Long answer, keep reading – but it’s going to take a while. Lots of words in this essay, you are warned.
My thinking is (1) the Ukrainian military is no longer a walkover (2) the Russians are politically and militarily not in an immediate assault mode and (3) NATO is doing things that will get Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attention.
This is not to say Putin isn’t dangerous, or that he couldn’t invade because of stupidity. The guy is a menace and the only way to deal with him is force. But the time where Putin gets send his army wherever he wants, free pass, are fading – because now, slowly, he is being met by force.
My breakdown goes like this:
Political situation, domestic and international:
– It looks like four-way talks in Europe next week, and I don’t think Putin will do anything until then;
– Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (March 29) said Russia has “absolutely no intention” of invading eastern Ukraine. Yes the Russians lie but they usually try and leave themselves an escape clause via double talk. Here the escape clause is, of course, if the Russians see a reason they must invade for their own national interest. But it has to be present, even on a farcical level, and that brings me to my next point.
– The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)/titushki (hired thugs) attempt to raise revolution in the east has failed. Kharkiv’s titushki are arrested, Donetsk’s titushki are arrested and Luhansk’s titushki are surrounded, and there are only about 60 of them (albeit armed). In Mykolayiv, a pro-Russian presidential candidate tried to visit a hospital, the locals yelled at him, roughed up his entourage and chased him away. It is getting harder and harder for Russia even to find a bad pretext to invade more of Ukraine.
– The Ukrainians have tightened their borders in what I see as a smart way, not full lockdown but just tight screening, so every day they seem to be combing out the idiot titushki crossing in from Russia. There is a limited number of poor, agressive thugs in Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts, and according to the Ukrainian border troops they’ve identified, blacklisted and sent back to Russia thousands. This has reduced the number of violent people Putin has been able to send into Ukraine, and political destabilization is pretty much the first card in the Red Army invasion playbook. Which moves me smoothly to the next topic.
Russian military:
– Reported Russian force levels are falling, no two ways about it. The panic reports used to be in excess of 100,000, now, the working number seems to be, in the panic media, about 40,000.
– The laundry list of major units on Ukraine’s eastern border seems to include: 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, 4th Guards Kantimirovskaya Tank Division,6th Pskov Airborne Assault Division and two battalions of the 106th Tula Airborne Division.There seems to be about a regiment of attack helicopters and there are hospitals being built but – and I think this is significant – we haven’t seen reports of heavy artillery. The logical artillery unit to hunt for would be 288th Artillery Brigade, which is of course the big gun element of 20th Army, which 2nd and 4th Guards are subordinate to. There is always room for a break with precedent but, for the past 300 years, if Russians go to war, they always, always always take lots of cannon. This to me is another argument against a Kremlin plan to start all out combat real soon – unless of course they’ve hidden 288th Artillery Brigade very well.
– The Russians according to news reports seem to be rotating units in and out, and at least some of the above-mentioned units appear to be in theater in partial strength. My estimate based on tea leaves and gut instinct is that there are about 20,000 Russian combat soldiers now on Ukraine’s eastern frontier. That’s a lot, but it’s not four full-strength combat divisions nor is it overwhelmingly superior to what the Ukrainians have on the other side.
– I think it’s worth noting Tamanskaya and Kantinmirovskaya are parade units; their main job is marching on Red Square. This is not to say they aren’t capable of fighting, but they are not first-line combat troops. If it’s the 20th Army that the Russians have on the Ukrainian eastern frontier – and I think that’s absolutely the case – then these are units that have a higher number of draftees and low number of professional soldiers in the ranks than the green people that invaded Crimea. Those Russians were from 49th Army, which is Russia’s most professional and combat-ready army, because 49th Army normally is stationed in the Caucasus and the insurgents try to kill Russian soldiers from time to time. The 49th of course would figure in any campaign into mainland Ukraine, but to do that they would either have to fight through the Crimean bottleneck against Ukrainian paratroopers and (I think) marines; or they have to do something amphibious or airmobile.
– The Americans just released pix of the Russians in cantonments near Rostov. As of April 5 the tanks and armored personnel carriers were in the motor pool. As I understand it, the picturee was shown at an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europea meeting recently. This is the southern wing of the Russian offensive. Not to say they can’t get moving, but at the moment, or at least very recently, they were parked. Good for intimidation, bad for a suprise attack.
Ukrainian military:
– The Ukrainians say they have mobilized and I sort of believe them. The level of Ukrainian military activity is the most intense that I have seen, ever, and I have been in country more or less since 1993.
The Ukrainian Air Force
– On the air front, the Ukrainians have done an exercise where they put 80 – 100 aircraft into the air, about half of them fighters, and they are bringing more fighters out of storage and bringing them online. This is already unprecedented for Ukraine; it is a demonstration of air combat capacity both NATO and Russia needed to see, if the Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is ever to be taken seriously.
– As an aside, if it ever does come to shooting, the Russians may wind up having committed a basic air campaign error. They invaded Crimea, overran about ¼ of Ukraine’s air force on the ground, and they didn’t arrest a single Ukrainian pilot. Why was this a mistake? Because, grasshopper, it is taking the Ukrainians about a week to bring a mothballed MiG-29 back to combat status – they have dozens. This is not Georgia or Afghanistan where aircraft mechanics are hard to come by: the Ukrainians build modern airplanes, they have a developed aircraft educational system, and now they’re calling up the reserves – which includes mechanics. It takes four years to train a fighter pilot. And now, that the Russians (or maybe Yanukovych) are buying violence in Donetsk, Kharkov and Lugansk, there are Ukrainian fighters in the air and flying the Russian border.
The Ukrainian land force
– On the land front, the Ukrainians say their army is mobilized. I tend to believe them. They aren’t saying how much that is and where, but I’ve seen reports of the following ground forces actually in position vs. 20th Army: (1) one Ukraine’s airmobile brigades (contract soldiers, a good percentage with Iraq war experience), (2) a single tank brigade, (3) two motor rifle brigades (4) a national guard brigade/regiment, about 1,500 men equipped with Ukraine’s spiffy BTR-4 armored personnel carrier (5) something like 3,000 extra border troops. This is not counting something like a brigade of Marines that got evacuated from Crimea and currently is “resting” in places like Nikolaev and Odessa. My WAG estimate is the Ukrainians have something like 15,000 ground soldiers on the ground right now up against 20th Army, and that’s before they call up reserves. I know of one airmobile brigade blocking the Crimea and logically, if it came to shooting, the Marines in Mykolaev and Odessa would reinforce them.
Bottom line: the Russians appear to outnumber the Ukrainians about 2 or maybe 3 to 1 by my personal count. That’s an advantage but not a decisive one.
If the Ukrainians fought they would be less mobile but the weaponry itself would be roughly equal. Where they actually got into combat with the Russians I think the Ukrainians would give as good as they got, and quite possibly more: it’s their ground, their maps, their country, and the Russians seem to be doing everything they can to associate their military with the Wehrmacht in the minds of Ukrainians, and I can’t think of a better way to make that peaceful nation willing to fight. All of which would give any rational Russian military planner pause – and yes, my personal escape clause in this essay is that I don’t consider the guy at the top of Russia strictly rational.
The 64,000 hryvnia question
– Which brings us to the Ukrainian will to fight.
Everyone from the president to the chief of staff to the colonels that are getting dragged onto TV are saying the same thing: if the Russians cross the border, they’re going to get a shooting war. Some of the Ukrainian officers are pointing out the Russian military is not all-conquering, it has “weak points”. Also, Turchinov has said that the West will only help Ukraine if Ukraine stands up for itself. That is another incentive not to back down if the Russians cross the line. I think the Ukrainians would fight but more importantly I think the Russian general staff will think the same thing, not least because Russian propaganda assumes Ukraine is a country full of Bandera terrorists.
– Russia probably could defeat Ukraine’s army over time – although I wouldn’t call it automatic – but in any case that’s only the start of Russia’s military problem. Ukraine can create big and very dangerous partisan movements in any major city, outside Crimea, simply by arming citizens and backing them up with the police and the secret police. The Russians do not have anything like the force to suppress an insurgency in Ukraine unless they start killing Ukrainians like the Germans did in World War Two. And if the Russians do that then NATO would not stay out, and the Russians know it.
All sorts of planes flying to NATO’s north flank
– And speaking of NATO, they have run through most of their standard threats and are now moving to the “increase troops near the theater” phase. Among other deployments I’ve noticed:
– There are 4 US F-15s in the Baltic Statesperforming standard patrols and playing games with airspace over Kaliningrad. The US Air Force is bumping the number to 12.
– Reuters citing a NATO spokesman says Britain will contribute 4x Typhoons (not really a fighter, more like a strike bomber) and Denmark 6 x F-16s (fighters) to be on standby in Denmark to beef up the Baltic NATO patrols.
– Poland will kick in 6 x MiG-29 (NATO-ized)
– Normally these Baltic patrols NATO bases in Lithuania. However, four of the Dennmark F-16s have the option of flying out of Estonia, because Estonia wants to help.
– France has “offered” 4 fighters (Rafales are the high-end option and Mirages are the low-end option) as well to start flying in May, maybe out of Poland.
– The Germans have “offered” 6 Eurofighters as well.
Whoops, NATO is about to assemble a multi-task air wing in the Baltic region!
– What’s all this NATO aircraft shifting mean? It means, Captain Solo, that sluggish NATO has announced it will shove, into a region where it normally flies 4xF-16 from time to time, the following aircraft: 12xF-15, 6xF-16, 6 x Eurofighter, 6 x MiG-29 and 4 x Rafale/Mirage. The plan appears to be to get most of them there by late May. The participants are the US, France, Germany, Britain, Denmark and Poland. That’s an overt sign of NATO solidarity. Previous news reports put the number of AWACs (one British, one German) flying in those parts at two.
That means, those combat aircraft, have the best early-warning radar and interception radars in the world backing them up, if necessary 24/7. Taken together, this isn’t symbolic, this is a substantial commitment of NATO airpower. It doesn’t include what the Poles and the Romanians base against Russia normally, nor does it take into account the fact that all these bits and pieces elements are potential intial parties.
Every squadron sent, by the Americans, the Brits, the Germans the French, is part of a combat wing and so the lead element of another 2-3 squadrons that could show up almost overnight. That is another message to Russia: if we choose, once we get our multinational drips and drabs to east Poland or thereabouts, we will be in a position to bump that number to 100+ aircraft in about 72 hours.
It is a message to Putin: we are setting up our airplanes so we challenge the Russian air force for air superiority over Ukraine, and if it comes to fighting and NATO decides to make an issue of it, then the Russian air force must either hide or be destroyed. Yes, Russia has more airplanes. They do not have AWACS, they do not have a pilot corps that has flown thousands of combat missions (thank you Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali and to a lesser extent Serbia and Kosovo); the Russians do not practice stuff like sortie surges and air campaigns, and the National Security agency would not on the side of the guys with Cyrillic alphabet, except the Ukrainians of course.
I’m sure the Kremlin isn’t worried about losing an air war over Ukraine, that’s just military geek stuff, but they have to be worried about this: If Brussels decides to reinforce, then NATO could erect a no-fly zone over Ukraine. That’s not fantasy, not if the Russians start killing Ukrainians. This military message cannot be lost on the Russians, and unless they reposition forces from Siberia they cannot even try to stop NATO’s air arm, and even if they did I doubt the Russians would have much chance. NATO’s advantage in the air is overwhelming, the Russian know it, and they will huff and puff but it will scare them.
And on the Black Sea front…
– That’s just the northern tier. In Romania on April 1Romanian President approved a U.S. request to deploy more force to “Mihail Kogalniceanu” air base (where I predicted). The bump will raise US forces there to 1,600 troops including what appear to be 600 US Marines (up from a company to a battalion), as well as “a number of military aircraft to fulfill specific missions.
The beef up is to the “Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force”, which officially is a joint air-land-sea NATO training entity. And I’m sure it is when there’s no war afoot, plenty of joint training and tug-of-war competitions and cross-training and barbecues, but in any case, you don’t have to be Napoleon to figure out the message there: NATO’s gears are turning so it can do something bigger than usual out of Mihail Kogalniceanu airfield.
A minimal possibility might be, increased NATO surveillance of the Black Sea. The Russian worst case might include a big NATO beef-up of combat aircraft in Mihail Kogalniceanu (planes can shift bases very fast, Herr Goering taught us that) and just maybe a battalion of US Marines able to go wherever in the Black Sea NATO thinks it can send them.
If you want a fantasy Hollywood scenario try this: Ukrainian marines return to Crimea with US marines on their left flank and, uh, Romanian marines on their right flank. Never happen but pleasant to think about, not least because, somewhere in the Kremlin, there are people that HAVE to think about and it bothers them.
– The Americans just sent another destroyer into the Black Sea, so now it’s two. I bet they’ll be more.
Stefan Korshak is a former Kyiv Post staff writer
