Significance
On 10 December according to different estimates between 25,000 to 50,000 demonstrators took to the streets of Moscow and on a smaller scale in other cities across Russia and abroad.
Different opposition groups and parties called for the annulment of the parliamentary election results and the exit of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin from power.
Implications
The peaceful protests across the country were heavily policed by law enforcement and internal troops. Shortly after the demonstrations, President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to a probe into the alleged voting irregularities. However, he was also quick to rule out an annulment of the overall results.
Outlook
The opposition has vowed to repeat the protests on 24 December, and the authorities will monitor public sentiment for signs of more organised protests in the future. The upcoming March 2012 presidential race is likely to reignite opposition to Putin, the de facto leader of Russia.
Heavy handed treatment of dissent is not viable in the medium term while half-hearted democratic openings have the potential to snowball into a stronger demand for change. Putin has to come up with a new plan of action to galvanise his own supporters to ensure winning a real mandate in March 2012.
Putin’s first taste of public opposition
Since first becoming president in 2000, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his government have not seen a display of popular opposition such as took place on 10 December. A wide range of opposition parties and movements, ranging from liberals to nationalists and Communists took part in protests mainly centred in the capital Moscow, not far from the Kremlin.
According to various estimates 25,000 to 50,000 protestors were present in Bolotnaya Square, central Moscow. Some 10,000 took part in similar anti-government demonstration in the second largest city St Petersburg while 5,000 attended a rally in the third largest city in central Siberia, Novosibirsk.
Once again according to varying reports by the opposition around 30 cities across Russia took part in what has been the single largest anti-government protest in over two decades.
The demonstrations in support of Russian opposition also took place in New York, London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Vancouver and elsewhere, although these were not very crowded gatherings.
The protests were allowed by the authorities who appeared to be more than usually tolerant. Initially only 300 demonstrators were allowed to take part in a rally on Revolution Square.
This was scrapped and the venue was moved to Bolotnaya, a less prominent place but this time around 3,000 people were allowed to come. The fact that at least 10 times more demonstrators arrived showed the opposition’s defiance.
The police, who were present in very large numbers, were relatively flexible and no major clashes were registered. Furthermore, after days of pro-government media’s deliberate decision not to cover the protests, leaving it to very active internet social networking sites, it finally broke the taboo and broadcast the events.
Russian voters came out demanding a recount of the votes in the 4 December election to the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, won by the ruling United Russia (ER) party.
They also demanded the resignation and prosecution of the head of the Central Election Committee, accused by the protestors of engineering ER’s victory, as well as calling for Putin to resign. The protest did attract a relatively large number of people but it did not have the hallmarks of a rally with the potential to turn into something larger.
The crowds dispersed towards the evening in order not to violate the terms of the rally. President Dmitry Medvedev stated that in the face of the large number of allegations of vote-rigging he was going to order a probe into the matter, but he ruled out the possibility of total annulment of the final results.
As expected, the opposition decried Medvedev’s move as a meaningless exercise as it will not quell the protestors’ discontent with what they call the stolen elections.
No "plan B" yet
Although the protests mainly centred on the recent election results, their main driving force is a strong opposition to Putin and the highly centralised political system that he has created over the past decade.
This anti-Putin sentiment has flared up for two reasons. Firstly, by Putin’s decision to return to the presidential office by swapping positions with Medvedev and potentially staying in power for another 12 years.
Secondly, his decision to continue with "Putin-brand" which is a mix of strongman politics where he resides at the top of the power pyramid, rewarding loyalty by granting proximity to power, and especially economic benefits.
All this is coupled with populist rhetoric and occasional public spending projects, which have proven effective in securing the support of a considerable portion of Russian voters.
Throughout Putin’s rule there has always been liberal opposition to his growing powers, but their voice was largely marginalised not only thanks to the government’s tight control of public space but also general lack of support among the wider population. Especially in the mid-2000s, Russian voters seemed to be fine with the unwritten agreement whereby
Putin could limit individual freedoms as long as he could ensure that the state machine was working and there was a real increase in wages. This original plan of action did secure genuine popularity for Putin in 2000s.
It has to be noted that when Russian voters were voting for him in the 2004 presidential election and for ER in 2007, they were comparing improving standards of living with the 1990s, when the country was dogged by economic problems and the wealth polarisation was massive.
Putin then appeared to be the leader who was changing this system, the defender of ordinary Russians against the oligarchs and restoring Russia’s pride as a global player.
Against the backdrop of recent protests it has become clear that Putin and his team displayed political short-sightedness by deciding to bank on the plan that worked in 2000s and erroneously suggest people will see more of it once Putin is elected.
Things have changed since 2000. Many Russians see Putin as having misled them by replacing one set of oligarchs with another, the polarisation of wealth continues and living standards have suffered due to the global crisis but also the slow pace of reforms.
The pre-election campaign has been less about the future than about the past, with Putin talking about the dreadful 1990—but there are younger voters now who want to see Russia changing faster and for the better.
One major problem is corruption, but this is only the most visible symptom of a larger problem—having this huge country is controlled by the Kremlin is not really working. So when Putin says that once he is back in the presidential office he will centralise it more, for many this means facing another decade of corruption and bureaucracy.
Putin and his team hope that given the low turnout at the latest opposition demonstrations and the coming of the festive season, the protest may fizzle out, as the opposition itself is rather fragmented and has no prominent uniting figure.
However, should this not be the course of events, Putin has to come up with a "Plan B", something that his team would need to work hard over the course of coming weeks.
Outlook and implications
The Russian government is not facing a revolutionary uprising as recently seen in North Africa or the Middle East. The opposition is only in the early stages of awakening but already has serious divides such as those between liberals and nationalists. That said, the fact that a rainbow opposition came out united by anti-Putin feeling is a serious message.
Russian civil society has been dormant for two decades and this inert state has made the Kremlin political ideologues miscalculate their strategy. Perhaps the situation was best summed up by the governor of Vologodskiy Oblast, Vyacheslav Pozgalyev. Explaining why the ER did so poorly in his region—managing to gain only 33.4%—he diagnosed one of Putin’s party’s key weaknesses.
Pozgalyev said that the ER was behind the times as the electorate has changed but not the party; the voters have a better life and are more liberated in their views, something that "the political advisers of ER failed to spot".
The recent protests gave prominence to new set of opposition leaders who could potentially lead the opposition in coming years. The Kremlin would need to closely monitor the course of action by famous blogger-turned-politician Alexei Navalny in coming months.
Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin, who was unceremoniously ousted following the Medvedev-Putin position swap, also indicated his willingness to aid the creation of a liberal party and it appears that he may collaborate with Russia’s third wealthiest man Mikhail Prokhorov, who is reportedly intending to take part in the presidential race. Should this happen, it could be a game-changer and certainly a positive development for Russia’s political landscape.
Unlike traditional liberals who have been rightly or wrongly tainted by association with the early 1990s and the economic hardship that befell most Russians, the new political parties will be more centrist with more inclusion for nationalist agenda as well.
Putin has always been very sensitive to his popularity ratings and it must be hard for him to see his popularity tumbling. But he is not really ready to undergo any dramatic change yet.
After the initial damage assessment he is likely to revamp his populist agenda to increase public spending and start perhaps showcasing high-profile corruption cases against state officials, but it is hard to see if after a decade in power he has the vision and the vigour to really start a new phase of reforms, end the unhealthy relations between state and big businesses, uphold the rule of law and start decentralising the Soviet-style state bureaucracy and make it more democratic.
Putin can potentially engineer his election in March by securing a high percentage of the vote, but he is well aware that to have viable power for one or even two terms he needs a real and strong mandate. The bad news is that he has to come up with the plan by March, and that is a short time for any politician to come up with a new vision for the future.
IHS Global Insight Russia and CIS political analyst Lilit Gevorgyan can be reached on +44 20 3159 3394 or at [email protected].
