I understand well why people can be scared of
the definition that is being used by those who want to cast slurs upon
nationalism. This manipulation is deeply rooted in the European public
mentality. But for me—as a nationalist and a Ukrainian—these terms stand
separately from one another.

A great number of Ukrainian families lost
their loved ones due to Nazis and many of those lost were nationalists. This is
why the policy of confining nationalism to Pandora’s box needs to be rethought.
In the 21st century we should understand that nationalism can be not
only negative, but also positive—egalitarian, mindful of national rights and
concerns, and safeguarding the sovereign state.

The character of nationalist forces in
different countries is determined, among other things, by the unique histories
of nationhood. For the past several centuries, the Ukrainian people did not
have any expansionist campaigns where they would conquer other nations.
Instead, the Ukrainian narrative has been a history filled with foreign
occupation and the tragic extermination of Ukrainians.

This essentially predetermined the face of
Ukrainian nationalism making it defensive and protective rather than offensive
and imperialistic or discriminatory against the rights of national minorities.
It guards Ukrainian sovereignty and the integrity of the state; it protects the
Ukrainian language, history and unique cultural heritage. Ukrainian nationalism
was born out of the need to nourish the idea of the Ukrainian nation-state and
to oppose national oppression.

Today, the only parliamentary nationalist
party in Ukraine is Svoboda (which means Freedom or Liberty) that I
lead. Sometimes Svoboda is described in Europe as a “radical
far-far-far-right fascist neo-Nazi” party. To me, this claim is based on a
widespread phobia of nationalism, on the Russian “concerns” and as-yet-unreconciled
historical experiences, rather than reasonable arguments. In fact, on the
left-right political spectrum, Svoboda is ideologically closer to
conservative ideas.

Svoboda does not position itself as a force
characterized by anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-Europeanism or imperialism. We
honor the soldiers that fought during the Second World War against the Soviet
and Nazis regimes. Since the Soviet Army had many Ukrainians in its ranks that
fought to free Ukraine from Nazism, we honor them together with those who
fought for an independent Ukrainian state.

Svoboda is not in conflict with Ukrainian
Jews, Crimean Tatars, or any other ethnic minority. Suffice it to say that
during the EuroMaidan in Kyiv members of Svoboda stood
shoulder-to-shoulder with others regardless of their ethnic origin. Ultimately,
by defending Ukrainian national interests we defend all those who are
conscientious citizens of our country.

Ukrainian nationalism in Svoboda’s
interpretation is first a love to one’s own nation, culture, territory,
language along with a readiness to defend them. We aim to overcome the social
consequences of our Soviet totalitarian past. That begins with restoring
dignity and historical truth of the Ukrainian nation, something that challenges
traditional narratives written by those who conquered Ukraine in the past. Part
of that entails honoring national heroes. These are the processes that Eastern
European countries successfully passed through during the 1990s.

Svoboda as a parliamentary party has systematically
supported Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU (the voting record of our
MPs proves this). This is in contrast with the position of some European nationalist
parties—especially in Western Europe. Indeed, some of them perceive the EU and
the U.S. as neo-imperialist world hegemons. Yet, for many in Central and
Eastern Europe such perceived threats fall far short of those posed by the
proximity to Russia
that still uses the 20th century imperialist toolkit of realpolitik.

Svoboda stands for
democracy, for the Europe as a union of democratic states enjoying equal rights.
We took active part in the Revolution of Dignity (EuroMaidan) in Ukraine –
which has become a struggle against totalitarianism for democracy and freedom.
You may know that during the EuroMaidan protests the police forces under
President Yanukovych shot dead over 100 people, without counting many missing
persons. Among the dead are 17 our fellow party members. Many of them had to
defend their life from bullets of authorities’ killers only with wooden shields
and sticks. 

Our strategic position at
EuroMaidan was
to achieve our results through peaceful means to pressure the criminal regime
of Yanukovych. Those that label us “Nazi”,
“xenophobic”,
“anti-Semitic” fall victims of propagandistic myths about Ukrainian
nationalism.

In many cases the argument goes that Svoboda is neo-Nazi because “they regard
the leader of OUN-UPA, Stepan Bandera, a hero.”

Yet, even a cursory look at
Ukrainian history—non-corrupted by the Soviet and Russian propaganda machine—would
expose this canard. Stepan Bandera was arrested by the Nazis in 1941 after he
categorically refused to renounce the declaration of Ukrainian independence. As
a result, he was kept in Sachsenhausen concentration camp up until his release
in 1944. He was consequently killed by a Soviet agent in Munich in 1959. The
fate of his relatives was tragic as well. Two of his brothers were killed in Auschwitz concentration camp in 1942. His father was
liquidated by the Soviets. His two sisters were exiled to Siberia.
One died there and the other returned to her homeland only after 50 years. A
third sister was also sentenced to 10 years in the Soviet Gulag. Both Soviet
and Nazi regimes considered Stepan Bandera an enemy since he fought for an independent
Ukraine.

Since the problem in the EU approach to
nationalism is not limited exclusively to Ukrainian Svoboda, I would like to
emphasize on the dangers that “Pandora’s box” kind of approach possesses for
European Union.

Globalization imposes a strain upon nation-states
and has the potential to fuel conflict between the “Pro” and “Anti” EU camps
almost in every member state. What can be more telling about this than the
expected and sociologically confirmed boost in Eurosceptic representation in
the next European Parliament. Given this trend, the issue of reconciliation
between national and supranational identities within the EU is more urgent. The
dissonance represents an emergent threat to the integrity of the European
Community as such. Moreover, the existing circumstances could be used by non-EU
states against the Union.

In fact, the Russian Federation has already
exploited tensions between European nationalists and pro-European forces to
undermine the integrity of the European fabric. For example, consider the list
of “European representatives” during the “Crimean pseudo-referendum” on March
16, 2014 that Russia used to justify its consequent annexation of Crimea. The
“European observers” were overwhelmingly from European far right parties.
Consciously or not, they sanctified the neo-imperialistic actions of Putin’s
authoritarian regime—at least in the eyes of ordinary Russian citizens.

The pursuit of a new balance in the EU will be
impossible as long as European ruling elites simply shun contact with all
nationalists across the board. As a result, it is incumbent upon EU elites to
recognize the legitimacy of those nationalist forces that are ready for a
civilized dialogue and are fit for political cooperation. The nationalists who
search for democracy, freedom, and prosperity of their countries within the
union of equal European nations are apt to become partners able to resolve the
conflict between the national interest and supranational cooperation. 

Oleh
Tiahnybok is the leader of the Svoboda political party