What a difference
from the 2004 enlargement! At that time 10 states joined the European
Union not only to create one of the largest areas of democracy and
rule of law in the world but also because Europe wished to be closer
to Yalta’s post World War II scenario.
I still remember
elderly people crying in Warsaw on that historical May 1st. The
reason for so many tears was deep-rooted. On that long awaited day
Poland finally defeated the tragic geostrategic situation which
provoked four divisions of the country during the last three
centuries.
After 2004, EU
membership for new candidate nations has changed meaning. The
idealist approach has given way to more pragmatic considerations.
Nation states massage the public opinion to believe that “Aunt
Europe” will pay for all and solve internal problems.
But this is not what
enlargement looks like from the point of view of the European Union.
Every organization typically chooses its development strategy based
on the goals it wants to achieve. Following this logic (and not
forgetting that most candidates have lost some of the ancient
idealistic thrust), we might strive to answer two fundamental
questions.
Taking into account
the continental energy market, is the Ukrainian membership in the EU
less crucial than that of the Balkan states? Considering the Arab
spring revolutions, is it still possible to deny Turkish stability’s
role in the Mediterranean region and in Central Asia?
What appears clear
is that the European Union is not playing
its cards well at the Eastern borders. The strange “semi-isolation”
of Ukraine from the EU is a terrible mistake as is President Viktor
Yanukovich’s failure to solve internal political issues.
All these mishaps
are an unexpected gift to Vladimir Putin’s project to create a
future EuroAsian Union (the next stage in the evolution of the
Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) to
counterbalance the EU in the East and revive old nightmares.
Most Eastern
European intellectuals recognize that historically the key to
Russia’s development is in Kyiv and without Ukraine, Moscow cannot
build an empire. This simple concept, unfortunately, seems to be lost
on officials in Brussels.
The Ukrainian
disappointment at not having become an EU member during the Orange
revolution can be shared, especially if we consider the membership
given to equally problematic Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and the
disastrous results that followed. Brussels would have had a better
position today in terms of control of the strategically important gas
and oil pipelines from Russia and Asia.
The Old Continent
risks losing a historic opportunity in Ukraine.
Giuseppe D’Amato is
an Italian journalist covering Eastern and Central Europe.
