Not mentioned, however, was the mother of all myths — now rapidly evaporating — that Ukraine can enter into an association
agreement with the EU while the present regime is in power in Kyiv, without
first flushing down its authoritarian tincture.
This myth was fostered or accepted by nearly all of
Ukraine’s elite as well as by most of the democratic opposition and the
literati. Incredibly, the worldwide
media and diplomatic corps went for it, hook and sinker. Very few, mostly in
the pedestrian compartment (including this writer) were clearly saying or
writing that this was nonsense. And a huge bubble.
One of the most telling expressions of outrage and
disappointment in the crowds that were assaulted by riot police on November 30
was “why the opposition parties were not protecting the protesters”. The short
answer is that the opposition has no organized combat units that could challenge
the interior ministry troops.
The present setting is different from the power lineup
during the Orange Revolution — when
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) signaled it was siding with the revolution,
and some in the Army’s top brass made it be known that the Army “will defend
the people”. A New York Times article (“How Ukraine’s top spies decided to
change the path of their nation”, January 17, 2005) provided a vast amount of
detail, not easily found in Ukrainian sources. For instance:
“The support from the SBU did not start with the protests.
Long before the election the siloviki and the opposition opened quiet lines of
communication…… It was an important element that aided the operation
professionally and systematically”. It
goes on to describe that ‘siloviki” occupied strategic positions on rooftops,
and how in closed-door meetings top government officials, including President
Leonid Kuchma, were persuaded by revolution supporters that government forces
were outgunned.
In a nutshell, the Orange Revolution, spontaneous as it was,
was organized as a revolution and not as a picnic. In contrast, public protests
at Maidan in November 2013 were “nonpolitical”, according to activists that
appeared to be setting the tone.
Perhaps coincidentally, in an interview with the BBC Hard
Talk on November 27, Petro Poroshenko, billionaire businessman and former
minister in Yuschenko’s government, pointed out that “68 percent of Ukrainians
want association with the EU for economic reasons, having nothing to do with
politics”.
Nothing to do with politics? In that case, such “support” is
insufficient. Poroshenko should know better. It is unlikely that Ukraine will
connect with the European Union without strong political action – such as toppling the present regime.
In case you missed the latest advice from Yanukovych to the
European Union, have it here: “Stop meddling over Tymoshenko…. She was part of
a gang of criminals…..” (Reuter, November 27). Too many Ukrainians will be
pretending, for their personal detachment and comfort, that this is not another
slap in the face of Ukraine. This is
their answer to the question “Why not ask what Ukrainians can do for their
country?” Their answer is consistent
with a Ukrainian adage: “When someone spits in their eyes, they are saying it’s
raining”.
Pretending that Yulia Tymoshenko is not a high-profile
victim of Yanukovych’s wrath, and a symbol of Ukraine behind bars, precisely
because she is an uncompromising defender of democratic path, is like saying
that Nelson Mandella didn’t spend 20 years in jail in his fight for a better
future of millions of black Africans.
In this late hour Ukraine needs not just a solution for its
ailing economy, but first and foremost, a national liberation plan, no matter
how rapidly drawn, with participation of patriotically minded players at all
levels of its political stratum.
Boris Danik is a Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
