At the time of Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, first annexing Crimea and then militarily intervening in Donbas, first by stoking a local insurgency and then with a full-scale military assault by Russian forces, it was important to understand why Vladimir Putin felt the need to act.
At the time, I put this low threshold for intervention on the part of Moscow in Ukraine to a range of factors:
Social/cultural/imperial
Putin and many Russians saw Ukraine as a natural extension, or even part, of Russia itself. This is based on 1,000-odd years of common history, with Kyivan Rus being the home of Russian civilization itself, religion, but also much shared common history – a joint struggle against Nazi Germany – close linguistic ties, and much common cultural affinity. There is much to suggest that Putin, and many Russians, never really accepted Ukraine’s right to independence – seeing this as a historical mistake following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. They saw Ukrainians as Russian and, in that part, they saw Ukraine as an essential part of aspirations to a Greater Russian project, recreating Russia’s reach from the nadir of the end of the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s decision then in 2014 to switch its orientation towards the West, looking for European Union and NATO membership, was a huge challenge to Putin’s cultural sense of Ukraine, but also his vision of recreating a Greater Russia.
Economic
Ukraine in 2013-14, at the outset of the EuroMaidan Revolution that drove President Viktor Yanukovych from power, was still closely integrated into the Russian economy. Close to half Ukrainian trade turnover was still oriented to Russia. Ukraine was still an integral part of the Russian energy export infrastructure – still, around two-thirds of Russian gas exports to Europe were being routed through Ukraine. Ukraine also provided key inputs to Russia’s defense, energy, metallurgy, agriculture, aviation, and metallurgy industries. Russian banks held significant investments ($25 billion) in Ukraine. And in terms of people, several million Ukrainians worked in Russia, and numerous Russians vice-versa. Similarly, with the EuroMaidan, was there concern in Russia that its economic security would be threatened by Ukraine’s new tilt West.
Strategic
Moscow couched its trigger to annex Crimea and then intervene in Donbas, as reflecting concern over the encroachment of NATO and the EU into its backyard. The messaging was that this was an offensive play too far by NATO, and EuroMaidan represented a direct strategic and military threat to Moscow. I personally think this is stretching the imagination a bit as de-facto Russia already militarily controlled Crimea through the presence of the Black Sea Fleet on the peninsula and, with it, close to 20,000 troops. The ease with which the Russia military annexed Crimea in 2014 is also testimony to this fact. Important also here is that Russia still enjoyed a 25-year lease over the Sevastopol naval base, which further assured Russian strategic dominance in Crimea and therein over the Black Sea. As to the broader military threat from Ukraine, the ease with which Russian troops initially took territory in Donbas in 2014-2015 just affirmed the weak state of the Ukrainian military at the time and that they represented no real threat to Russia. In fact no threat. Even the Ukrainian military doctrine at the time was set to defend against a perceived threat from the west, not the east. So I would argue that EuroMaidan’s Western orientation at the time posed no real threat to Russia’s military position. Even in 2014, there was only single-digit opinion poll support for Ukrainian NATO membership and most Ukrainians favored a nonaligned status for Ukraine. But it could perhaps be argued that EuroMaidn presented a strategic threat to Russia, as by pulling Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit it undermined Russia’s perception of itself, and even others’ perceptions of Russia, as a global power. In Moscow at least the view was that global powers had “spheres of influence” and they saw Ukraine as clearly existing within Russia’s sphere of influence, despite Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Having this taken away by EuroMaidan was then an affront to Russia’s sense of its own stature in the world.
Ideological
Putin’s grip on Russia is based on some combination of the “power vertical” and the “sovereign democratic” model. Essentially Russia is a managed democracy and, for that matter, quite a managed economic model. Markets are allowed to operate and macroeconomic policy is managed by very capable technocrats. Putin hires the best. Importantly though, Russia’s strategic interests are directed through state control (not necessarily ownership) of powerful national champion corporations – Gazprom, Rosneft, VTB, Sberbank, Transneft, Rusal, et al. The economic and political model is focused on assuring control over society from the very top – one can perhaps add in the defense/security architecture therein as an integral part of this system. But the power vertical/sovereign democratic model is presented, by the Kremlin, as a viable, even a much more efficient and stable governance model than the liberal democratic model in the West. Indeed, Moscow would see the Russian model as in a battle for supremacy with the Western model.
And herein given Moscow has viewed itself in a battle for supremacy with the West, at least since 2008 if not earlier, with different visions of governance, it was not difficult to see how Moscow could see EuroMaidan as a direct threat to the status quo in Russia and Putin’s dominance. EuroMaidan at its heart was a rejection of the power vertical/sovereign democratic model which the former Yanukovych regime resembled. Protesters knew what Moscow stood for and they were clear that they wanted Ukraine to operate as a Western, liberal market democracy. But for Putin the fear was that if EuroMaidan was successful, it could be a model for Russia itself – Russians might actually want something similar, and cast off his rule. This fear is reflected in Putin’s obsession with countering “colored revolutions” which are essentially bottom-up demands by populations to decide their own fate – and where, more often than not, they have typically chosen the Western liberal democratic model. This has been reflected in Russian opposition to colored revolutions across the former Soviet Union — in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan — but also in the Arab Spring, and perhaps even Turkey. Incumbent, authoritarian leaders being removed by popular street protests was too close for comfort for the Putin regime. Hence the revulsion to the Euromaydan’s ousting of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych, and the impulse even compulsion to intervene.
So all that kind of explains why Russia felt the need to walk all over the international order, and international agreements therein (the Budapest Memorandum guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity signed in 1994) by annexing Crimea and intervening in Donbas back in 2014/15. But where are we now? What has changed in five years, and does the recent move by Kyiv and Moscow to engage in a fresh wave of peace talks under the Normandy format presage a new/fresh start between Ukraine and Russia, and perhaps new thinking in Moscow with respect to Ukraine?
Reviewing the four drivers for Russian intervention and where we stand now:
Social/cultural/imperial
I don’t think much has changed in thinking in Moscow. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s own softer rhetoric around issues such as the Russian language issue, and his appeal and electoral success across the country including into more Russia-leaning regions of eastern Ukraine, has perhaps softened Russia’s approach. There is perhaps a recognition that Zelensky represents a move back from the more Ukrainian patriot/nationalist stance of the Petro Poroshenko administration in the last years. There is maybe a willingness to give Zelensky a chance to turn the tide away from the West in Ukraine, even though the new president is still supportive of the country’s EU, and albeit less so NATO, membership drives.
More cynically, there might be a sense in Moscow that Zelensky’s pushback against the Ukrainian nationalist/patriot vent will inevitably deepen internal fissures in Ukraine which can be later exploited – perhaps through further military interventions and land grabs. Hence there is perhaps a willingness to see how Zelensky’s election stirs things up, and bide Russia’s time.
Economy
This has changed most. Ukraine has very significantly disengaged itself from the Russian economy. Trade flows with Russia have collapsed to the low teens as a share of total trade. Reliance on Russian energy imports has massively reduced – near zero now in terms of gas, from prior imports of over 40 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Gas and energy transit has dropped and could decline to near-zero with the completion of Nord Stream 2 and other projects instigated by Russia to cut its reliance on energy transit through Ukraine. Russian banks have been forced to shutter their operations in Ukraine, at a considerable cost to them. The reliance and interdependency of these two economies have massively reduced. So now the two economies have learned to live without each other, very significantly Ukraine’s Western orientation no longer risks a major economic hit to Russia. Whatever hit has already happened, and adjustment made by both economies. Perhaps we are now witnessing the final adjustments with ongoing negations over future energy supply and transit contracts between Russia and Ukraine.
On the strategic and ideological level, much has changed over the past five years to suggest that Moscow might be more willing to adopt a softer approach towards Ukraine.
But at the outset now it is important to note that militarily if Ukraine was no threat to Russia in 2014, it is perhaps now. Its military has been scaled up and benefit from a large amount of training and military assistance from NATO, it is now a serious fighting force or around 300,000 troops. While the Ukrainian military might not be able to defeat an offensive Russian force, it could certainly now inflict sizeably and perhaps defining casualties against any Russian offensive so as to make Moscow think long and hard about such a strategy. Important also is that Ukraine’s military doctrine has now changed to one which now sees the prime risk to Ukraine coming from the East, and not from the West.
What has perhaps changed though in terms of the Russian mindset now is its risk assessment of the West. The advent of the Donald J. Trump presidency, Brexit and the rise of populism in Europe, and the fading star of Angela Merkel have weakened the transatlantic alliance, perhaps terminally. President Emmanuel Macron spoke recently about NATO being “brain dead,” while also downplaying the security threat from China and Russia. A recent U.K. think tank report also noted that the U.K. military was in such a state of decline that it would now lose a direct conflict with Russia, as the defense budget has been cut beyond the bone. And the UK is not alone here. Serious question marks must be raised about NATO’s ability to defend Europe from an assault from the east. Add in there the weakening position of Turkey within NATO, being pulled away by overtures and military equipment sales by Russia.
Meanwhile, Macron has also spoken out about ending the EU accession process. The push east by the EU and NATO appears to have reached its maximum extent, and indeed, with Brexit and the challenges of keeping Turkey within NATO, the EU/NATO might appear to Moscow to be in terminal decline/retreat, if anything. Viewed from Moscow, and actually Western capitals themselves, Western liberal market democracy appears to be in a state of crisis, and perhaps terminal decline. By contrast, Russia’s vision of the power vertical/sovereign democracy seems to be in the ascendency, with Putin now the go-to power broker for strong men,
Viewed from a prism where Western liberal market democracy and the transatlantic alliance is seen as in permanent decline, why worry about Ukraine’s Western orientation if it is set on joining a club which is disintegrating and no longer any threat to Russia?
Surely the better approach from Moscow now would be to give the Ukrainian side more time, to understand the error of their ways. And at the same time, with the West, as reflected now in Trump and Macron seeming willing to bend down on one knee and extend the hand to Putin and Russia, why not at least appear willing to compromise with Ukraine, albeit not on key red lines as on Moscow’s insistence still on a federal solution to the Ukrainian issue.
But Moscow now has an interest in appearing reasonable and seeming like it wants to compromise with the assumption that the Ukrainian side will be forced to blink first. Either the Ukrainians will be forced to concede to Moscow’s terms or be seen as unreasonable in the West – thereby losing friends and the willingness to bring them into European economic and security structures.
And surely, from the perspective of Moscow at least, the ongoing impeachment hearings in the U.S. send a message to some at least that Ukraine is a corrupt country, beyond hope of reform and indeed a graveyard for Western politicians, like Joe Biden, who get dragged into Ukrainian politics. Moscow assumes that the West will eventually throw in the towel in Ukraine, pushing it back within Russia’s sphere of influence.
And ultimately Moscow likely feels that Ukrainians themselves will tire of their current dalliance with the West, as the West inevitably disappoints. And therein surely Macron’s decision to close the door on further EU enlargement will drive the final nail in the coffin of those in Ukraine still aspiring to Western integration. Moscow would view recent volte-face by prominent Ukrainian oligarchs, including Igor Kolomoisky, as suggesting rapprochement with Moscow as a salient example already of this turning of Ukrainian opinion, as was the election victory of Volodymyr Zelensky itself. Or at least that is the logic as viewed from a Russian perspective.
In a nutshell, Putin and Russia have not given up on the project to subjugate Ukraine. But they think the tide has turned back in their favor, and they see no reason at this stage to escalate through direct conflict. Moscow likely thinks that time is now on its side in Ukraine. And it thinks it is winning.
Moscow might well think that.
But Ukraine is not about the views of a few oligarchs. What is striking in my mind is that despite all the economic difficulties of the past five years, and disenchantment with the approach perhaps of Western governments, opinion polls still suggest two-thirds support in Ukraine for Ukraine’s Western orientation, as reflected in the desire for EU accession. I see this as Ukrainians not wanting, or rather expecting, EU membership imminently, but what they aspire to more is to live in a functioning Western liberal market democracy. They want to live in a Western country, and what they know is that they don’t want to live by the power vertical/sovereign democratic model. And even Zelensky therein, elected on a mandate to seek fresh talks with Moscow, cannot surrender upon the population’s desire for Western orientation.
Any such to shift back east would spur a third grassroots revolution in Ukraine, and most Ukrainian politicians clearly
