Ukraine could become a solution for U.S. President-elect Donald Trump if he revisits guarantees provided under the Budapest Memorandum. Trump could open a new page in global security history by restoring its architecture and protecting values of the non-proliferation regime, America’s top security priority.
Ukrainians don’t like to recall Dec. 5, 1994 – the day they were pressed to give up the third largest nuclear arsenal by signing the Budapest Memorandum. The Memorandum is often referred to as a piece of paper in Ukraine after Russian aggression erupted in 2014.
As the 22nd anniversary of the Memorandum on Security Assurances with the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to ensure their non-nuclear status is approaching, the world has hardly become a safer place. What is even more disturbing in the long run, the document may fail in securing its key objective: enhancing a non-proliferation regime.
Almost a quarter century ago, when the world was undergoing a period of profound instability, the deal, signed in Budapest, was straight and simple. The three newly independent nuclear states gave up their stockpiles in exchange for extended security guarantees from the trio of the USA, the Great Britain, and Russia. The latter committed to non-use of force and/or threat of force and to respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former. If successful, the compromise should have become a model for further slowing down the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The underlining logic was also clear. Going nuclear has been costly and risky, and could be a rational option only if possessing such weapons becomes a critical condition for survival. Thus the Memorandum provided right conditions for a cost/benefit analysis to be strongly inclined to nuclear disarmament. Concerted pressure from the great powers coupled with credible security guarantees seemed to be sufficient for keeping non-proliferation hopes alive. No country except North Korea and – with possible reservations over exact timing – Pakistan turned nuclear since 1994, which is a good indicator of horizontal non-proliferation efficiency.
However, things have changed with the annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine and banning trade and transit by Russia in 2014. A direct breach of the cornerstone principles on international law destabilized international system in many ways, of which devaluating of non-proliferation regime is the most disturbing. Russia was the only party to the Budapest Memorandum to directly violate its provisions.
Common wisdom in Ukraine holds that the U.S. and the Great Britain have not done enough to protect Ukraine and thus also failed to stick to their obligations. But that’s not the case: the Memorandum holds that none of the parties would attack Ukraine, not that all of them should protect her. Formally, the U.S. and the Great Britain followed the provisions of the document and owe nothing to Ukraine in what regards protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
But the Budapest Memorandum was something bigger than just a memorandum. There was also something about its spirit, not only the letter. No matter how unlikely a Russian aggression against Ukraine may have seemed in 1994, the parties to the document laid down a mechanism binding together founding principles of a post-bipolar world order and issues of non-proliferation. Non-use of force against non-nuclear states has been once again reaffirmed and – together with a high cost of possessing nuclear weapons – became a second pillar of non-proliferation regime.
With Ukrainian economy suffocated and territorial integrity violated at a comparatively low cost, the current logic of non-proliferation is about to face serious challenges. In order to be effective any security guarantees need to be credible. Breaking down the rules leads to rising anarchy, negative scenario thinking, and growing distrust. All of those are bad news for any international regime, but most of all for that in the field of international security.
Russia’s actions in and against Ukraine initiated a chain reaction of growing distrust and fear, bringing international politics, at least at a regional level, back to a Hobbessian all against all stance. Even if there were no Budapest Memorandum and Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament in 1994, states in different corners of the world would feel much greater insecurity, driving them closer to nuclear weapons.
The fact that Memorandum does exist and Ukraine did give up her nuclear arsenal makes the problem harder to handle. It leaves the non-proliferation regime with only one pillar – the high cost of obtaining and keeping nuclear weapons. At the same time, a growing turbulence of international security makes hard security a top priority for states all over the world. Russia’s direct application of force turns hard power into a trump card in international affairs. Is there anything harder and more powerful than nuclear weapons?
Not all, but many countries will reconsider an answer to that question. Some of them will pay attention to the Budapest Memorandum – a document which promised security in exchange for a non-nuclear status, but proved to be unable to deliver.
Preserving the spirit of the Budapest Memorandum will be extremely hard after Russia openly violated it. But raising the price for aggression against a non-nuclear state is a crucial task for saving what’s left from the non-proliferation regime. A strong Ukraine with its territorial integrity fully restored will be the best possible solution.
Hanna Hopko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, is chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mykola Kapitonenko is director of the Center for International Studies.
