So, after receiving his homework and the May deadline for it, Ukraine’s leader went to Russia. He hoped to receive a better offer from Russian President Vladimir Putin. But the trip did not meet his expectations. Instead of promises from Russia, Yanukovych received a barely veiled threat: either you join the Customs Union and bring your gas transit network with you, or there will be no further talks at all.
We can only guess how badly the visit ended by the next steps undertaken by Yanukovych. He started tightening the screws in the political sphere by increasing pressure on Serhiy Vlasenko, the lawyer of imprisoned former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, by stripping Vlasenko of his parliamentary mandate through court. In the economic sphere, he started the new idea to create a “financial police” force with powers to get into anyone’s home or office without warning or court order to investigate any suspicion of economic misdeeds.
All these actions, along with a complete absence of any official statements on the Russian visit, can lead us to several conclusions.
Firstly, Yanukovych is not ready for European integration. He has troubles accepting the concept behind the European Union with its equal opportunities, people power, transparency of cash flows and inevitability of punishment for crimes.
Secondly, Yanukovych does not want to take responsibility for failing to make progress in EU relations. That’s why he is searching for scapegoats – be it EU leaders or Ukraine’s opposition.
Most of the president’s steps are ceremonial, such as appointing Serhiy Klyuev as head of the governmental coordination agency for European integration, which has been idle since 2010. This shows that the president is more interested in keeping a good face on a bad game rather than playing a good game.
The ideal outcome for Yanukovych would be if the EU brands Ukrainians as people who failed to meet their commitments, while our Foreign Ministry and his administration spin it as their achievement in protecting the Ukrainian producers.
They will say that, by signing a deep and comprehensive trade agreement, Ukraine would get discriminating quotas and customs limitations; that signing an association agreement would let sexual minorities on the loose, and the rest of the typical blah-blah-blah. They will say it’s time to go back to a union of three or four brotherly nations, in other words, to the Customs Union or a Eurasian Union created by Putin.
EU dilemma
The president’s calculations do have a basis in reality. European leaders who have invested heavily in Ukraine’s democratization can get in trouble with their own employers, the people, if they sign an association agreement with an authoritarian state that politicizes justice and persecutes political opponents.
However, European officials have no illusions about the prospects of further evolution of the Ukrainian state if they refuse to cooperate with Ukraine. They’re quite aware of the fact that by 2015 Ukraine will turn into a trade representative of Gazprom if it doesn’t move West.
So, what can our European friends do to overcome this dilemma?
They can sign the association agreement. They will lose nothing since signing is just one step of many in the long process of confirmation of this agreement. The 27 European nations, as well as the European parliament, would have to ratify the agreement.
Signing passes the ball to our leaders’ field. They will no longer be able to tell tall tales about the evil Europeans who don’t love Ukraine. Also, signing gives more leverage in making Ukraine’s European choice irreversible.
Road to democracy
Many historical examples speak in favor of this method. Slovakia is a case in point. Its European integration started with an agreement in 1993, artificially slowed down by the Socialist government. As a result, economic reform did not move beyond declarations. Privatization was either stalled or benefiting the clan of leader Vladimir Meciar.
Access of foreign investors was limited and isolationist measures were in place – such as import quotas and licenses. In other words, the Slovak government was taking steps similar to our government’s initiative to renegotiate quotas and tariffs within the World Trade Organization.
Nevertheless, in all those five years, the work of the agreement with Slovakia was not stopped. But when the European Commission started negotiations in 1998 with potential new members of the EU, Slovakia was left out of the list of contenders.
The sad news mobilized the nation, and activated the community and media who demanded active steps from the government. The world community talked about the risks of losing such a historical chance. As a result, Meciar’s government was replaced by the democratic government of Mikuláš Dzurinda who returned Slovakia to the list of candidates for entering EU.
Lessons we can learn
Slovakia’s example is very telling. The agreement with Europe was signed by an authoritarian government under pressure from civil society, media and foreign partners. It not only moved the country to Europe, it eventually changed the country.
We have at least as many foreign partners and a civil society ready to take on a real role. The civic organization “We – Europeans,” for instance, coordinate a working group of experts, politicians and activists who monitor the commitments that Ukraine undertook during the last Ukraine-EU summit.
Ukraine’s European integration might gain its second wind when people realize that progress is up to them.
Lesya Orobets is a member of parliament from the Batkivshchyna Party minority opposition faction in the Verkhovna Rada. She is also the secretary of the parliamentary committee on foreign relations.
