In the ongoing separatist eruptions in these two regions the
key difference between Odessa and Donbas is made by demographics. There is no
denial that the latter has a hysterically pro-Russian majority, waving Russian
flags, blaring Soviet martial music, denouncing the present Ukrainian
government with unabashed hate of its genuine Ukrainian agenda and content, and
parroting ad nauseam the epithets as only the chauvinistic Russians could
concoct. In their dictionary, Ukrainian patriotism means fascism, while the
Russian jingoism glorifying overt aggression is indicative of a unique Russian civilization.
In Odessa, the loyalties are somewhat evenly divided between
pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian, making it more feasible for the government in
Kyiv to maintain control and gain an upper hand over infiltration from Russia.
Ukraine needs Odessa with its access to Black Sea and its
adjacent land that provides territorial sovereignty over the Black Sea area
with known large natural gas sources under sea bed.
In Donbas, as a comparison, the main asset is perpetual trouble
from ingrained Soviet-Russian traditionalism and the gangland mentality of
local elite, which taken together with Russia’s help has become an
insurmountable drag on Ukraine as a nation, and actually made the country
captive of the Donbas clique (the Party of Regions) in the 2010 elections,
including also a physical lockup of Yulia Tymoshenko, Ukraine’s democratic
leader.
The democratic camp had long been under an illusion of an
impending national awakening in the east. Vyacheslav Chornovil, a leading Rukh
activist and member of parliament predicted in 1992 that in two years the east
of Ukraine will become Ukrainian conscious like its west. It shows the extent
of political simplicity displayed at the time by Ukraine’s best.
In Donbas today, the anti-Ukrainian militants have direct
supply lines from Russia for weaponry like the rocket-propelled grenades to
shoot down helicopters. But the US president Barack Obama has pointedly refused
to send weapons for Ukraine’s defenders.
Russia’s president Putin is analyzed in the West nowadays as
“strong on tactics and weak on strategy”. Whatever his forte, he seems to be
working on wearing out Ukraine with what he calls a civil war, slicing one part
of Ukraine after another. This is working for him in Donbas, where Ukraine’s
government has lost its footing, despite most recent attempts to regain ground in
a nasty confrontation with the enemy, euphemistically called pro-Russian
militants.
The Russian army standing at the border is outfitted with
some of the best equipment designed in Germany. Rheinmetall, a German company
received a $140 m contract in 2011 to construct an advanced training facility
for the Russian army, snubbing Germany’s NATO ally the United States. About
6000 German companies are doing business in Russia. German business lobby has
essentially blocked far-reaching economic sanctions by the European Union and
in effect has aligned itself with Russia.
Interesting coverage of this collaboration has appeared in
The Wall Street Journal (“In Europe, Putin Also Has His Defenders”, April 5,
2014).
The ongoing conflict in the east is not only draining the
meager resources of Ukraine’s fire power. It also devastates the economy. An
old nemesis, reliance on imported Russian gas will not go away, and sooner or
later will reassert itself as a major if not the decisive factor in the
dependence on Russia, unless something is done.
That “something” is the elimination of the Donbas from
Ukraine’s economic and political equation, and concentrating on defending
Ukraine where the loyalty of its population is not as abysmal as it is in the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. No one should be fooled by blinders of this or
that poll showing the numbers with preference to be part of Ukraine (but not
explaining what kind of pro-Russian requirements is connected to that
preference).
The depressed dilapidated industries in Donbas consume a
huge part of imported Russian natural gas. The long and short of it is that,
without Donbas, Ukraine should be able to get by with no imports from Russia,
by buying up to 10 billion cubic meters a year from Slovakia and similar amount
from Germany’s energy company RWE, as already
envisioned in the ongoing negotiations. Ukraine itself is currently
producing 18.6b cm — about one third of its annual demand of 50
billion cubic meters. 27.7b cm was imported from Russia’s Gasprom in 2013. The
demand would be sharply reduced if Donbas moves on with its secession.
As for the upcoming presidential elections, there is no need
to agonize whether or not they will happen this month. There is nothing wrong
with Ukraine’s interim government, at least in relative terms when compared
with previous governments. The Maidan revolution made it more legitimate and
more independent from Russia than any previous.
This government is functioning under a horrific strain not
experienced by any government in Ukraine in the last 23 years. The interim
president Olexandr Turchynov and prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk probably
deserve medals despite all the breakdowns. It is very doubtful that the
elections will give Ukraine a better president or prime minister, although
Yulia Tymoshenko had indicated, if elected, she will keep Yatseniuk where he
is.
In an interview with Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times,
the prime minister Yatseniuk was asked if the job has proved as hellish as
anticipated. His answer was: “Worse. We face the Russian military, Russian-
backed terrorism, the economy is insolvent, our own military has been
dismantled, the police are disoriented. The last government stole everything
they could” (FT, May 6. 2014).
And yet, the gloom and doom is not the leitmotif of this
government. Russia’s president is probably told by some of his advisers that he
may be overplaying his hand. For one thing, Mr. Putin may not be at all certain
how to handle the Genie that got out of the bottle in Donbas. Does he want to
annex it to Russia? If not, why?
Because Donbas is more useful for Putin as part of Ukraine — a
knot that pulls Ukraine to Russia and makes it corrupt failed state.
In line with this hocus, he has sent a message
to the rebels in Donetsk on May 7 to postpone their planned referendum for
secession.
Also, Petro Poroshenko’s poll numbers suggesting
that he will be elected president may have a positive meaning for Putin — if
he thinks Poroshenko is not a bad choice for Moscow. Stay tuned.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
