November Eastern partnership summit in Vilnius is heading to a signature of EU – Ukraine association agreement despite all doubts. Predictably but still surprisingly Russia reacted on this by engaging in tough rhetoric, a chocolate war and threat of trade sanctions. Almost the exact same scene was played out during the later stages of Ukraine’s efforts to receive a membership action plan from NATO.
Interestingly, back then Russia declared it had no objections to Ukraine’s European choice. However, with signature on the horizon, Russia again showed its true colors and moved kill-off Ukraine’s EU deal. Just last week, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, openly declared that he considers Ukraine and Russia as “odin narod” – one nation or one people. Yet the Russian’s shot themselves in the foot. As they increased the pressure, so Kyiv pushed back and sped up their efforts to meet the EU’s criteria.
In fact, from a rational point of view Russian concerns are groundless. The Association Agreement has no membership prospect, while the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, even if implemented, offers a much lower level of integration than the Russian-led Customs Union. Ukraine’s sovereignty will remain intact.
Rather Russia’s frantic actions stem from Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions. The region of former Soviet republics has not yet been able to make a comprehensive jump towards efficient democracy, free market economy and social well-being. Thereby, with an uninterested US and a weak EU, there was never a better opportunity to act.
Yet the real challenge will begin once the agreement is signed. The Association Agreement, which will foster closer political links and open markets, represents a good step forward. However, there are serious doubts whether the agreements objectives will be able to withstand the many challenges that Ukraine will have to face.
Current social polls show that 42 percent of Ukrainians support EU accession, with 31 percent backing the Customs Union. However, more than 51 percent believed their lives would improve with greater European integration. It is a good result considering that less than 16 percent of the adult population has traveled to the EU. Yet these figures risk depleting in the face of inadequate EU support and robust pro-Russian forces working to repeat their NATO success story.
Unfortunately, it is likely that pro-European euphoria will evaporate as the high cost of implementation and competitive pressure from EU producers arrives. Candidate countries benefited from generous EU assistance, access to EU funds, and free movement of persons and could therefore justify painful reforms with the prospect of membership. Ukraine will not be so fortunate. Implementation of many EU directives will be very costly; experts forecast that price of implementation of for example the directive on large combustion plants equals up half of Ukraine’s annual budget. Who is going to pay? How will the EU help?
This list of questions could be longer. Hopefully, the movers and shakers from both the EU and Ukraine will discuss in Yalta not only how to sign but also do some seriously brainstorming over how to live with it? Yet there is even a bigger challenge. Russia’s irrational reaction must be neither accepted nor ignored. While cannot allow anyone to question Ukraine’s right to choose its own future, we also need to find a way to accommodate Russia in the European reunification project otherwise the August chocolate war will not be the last one.
Vasyl Filipchuk is advisor to the board of the International Centre for Policy Studies and Amanda Paul is an analyst at the European Policy Centre.
