Winter has always given confidence to Russia in pursuit of military and geopolitical
victories. Today the sphere for these geopolitical victories has become the gas sector. It is no
accident that Russia tends to launch its “gas wars” in winter, and 2012 is no exception.
In using gas as its weapon, at whom is the modern Russian geopolitical game directed?
Russia’s new gas debut is a gambit. It is clear that the main task in this game is to gain
substantial financial positional advantage by playing the victim in this acute and complicated
struggle. Who is the victim and who is the victor in this game? Sacrificing the confidence of the
European consumers to “Gazprom”, Russia has once again tried to persuade the EU that Ukraine
is an unreliable transit country, using this as the reason for building South Stream whereby
Russia will bypass Ukraine. Europe was reminded once again of its critical dependence on
Russia and its energy policy in the cold of winter. This gambit attack on Europe was to make it
more compliant in relations with the Kremlin.
As for Ukraine, since independence it has failed to ensure its energy security. Russia
has used this failure in an attempt to control Ukraine. Gas conflicts between Ukraine and Russia
are a series of economic conflicts between Russian “Gazprom” and Ukrainian “Naftogaz”. The
key word in this definition is “economic”, which, de facto, does not match the reality faced by
Ukraine. Among the key attributes of the gas conflicts are political pressure and information
wars. For Ukraine, 2012 began with a new “gas war” with Russia. In 2009, Europe was
convinced that Ukraine was the main culprit and responsible for its own problems. Since this
year a similar situation was observed, the Europeans experienced a case of deja vu.
A latent phase of the new gas conflict took place in December 2011 – at the beginning
of January 2012 when Ukrainian-Russian negotiations on the revision of contracts between
“Gazprom” and “Naftogaz” reached a deadlock. In January “Gazprom” was unsatisfied with the
fact that Ukraine was planning to buy too little gas, citing the illegality of such an action and its
incompatibility with existing contracts. However, once the severe frosts hit accusations began to
abound about the lack of gas being supplied to Italy, Austria, Slovakia and Poland, and the
conflict escalated. Russia accused Ukraine of “stealing” gas as “Gazprom” increased gas
supplies to Western Europe. This manipulation was very successful and Ukraine’s authority in
the European arena was finally undermined.
Although “Gazprom” acknowledged that, in fact, it had rolled back gas supplies, the EU
was provided with additional evidence that both Ukraine and Russia are unstable and
unpredictable, and reiterated the need to diversify its gas supplies. It is more likely that the EU
will take up these programmes with new and doubled up forces, however at this point in time
there is no other choice. It is difficult to predict how this situation will affect the Association
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.
Kyiv’s position is that the current problem could be resolved by setting up a trilateral
consortium (the EU – Russia – Ukraine). However, it is clear that Russia will try in any way it
can to remove the EU from the talks as it does not want this process to be open and transparent.
Assuming that the EU is actively involved in the gas negotiations, it will lead to new problems in
other areas of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. Russia will apply pressure and
force on Ukraine.
In the case of defeat in the gas sphere, Russia will find new methods of coercion. One of
the most striking examples of this approach is the current “cheese war” which is political, not
economic, and based upon the gas conflict and Ukraine’s reluctance to join the Customs Union.
In turn, the European Union cannot distance itself from the settlement of the conflict between
Ukraine and Russia, despite its projects in forming its own energy infrastructure. After having
made its conclusions in 2009, the EU built special storage gas tanks but still, this was not enough
to ensure stability.
In order to loosen Kyiv’s dependence on Moscow a series of difficult but effective
measures must be implemented including, diversification of energy supplies; the search for
alternative sources of energy; the introduction of energy-efficient technologies and closed
production cycles; depoliticization; bringing Russian capital in from the shadows; the eradication
of poverty and corruption at all authoritative levels; and bringing the Ukrainian economy from
out of the shadows.
However, Kyiv has already started the privatization process of energy companies, and it
is not difficult to guess who will take control of them. Ukraine has made concessions to Russia,
thereby gradually “selling” its national interests and sovereignty.
Ukraine must define a specific, clear and strict strategy of cooperation with Russia,
but it should not try to satisfy the short-term preferences of the Eastern neighbour. One
should realize that Russia will never want to let Ukraine off its control hook.
In general, all the gas conflicts between Ukraine and Russia demonstrate Kyiv’s
incredible dependence on Moscow, the lack of clear strategy, and the weakness of and dire
need for energy reforms.
UKRAINE – NATO
Key Theme Analysis: Results of the 12th International NATO Week
“NATO: joint responses to common security challenges”
Having declared non-bloc status in 2010, Ukraine has refocused its relations with NATO
on tactical issues, i. e., specific and practical measures. The 12th International NATO Week was
held February 6 -10 in Kyiv. The theme for the week was, “NATO: joint responses to
common security challenges”. The event of such caliber demonstrated the sophistication of
cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, with emphasis on the practical approach to
cooperation. For the first time, representatives of the NATO Defence College in Rome and the
NATO School in Oberammergau participated in the event. They shared their practical
experiences with Ukrainian officers in preparing and carrying out military operations .During the
discussions the participants not only touched upon threats facing the world in recent years, but
also those that appeared just a few days ago. For example, the hacker attacks on governmental
sites in Ukraine, the USA, Germany and France; attacks on commercial ships in the Atlantic
Ocean and in the Danube River; conflicts in Syria and Egypt; terrorist attacks in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Ukrainian servicemen were introduced to the notion that joint threats mean joint
actions, however more details on this would be revealed in Chicago at the NATO Summit in
May.
According to Lieutenant General Arne Bard Dalhaug, NDC Commandant such conflicts
destroy the balance of international security simultaneously in several parts of the world, so they
should be resolved jointly, where several thousand people who are physically divided by
thousands of miles work together for a common goal. Because of the fact that Ukrainian officers
have experience in peacekeeping and military operations in different parts of the world, they
know what “collective security” means in practice, as well as how to work with servicemen from
various countries to prevent or contain conflict. Of course, these words could only flatter
Ukrainian servicemen. However, the attention given through these words do not focus on mutual
commitments or guarantees from NATO to include the Ukrainian Armed Forces and its available
defence capabilities in its missions and operations. All of this is on a so-called “philanthropic
basis” of cooperation.
On the other hand, Kyiv’s non-bloc status limits taking full advantage of cooperation
with the Alliance, so even the theoretical training of Ukrainian servicemen within the framework
of NATO Week took place within narrow lines. During NATO Week one could hear comments
related to the Ukraine’s non-bloc status and its cooperation with NATO. Some argued that while
NATO was aware of what Ukraine did not want as a non-bloc state, Ukraine had not explained
what was the essence and benefit of the non-bloc security doctrine.
The 12th International NATO Week was of great importance for students of the National
Defence University of Ukraine where the event was held, as it helped accumulate personal
knowledge and increase the level of professional skills through NATO experience. The lectures
and workshops with NATO experts contributed to increasing the military skills of the Ukrainian
Army, police and intelligence services. Unfortunately, Ukraine will remain a spectator of events
unfolding internationally where there is NATO involvement, even with first-hand experience and
theoretical knowledge. Strategically Ukraine will remain on the sidelines due to its non-bloc
status fixed in the Law “On Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy”. This is our own
choice.
FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE
The Munich Conference is the place where countries share their views on regional,
national and global security. Which priorities and trends in the sphere of international security
were identified by members of this year’s Conference? The main trend was the deterioration of
security in the Euro-Atlantic region. The main feature of this as defined by the participants, was
the increase in the deficit of trust among key players in the region that include the USA, NATO,
the EU and Russia, and within security associations. Another feature of the deterioration of
security was the inability of countries and security sector to deal with the new challenges of
the 21st century. The third feature of the security theme was a diverse understanding of threats
to national and international security by its participants. Western countries which were
protected under the NATO umbrella were more concerned about non-traditional, soft threats that
are becoming a serious challenge for them. Cyber attacks are among such threats, and constitute
a real danger. It is not just about cyberspace crime or industrial espionage, but also about the
destruction of national security systems. Therefore, the point was raised that there is a need to
regulate the Internet and to develop software systems that can meet the highest standards of
safety of these critical infrastructures. Some NATO experts proposed including cyber security
issues and the protection of critical technologies under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as an
integral part of collective defence. However, the implementation of such cyberspace controls
goes against freedom, security, interests and rights of citizens. Today, finding the right balance
between security and freedom is a real issue to be resolved.
The United States was primarily concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme and the
problem of nuclear proliferation. The White House succeeded in garnishing support of the EU
to impose economic sanctions on Iran in response to these concerns. The solidarity of Europe
and the US on this issue indicates the exhaustion of diplomatic tools in taking this decision. Yet,
economic sanctions may be ineffective. Western politicians hope that sanctions will help
overthrow the existing regime in Iran and precipitate a change in its foreign policy. Sanctions
have a poor reputation in forcing regime change or driving shifts in political course, and they did
not prevent countries such as Pakistan, India or North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The most effective force to be taken into consideration by all countries and regimes has
been and remains military power. This is not an option for the US and the EU in the case of Iran.
The consequences of going this route could be devastating for everyone involved. Military
intervention will never get a mandate from the UN Security Council when the positions of China
and Russia are taken into account. “Now sanctions are our only option. We must do something,”
one American official said at the Conference.
Among the many security problems, the EU was mostly interested in economic
security. Today’s biggest risk to national security for many European countries may arise in
connection with the fate of the euro. The failure of the European currency can greatly
destabilize the situation in Europe threatening the institutional and economic order of the
European community. The collapse of the euro can fragment the European Union and threaten its
existence. It could have dire consequences for both world trade and the health of the financial
system. In addition, the financial crisis can cause deep and lasting political, economic and social
crises that could ultimately lead to a real crisis of the liberal, market democracy. The potential
consequences of this financial and economic crisis deprive the EU of possibly building up its
own defences.
The crisis has also impacted NATO’s military capabilities. Its defense potential
decreased as the Alliance’s Member States reduced their military budgets in an attempt to
overcome the financial crisis. As a result, NATO and the EU were concerned with the rapid
change in military balance of power in favour of such Asian powers as China. In particular,
Asia-Pacific, Central Asia and the African region are growing in strength. As a result, the role of
the West in maintaining international order consistently diminishes.
Russia also put forth its own security priorities. The first among them was removing
prospects of deploying elements of the AMD, and overcoming the power imbalances in
relations with NATO to restore its own sphere of influence in Europe. For this reason Sergey
Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, suggested including Dmitrii Medvedev’s old
initiative to sign the Treaty on European Security as part of the Munich Conference’s agenda.
The most painful priority of Ukraine’s national security was its energy security. Viktor
Yanukovych outlined the main parts of this problem at the Conference. In particular, he focused
on applying the principles of military and political security in the energy sector. Firstly, this
requires a systematic and consolidated approach based on agreed principles and instruments of
cooperation, including contractual and legal ones. Commitment of the states not to strengthen
their security at the expense of others, recorded in the Istanbul Charter for European Security of
1999, is also required. This key principle could be applied to resolving energy problems. In
practice this means that economic feasibility and environmental compliance, rather than
political interests of separate states, should be determining the implementation of energy
projects.
From this perspective Ukraine proposes to assess the rationality of a new energy
transportation project, specifically the so-called “alternative” routes initiative which will require
enormous financial and human costs, time and may result in significant hazards to the
environment. It is clear that the search for balance in this area is challenging, but balance is
necessary in order to come to a mutually beneficial compromise in any case. The Ukrainian
example points to the need to consolidate joint efforts to develop clear, transparent and fair rules
in the energy sector to achieve a balance of interests: for Ukraine as a major transit country, for
Russia as a supplier, and the EU as a consumer.
The creation of single, clear rules, and an effective legal framework for international
cooperation is the key to success. In particular, Ukraine supports the practical implementation of
initiatives for the creation of multilateral mechanisms to forewarn developing energy crises.
These issues have already been discussed in various formats, including the OSCE. An
agreement could not be reached due to the differences in national positions and the lack of
adequate political will. Since every party discussed their own grievances at the Munich
Conference, it is uncertain that the international community heard the Ukrainian initiatives
this time.
Grihoriy Perepelytsia is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
