”, March
24): “ Andrew Weiss, who worked on
Russia issues in the Administration of Presidents Bill Clinton and the Elder
George Bush, said Mr. Putin’s actions were logical, even if incompatible with
Western interests, in seeking to destabilize Ukraine rather than allowing it to
fall into Europe’s sphere of influence.”
“Mr. Weiss also said that Europe repeatedly
refused to honor Russian concerns, effectively forcing a conflict by insisting
a trade deal with Europe was incompatible with joining Russia’s custom union…
Europe also resisted three-way talks with Russia.”
Does it not sound that “the conflict” is
Europe’s fault?
And let’s get it straight, what are
Russia’s concerns? Ukraine could escape from Russia’s dungeon. That’s what.
If Russia overruns Ukraine, where does that
leave Europe? Here is one view: “Europe’s long-term security depends on Ukraine’s
full integration into the EU and NATO. Otherwise Russia would continue to
destabilize the continent indefinitely “, warned Ukraine’s former President
Viktor Yushchenko in the Financial Time, March 19.
In contrast, in a speech at Brussels on
March 26, US President Barack Obama was by far less specific, except to
underline that “Russia cannot be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further
escalation by military force”. Does that sound like Obama’s way of reassuring
the top NATO commanding general, who the day before had sounded alarm at
Russia’s readiness to invade Ukraine from the Rostov-on-Don area and move its
forces all the way to Transnistria and perhaps into Moldova?
And what about the following passage in
Obama’s speech: “I believe a stable peace will come from de-escalation —
direct dialogue between Russia, the government of Ukraine, and the
international community, monitors who can assure that the rights of all
Ukrainians are protected; a process of Constitutional reforms within Ukraine itself,
and free and fair elections this spring”.
Does this not sound like the core of the
problem is not in the Kremlin but in Ukraine, which needs to speak to Russia
about protecting the rights of all Ukrainians and reforming Ukraine’s
Constitution?
Robert Gates, former US Secretary of
Defense, despite his keen perception of Putin’s mentality and of his challenge
to the entire post-Cold War order, has nothing concrete to say how the West can
help defend Ukraine, except: “The EU should be urged to grant associate
agreements with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine” (“Putin’s challenge to the West”,
The Wall Street Journal, March 25}.
Gates also writes (ibid): Ukraine is
central to Mr. Putin’s vision of a pro-Russian block, partly because of its
size and importantly because of Kiev’s role as the birthplace of the Russian
empire more than a thousand years ago”.
Actually, the time when the Russian empire was born depends on
politicians who write history, and that’s part of the problem. It breeds phony rationale for aggression.
The Duchy of Moscow — that grew to become the Russian
empire — was born in late 14-th century. The Kyiv Rus
was overrun by the Mongols in 1240, and its center gravity then shifted to what
is now Western Ukraine for the next 100 years. In the 1360s the Lithuanian
grand duke Olgerd defeated the Mongols in what is now central Ukraine and
extended his empire from the Baltics into Kyiv and farther east.
In 1385 Lithuania and Poland joined in a
“Commonwealth” that also included until 1648 most of the present-day Ukraine,
except its south which was no man’s land facing devastating forays from the
Crimean Tatars.
The Pereyaslav treaty that tied the
Ukrainian Kozak state as an autonomous entity to Russia was signed in 1654,
while a large part of Ukraine stayed de facto under Polish rule almost until
the partitioning of Poland in 18-th century. Russia, of course, scuttled
Ukraine’s autonomy 80 years later.
History does not place the origin of
Russia’s empire in Kyiv, much less “for a thousand years”, as Robert Gates
claims along with a large segment of academia politically subdued over the
centuries.
Coming back to the margins of Crimean
fiasco, was it war or “a theatre of the absurd”? Is there anyone who is
troubled by the absence of a declaration of war in this case, and remembers
when was the last declaration of war announced, in any war, in the past 70
years?
Nearly 75 years ago, Britain’s ambassador to
Germany Neville Henderson delivered declaration of war to Dr. Schmidt, official
translator for Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany’s foreign minister at 9 a.m. September
3, 1939 at Wilhemstrasse, three days after Germany invaded Poland. Ribbentrop himself didn’t show up, and Dr.
Schmidt overslept that morning and barely made it to the office on time.
Britain, of course, could rely on American
help. Said Winston Churchill in one of his famous perorations during “the
battle of Britain” in 1940: “We shall hold, until in God’s good time the New
World will come to the rescue of the Old”.
There is slim chance that Great Britain and
the rest of Europe will “hold” now or later and not succumb to Russian gas.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
