I wouldn’t overestimate the factor of ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine’s move to Europe. There are many reasons for that.

After the end of the two-day Eastern Partnership summit, which took place in Poland on Sept. 29-30, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski said that not only is Poland ready to help Ukraine reach free-trade and association agreements with Europe by the end of the year, it is also prepared to help in ratification of the agreements by the 27 parliaments of European Union countries.

This offer to bring together the efforts of diplomats and lobbyists is worth a lot. Yet the effort of the Poles reflects not just their desire to lead the process of Ukraine’s integration to Europe, but shows they recognize the nation’s achievements in this sphere.

Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, talked about those achievements publicly.

Yes, there is the Tymoshenko factor. (The Kyiv judge hearing evidence of her alleged abuse of office is expected to deliver a verdict after resuming on Oct. 11.)

Yet there is Ukrainian politics in the EU. When President Viktor Yanukovych took office, his first trip in March 2010 was to Brussels.

Early in the summer of 2010, the parliament — led by the Party of Regions — approved a number of laws that the European Union had expected from the Orange Revolution team [of ex-President Viktor Yushchenko and Tymoshenko] for years, to no avail.

They were laws on the energy market, the National Bank, access to public information and protection of personal information.

Then Yanukovych moved on to receive what the Orange team failed to do: the Ukraine-EU action plan, which we got on Nov. 22, 2010, and the plan for liberalization of the visa regime with Europe, which would eventually turn our country into a European one.

On Sept. 23, near the eve of the Eastern Partnership summit, the European Commission marked Ukraine’s progress in fulfilling the liberalization plan for the visa-free regime with Europe.

They assessed four tasks. In two of them – “maintenance of public order” and “prevention of illegal migration” – Ukraine’s progress was assessed as “good” and “very good.” Did Tymoshenko manage to achieve even a third of this?

But despite the progress and persistence of Ukraine’s authorities that the nation should be given the prospect of EU membership, the final declaration at the end of the summit contained no such clause.

Yanukovych will continue moving to Europe regardless of Tymoshenko’s fate, in light of her political prospects and the criminal code.

Instead there was a clause about recognition of European aspirations of those nations what want to be part of the EU, including Ukraine.

Yanukovych will continue moving to Europe regardless of Tymoshenko’s fate, in light of her political prospects and the criminal code.

Interestingly, her fate was not mentioned by Polish leaders in the presence of Yanukovych. Moreover, their joint public appearances were planned without question-and-answer sessions, which clearly shows that Komorowski and Tusk wanted to avoid questions about Tymoshenko in Yanukovych’s presence.

On the site of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who also talked to Yanukovych, I found no mention of Tymoshenko either.

All this leads me to think that the influence of her factor is possibly over-dramatized.

Kyiv Post staff writer Yuriy Onyshkiv (Sept. 30 story, “Ukraine, EU brace for Tymoshenko trial outcome”) quotes a Ukrainian diplomat, who said off the record that “had it not been for Tymoshenko, they would find something else to slow down the association agreement with Ukraine.

Tymoshenko’s case is nothing more than a thought-up excuse to postpone the agreement.” He calls these words “particularly cynical.” He moves on to analyze pessimistic scenarios of the development of Ukraine’s relations with the EU, reminiscent of the pressure Ukraine faced when the West believed the nation had sold Kolchuga radar stations to Iraq.

Was the Ukrainian government aware of the consequences, including the international ones, of legal actions against Tymoshenko? I think they were.

The current pressure of the West is often compared to what President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) had to endure in his second term over Kolchugas. But the attitude to Ukraine changed suddenly as soon as Kuchma sent some peacekeeping troops to Iraq. So, what is the right name for this kind of politics? Is it “cynical” or “pragmatic”?

As far as Tymoshenko goes, Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Gryshchenko made a fair statement: “If the government starts to say that Tymoshenko’s case becomes small change in exchange for a written pledge of Ukraine’s potential membership in the EU, then they will admit that the judiciary is not independent in Ukraine.”

From my point of view, her alleged falsification of government directives for signing a gas contract with Russia [in 2009] has to be investigated, and so does the accusation of issuing false promissory notes on behalf of Naftogaz Ukraine. So does her “flu epidemic” of 2009, along with the Hr 3 billion allegedly set off by the government for this “epidemic.” So does the missing money set aside for recapitalization of Ukrprombank and Rodovid.

Or should we turn into lotophagi, and forget, since we’re told the voters should give a political assessment. In my opinion, potential fraud and money laundering requires a criminal assessment, or am I wrong?

Was the Ukrainian government aware of the consequences, including the international ones, of legal actions against Tymoshenko? I think they were.
However, I officially declare that I am prepared to reconsider the Tymoshenko factor in the process of Ukraine’s European integration in exchange for Ukraine’s full membership in the EU – not just a promise.

This would be her first real investment into the European integration.

Viacheslav Pikhovshek is a former news editor at 1+1 channel and a former speechwriter for ex-President Leonid Kuchma.