Western countries are sending mixed messages to Ukraine’s leaders. The British government hosted an international conference in London in early July that praised Ukraine’s leaders for their reform achievements since the EuroMaidan Revolution that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014.
To the surprise of Ukrainians present, several foreign participants spoke positively about the results of judicial reform despite clear evidence that Ukrainian courts remain a key element in a system that abuses rather than upholds the principle of justice
Visits to Kyiv shortly afterward by U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg were tougher on the need for real action to address pervasive corruption in state institutions. Stoltenberg correctly identified the problem as a national security issue.
Western countries have provided strong political support to Ukraine over the past three and a half years and have avoided the temptation to “accommodate” Russian interests. They are under pressure to demonstrate to their electorates that they are pursuing the right course and that Ukraine is making the necessary progress.
This explains the positive messages. They also believe that there are limits to how hard they can push President Petro Poroshenko and the government on delivering a challenging set of reforms when the country remains at war with Russia.
Yet here they are playing into the hands of Ukraine’s “old” elites that want to carry out the minimum level of reforms to maintain as far as possible their rent-seeking model that has served them well for more than 20 years at the expense of the country.
Poroshenko’s game is simple. He is exploiting Russia’s continuation of the war against Ukraine to persuade Western countries that they must continue to support him as president to protect themselves.
At the same time, he is using the war as a justification for the government’s slow progress on reforms.
Western countries are also victims of their success: the International Monetary Fund’s stabilization package has worked.
Ukraine’s currency reserves are now over $17 billion and the economy is growing modestly. The authorities are no longer under the same economic pressure as they were in 2014. The experience of those days showed that the government could achieve the impossible if it needed external funding.
The far-reaching reform of Naftogaz is a powerful example. Just as the IMF now has less leverage over Ukraine, the European Union has granted visa-free travel to Ukrainians, giving up a major source of influence over the country.
In this situation and with the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections already on the horizon, there are signs that the pace of reform is slowing further and the “old” guard is fighting back against the anti-corruption reforms. These include efforts to water down the stringent requirements for asset disclosures and rein in the new National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, or NABU, which is trying to investigate official corruption.
Western countries have so far been silent on other important gaps in the reform agenda.
The 2014 coalition agreement committed the ruling parties to reforming the electoral system. Society has been pushing for a proportional representation system for elections to parliament in preference to the current mixed system that favors established parties such as the Poroshenko’s that can offset their low level of support at the expense of smaller parties by virtue of the majority principle. This system is hindering the process of political renewal that Ukraine so desperately needs. Society has developed faster than its political leaders.
There has also been no progress on a similar commitment to make it realistically possible to impeach a president of Ukraine. Current legislation requires approval from both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court as well as a 75 percent majority in parliament. The Kremlin used this loophole in 2014 to justify its actions in Ukraine, arguing that Yanukovych remained the “legal” president, even after he had fled to Russia.
An overhaul of the Central Election Commission has still to take place despite the fact that the terms of several of its members expired years ago.
There is increasing speculation that Poroshenko will seek re-election in 2019 despite catastrophically low personal and party ratings. He might succeed.
By sticking to the current electoral system, he can compensate for his relative lack of support while also easily persuading Ukraine’s Western backers that he is a more reliable ally than his nearest rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. He can argue that the continued partial reforms he offers are a guarantee of stability compared to the populist remedies offered by Tymoshenko that threaten renewed macroeconomic stability and deviation from Ukraine’s European course.
Western countries need to look beyond the paradigm that Poroshenko embodies.
What Ukraine needed in 2014 no longer applies for several reasons: the country found the strength to resist Russia, more thanks to the efforts of society than its leaders.
In addition to economic improvement, rapid processes of transformation are under way in society as Ukrainian citizens become better organized at the local level to hold their leaders accountable and assert their rights.
Ukraine now has an excellent chance to develop a new national elite drawn from the younger generation of officials, parliamentarians, civic activists, journalists and others who have emerged since 2014. Together with a remarkably vibrant and increasingly capable civil society, these people have the capacity to ensure that Ukraine makes a decisive break with its past.
It is time for Western countries to take a longer-term view of Ukraine and communicate a clear message to the Ukrainian public about the need for political renewal.
Sergii Bondarchuk was a member of the Ukrainian parliament (2002-2005) and general director of Ukrspetseksort (2005-2010). He led a number of public initiatives in 2012-2013 in favor of Ukraine’s European integration.
