As a European Affairs student at Lund University in Sweden, I was asked to author a term paper for my class on Europe in international politics. The task was to explain whether I consider the European Union (EU) to be a power.
My paper turned out to be as straightforward as its title: “When the Postmodern Met Modern: Why the European Union is a New Type of Global Foreign Policy Actor in a World of Sovereign States. And Why it is Not a Power.”
Six years later, as I watch British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Polish counterpart Mateusz Morawiecki pledge support during a visit to Kyiv, I maintain my assertion: The EU is not a real power – and the current crisis at the Ukrainian border has amplified its ineptitude.
Peace vs. war
The Union started out as a peace project in the 1950s powered by the assumption that a coal and steel union between France and Germany would preempt new wars in Europe. Over time, more countries joined the European Economic Community, resulting in the creation of the EU in 1993.
The mantra was and still is, that one day it would become a federal state. Until then, it would act as a global “ethical” or “normative” power – arguably, reflecting superfluous academic concepts that presume that actor B will change its behavior because actor A is “better.”
In reality, throughout the years Brussels acted as a regional force with foreign policy leverages such as trade agreements, visa waivers, and the membership “carrot,” – all of which incentivize countries to implement EU-centric reforms.
In times of peace, these leverages might have sufficed to qualify the EU as a force or even a civilian regional power by modernist foreign policy standards. More so since the economic and political union of 27 countries kept successfully integrating former Soviet republics and satellite states.
But those times ended eight years ago after Russia annexed Crimea, started the Donbas war, and shot down the MH-17 Boeing airliner in broad daylight. And with them came the first death of the EU’s foreign power.
For years, the EU has been trying to carry out a quasi-independent foreign policy from NATO and the U.S., floating the idea of strengthening European security and taking some steps to realize it. Yet, when a series of crises took place in 2014, the EU was almost immediately sidelined.
Although Brussels did introduce sanctions against Russia after the sham referendum in Crimea, it played no major role in the Normandy Format talks or the Minsk Agreements. Instead, member states Germany and France took the reins.
It would be reasonable to assume that the current Russian military build-up at the Ukrainian border is the second death of the EU’s foreign power. But I would argue that it occurred earlier than that: during High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell’s official visit to Moscow in early 2021.
During the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the EU and its member states, sceptical of the policies of the “very-very terrific and great” U.S. president, reignited the idea of strengthening European security and becoming an independent foreign policy player.
But Borrell’s attempt to show the EU’s ambitions in Moscow went terribly wrong as he found himself publicly lambasted by the Kremlin and its puppet journalists.
The current crisis is a continuation of that downsizing. From the outset, the Kremlin made it clear that the only entities worth talking to in its highly modernist view of foreign policy are its archrivals NATO and the U.S., which it considers to be synonymous.
This is clearly reflected in its ultimatums and the “concessions” contained therein to accept the White House’s official promise to stop the Alliance’s expansion instead of a collective promise.
The recent attempt of France’s president and current EU presidency holder Emmanuel Macron, who is determined to create a new security framework both because of Afghanistan’s chaos and Russia’s regional appetites, to solve the crisis the Sacre Bleu way has expectedly borne little fruit.
Russian President Vladimir Putin simply told him that Moscow’s concerns were ignored by both Brussels and the U.S. But we are talking about the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons not far away from Brussels, not Brussels.
So, where does all this leave the EU?
Except for all the hackneyed talk of the need for the EU and its member states to decide whether they are an intergovernmental institution or a federalist wannabe, the real task is for Brussels to reinvigorate those leverages that it already has.
In recent years, trade agreements, visa waivers, and other traditional means have begun to wear out because of the EU’s unwillingness to expand. The Balkan states, which are official candidates for accession, have yet to receive a specific accession date. Other countries like Ukraine are busy implementing reforms, which is a perennial process in eastern Europe.
There is no immediate recipe for how to do this, especially since the EU has seen the rise of illiberal governments in Poland and Hungary, which are not planning on stepping down anytime soon.
On the contrary, Warsaw’s decisiveness in the current crisis and the promise to launch a new regional format of cooperation with London and Kyiv is strengthening its influence domestically and abroad.
In the meantime, Victor Orban of Hungary was all smiles during his visit to Moscow that took place the very same day Britain’s Johnson traveled to Kyiv to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Although difficult to come up with, this recipe is far more necessary than the potential creation of a NATO emulator with insignificant nuclear potential, which would add a new decision-making layer in the already heavily packed consensual interagency culture.
It is cumbersome, complicated, and would not necessarily result in Brussels having a greater geopolitical say. It is much likelier to become a new venue for Paris, Warsaw, or Berlin to assert their influence.
So, the best thing Brussels can do in the non-wishful thinking domain is to accept this and focus on those areas it is truly good at – trade, integration, and internal reforms.
Op-ed disclaimer: The Kyiv Post is not responsible or liable for any content in this article, which expresses the personal viewpoint of the author only.
