“Personnel is policy” is a maxim that is frequently overheard in the corridors of the White House and federal agencies whenever there is a transition of presidential administrations. It is customary, therefore, to filter out campaign rhetoric from a president’s foreign policy views and positions by noting the appointment of officials to the State Department and the National Security Council who reflect his views.
President Donald J. Trump appointed as his first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who, like Trump, had no prior experience in government or diplomacy, but who had been honored by Vladimir Putin with the “Order of Friendship.” Trump replaced him with Michael Pompeo after Tillerson called his boss “a f—-ing moron.” Pompeo was far more of a diplomat.
Our concern, herein, is not so much with joe Biden’s view of foreign policy in general, but with his views on Ukraine and Russia. In a prior op-ed (https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/george-woloshyn-bidens-choice-for-secretary-of-state.html), I commented on Biden’s appointment of Antony Blinken to be his secretary of state. This op-ed will identify and highlight the views of Andrea Kendall-Taylor, his newly appointed Russia and Central Asia senior director within the National Security Council.
These two officials – the president’s secretary of state and his top Russia adviser – appear to have similar views on the challenge the U.S. faces from Russia and Ukraine’s importance in meeting that challenge. Ukraine should grasp the opportunity this offers to support its “strategic partner,” and, thereby, greatly enhance its own security and well-being.
Ever since her studies as a Fulbright scholar in Central Asia, Taylor has had a special interest and expertise in Russia and Eurasia, the political dynamics of autocracies, and democratic decline. This interest was reinforced and validated during her eight years as a senior analyst at the CIA. From 2015 to 2018 she was the deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia, before joining the Center for a New American Security as Director of the Transatlantic Security Program. She also teaches as an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service and has written extensively for numerous political science and policy journals.
Taylor believes that the greatest threats facing the U.S. in this century come from authoritarianism and autocratic states coordinating their efforts to subvert democracy. She refers to the Russian-Chinese “partnership” as being a long-term challenge in that both countries and their leaders are comfortable with each other and share a common goal to displace the U.S. as the dominant world economic and military power. She is very much concerned that the U.S. alone would not be able to adequately protect its interests, but is the only country that can provide leadership and a unified and effective counterforce to the autocratic nations of the world in coalition with its European allies and other democratic states.
She believes that Putin has accepted a junior role in his partnership with China because of his failing economy and weakening demographic base, but that, nevertheless, he has enjoyed considerable success in stoking populist sentiments in Europe, chaos, disinformation, civil distrust, and dissatisfaction with democratic institutions and processes.
Even Putin’s riskiest actions such as his attack on Ukraine and Georgia and military operations in Syria have been pursued “when he calculates that Russia cares more about a certain country or issue than the United States or Europe,” and that “use of military force enhances Russia’s bargaining position and are the most effective way to gain the attention of the West.”
She believes that Putin has “an interest to drive a wedge between his enemy, Ukraine, and Ukraine’s most important ally, the United States,” and that Putin has deliberately ston-walled any solution to Donbas because “he can’t have a successful Ukraine on his southern border because it then demonstrates to Russians what is possible” and “provides a direct threat to Putin’s hold on Russia.”
Her conclusion is that Putin’s geopolitical momentum “is largely the result of Washington’s reticence to lead, and the West’s failure to mount sufficient opposition to its moves. The time is now for the United States and Europe to step in and up to blunt Putin’s momentum and protect the future we envision.”
However, she believes that the Russian threat alone would not be so serious were it not that “Russian and Chinese actions are converging to challenge the U.S. global order….Central is the shared view that weakening democracy can accelerate the decline of Western influence and advance Russia’s and China’s geopolitical goals….Russia and China view efforts to support democracy- especially U.S. efforts- as thinly veiled attempts to expand U.S. influence and undermine their regimes….Russian foreign policy is confrontational and brazen; China, so far, has used a subtler and more risk-averse strategy, preferring stability that is conducive to building economic ties and influence. Although these two approaches are different and seemingly uncoordinated, taken together, they are having a more corrosive effect on democracy than either would have single-handedly.”
According to Taylor, the “populist” movement feeds off Russian and Chinese narratives that Western democracies are dysfunctional and cannot deliver on their promises. Putin actively seeks to “amplify polarization and division within Western societies.” Economic hardship, growing unease with immigration and the alleged elite, nationalism, disillusion with corruption, and government performance have propelled parties into power that extol the virtues of strong and decisive leadership, share a disdain for established institutions, and express deep distrust of perceived experts and elites. Consequently, the “steady dismantling of democratic norms and practices by democratically elected leaders, what we call authoritarianization, marks a significant change in the way that democracies have fallen apart.”
Whereas, in the last 54 years of the 20th century 64% of democracies failed through coups, 40% of democratic failures in just the first 10 years of the 21th century were fueled by populist authoritarianization of which 75% resulted in autocracies with power concentrated in the hands of a single “strongman.” She sees this is a growing trend not only in “fragile” democracies but also in countries with heretofore strong democratic systems and traditions, such as the U.S. At the same time, Putin is deepening ties with fellow autocrats allowing him to offset the isolation that the West has tried to impose on him.
So where does all this leave Ukraine, and what can Ukraine do to boot-strap itself most distinctly onto the Biden administration’s foreign policy initiatives; and for the Biden administration to demonstrate that its policies are not simply empty platitudes?
- We know that a central tenet of Biden’s foreign policy (contrary to that of Trump) is to “breathe life back into the eroding transatlantic alliance with Europe.” Ukraine’s formal ties with the European Union and NATO provide it a strong legal basis for seeking inclusion and recognition as a frontline state in the implementation of Biden’s support of “fragile democracies” resisting autocracies such as Putin’s Russia. In fact, Ukraine’s position is not only that of an object of competition between the “democratic” world and the “autocratic” world but is unique in that Putin’s goals, resources, and momentum would be greatly enhanced if Ukraine were to end up on the dark side of that line. Biden supported Ukraine’s entry into NATO in 2009, and he should make Ukraine’s full entry into the EU and NATO a US priority. Ukraine should be included with European allies in strengthening their cyberinfrastructure, close foreign-money loopholes, increase the transparency of online platforms, and better coordinate intelligence and law enforcement efforts.
- Biden supported the arming of Ukraine when he was vice president but was frustrated by the president. He should now begin providing Ukraine with the full range of support needed to ensure that any further incursion will be met with resistance too costly for Putin to bear.
- Biden must come to terms with the fact that Ukraine is not a truly democratic state. It is a state in which Ukrainian citizens are free to vote but the process and outcome are heavily skewed in favor of the oligarchs who control 80% of the media and the pro-Russian 5th column that has been continuously investing in the media. Ukrainian citizens have very limited control over their bureaucracy, their courts, and their parliament. However, Ukraine is ideal for the U.S. to demonstrate the seriousness and vigor with which it will lead the fight for democracy by (a) applying sanctions against pro-Russian oligarchs like Viktor Medvedchuk and Ihor Kolomoisky; (b) greatly increasing funding for civic organizations who are the democratic standard-bearers for the Ukrainian people; and (c) (just like Biden’s efforts in the Obama Administration) pressuring Ukraine’s government to reform the judiciary, strengthening anti-corruption efforts, and rule of law.
- Biden has also expressed objection to the construction of Nord Stream II because of its potential to further corrupt European governments and increase control over Europe’s energy supplies. Furthermore, it will divert critical income from Ukraine into the coffers of Russian oligarchs. Biden must show his leadership – despite Germany’s objections – by maintaining tight sanctions against any efforts to resume its construction.
- Ukraine should become a platform from which a steady stream of news is disseminated to Russia exposing the corruption of its autocratic government and the poverty and losses Putin has brought his people.
- The Biden administration should review every possibility for U.S. government grants and mutually cooperative agreements – such as in the space program, IT, and other scientific fields and “green energy” projects – so as to raise the economic well-being of Ukrainian citizens and show them immediate benefits from interaction with democratic states.
- The Biden administration should increase and broaden U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Exim Bank financing, guarantees, and lending capability to facilitate the export of U.S. products and services needed for Ukraine’s economic growth, particularly in agriculture.
- The Global Magnitsky Act should be expanded and applied more broadly to all those individuals and companies who are engaged in or contributing to all forms of hybrid wars against neighboring states, including disinformation, propaganda, construction projects on occupied territories, etc.
If Biden’s new foreign policy direction and “Weltanschauung,” or “worldview” and that of his appointees – is to have any meaning at all, it must be introduced with the same vigor against autocrats that autocrats are applying against democratic states.
