No less
importantly, the split is also characterized by cultural and language chasm
between west and southeast.
As the
Regions Party gained control of the government in 2010 with Viktor Yanukovych
becoming president, democracy in Ukraine is eroding, political persecution is
on the rise,. and the state’s Ukrainian identity is ravaged.
Not
surprisingly, resentment has been growing among patriotic Ukrainians, who see
the high expectations for a national Ukraine dashed by the ongoing Soviet-style
regression and unabated russification. “The
mutual non-acceptance of mentalities” is so deep that the ability to live in
one country exists only because of the absence of contact between each other, a
respected Ukrainian intellectual told the daily newspaper Den in Kyiv.
In a
front-page article in The Ukrainian Weekly, February 24, headlined “Once a
taboo subject, separatism now advocated by some in Halychyna,” Zenon Zavada
reported from Kyiv that talk about secession is now heard more often.
The mood along
those lines is described in Zavada’s article by extensive quoting of well known
individuals, such as: “Present-day Ukraine doesn’t suit anyone. The patriots
aren’t happy because they are forced to reconcile with the fact that a classic
nation-state won’t emerge here. The post-Soviets passively reject an independent
Ukrainian state and pathologically reject anything Ukrainian.”
A respected
media host recently suggested that Ukraine should be divided along the lines
corresponding to the borders of the 16th century Polish-Lithuanian
commonwealth. Remarkably, beyond those lines at that time was Ukraine’s
uninhabited southeast, from which the Crimean Tatars staged devastating raids
into Ukraine’s “borderland.”
It is the
same southeast that now is an industrial heartland with an upper hand in
Ukraine.
Others say
that Halychyna, or the entire western part of Ukraine that was under the rule
of Poland before 1939, should be given the right to secede.
That’s the
libretto. Now consider a reality check. The first question is: Is western
Ukraine today more free than it was under Poland’s rule before 1939? No argument there. But why ask that question?
That
question had to be asked because the idea of an independent Halychyna, or of
the entire western Ukraine is dream-like. They would be absorbed into some
larger conglomerate as soon as the current posturing of international peace and
idyll in Europe goes by the wayside toward the traditional “dog eats dog”
configuration. American power that up to this point had bound Europe together
with common goals will not be weighing in forever. Nothing is permanent except
greed. The rest is likely to change sooner rather than later.
Today
Ukraine has some standing (however shaky) in the eyes of the European Union and the USA, mainly
because of its potential to be a viable state that makes Russia smaller than it
was as a world power that could threaten Europe.
In particular, Poland’s leaders these days apparently
understand that a viable independent Ukraine effectively depresses, if not
entirely changes, the scenario in which Poland was sitting between hammer and
the hard place of Germany and Russia for almost 200 years.
And — equally important — Poland’s leaders can plainly see that
Ukraine needs Halychyna to bolster own consciousness and survive as a nation
and an independent state.
All of
these incentives for Europe and Poland would evaporate if Ukraine becomes
divided, and its main body, where industrial power and population mass resides,
is inescapably gobbled up by Russia.
And so,
giving up the struggle for democracy in Ukraine as a prime goal that provides
freedom of choice and an essence of justice for all its citizens is not an
option.
It is true
that in any diverse society various forces are at play: the national idea,
commercial interests, ethnic passion on all sides, and economic pressures as
well as moral scruples.. Add to this corruption and mafia — and
not only in the Donbas. Corruption also exists in some pristine places — you can name them.. Likewise,
semi-criminal excesses in banks and quasi- financial entities can be found
almost anywhere in the world, for which they almost never bear consequences.
But at the
end of the day, if Ukrainians cannot achieve a degree of civility and justice
for all citizens in the now existing state, they will not get it in any other
configuration, not even in the bliss of a nation-state.
Blaming
others can be the main trap in any layout. Apparently alluding to a declaration
by Donbas residents in 2004 that demanded secession from Ukrainian state, one
separation proponent for Halychyna was quoted as saying: “The illusion of
Ukraine’s territorial integrity exists only because one of their boys is sitting
in Kyiv on his throne. Therefore, one-seventh of Ukraine determines how the
country is living as a whole”.
Really?
“Their boy” was elected president in 2010 by a majority vote, thanks to
insufficient support given to Yulia Tymoshenko’s candidacy in places like the
classic Ukrainian Poltava oblast, mostly because of the bad economy in a
worldwide recession, for which she was unjustly blamed. Nearly two million
fewer voters went for her than for Viktor Yushchenko in 2004.
But once
again, Halychyna should be praised for giving Ms. Tymoshenko 88 percent,
despite Yushchenko’s antics urging the
people to “vote for nobody”.
The way to
victory is to gain control of the government, instead of whimpering as it shows
in quoted pamphlets. Power is obtained by winning elections, despite marginal
chicanery by the Yanukovych cohorts.
Again,
Ukrainians in central regions have only themselves to blame for losing the
parliamentary elections in October 2012, despite the opposition’s win of
majority vote.
How are
elections lost while winning a majority vote? In the USA, the Republican Party
lost the popular vote by one million nationwide in the 2012 Congressional
elections, and yet it obtained a majority in the Congress by gerrymandering the
Congressional districts when it had control of the legislatures in many of the
50 states.
In Ukraine,
the opposition camp lost elections despite winning the majority vote, by
ignoring the advice to run only one party slate campaign in the single-mandate
districts — as demonstrated by Vitali
Klitshcko’s Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms Party (with some
exceptions), with disastrous results. This kind of separation can tip the scale
the wrong way as it did last year. It is usually fostered by the temptation of
self-importance — which has dogged Ukraine’s proverbial “otamans” over the
centuries.
Perhaps
Ukraine’s intellectuals could make themselves more useful by explaining to the
democratic opposition’s aspiring leaders how not to lose elections.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American
living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
