It is a little unclear as to turnout, but it seems to be something like 60.3 percent, which is close to that in the 2010 elections and impressive given that around 20 percent of the country was physically unable to vote, due to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the security problems in Donetsk and Luhansk.

The turnout surely affirms the legitimacy of the vote, and the scale of Poroshenko’s victory marks him out as a person who should be dealt with – it is a little difficult now for Moscow to argue that he is not the legitimately elected leader of Ukraine.

The election results were also notable for the performance of the other candidates:

Yulia Tymoshenko came second, but with only 12-13 percent of the vote as she struggled to shrug off the image of being part of Ukraine’s “old oligarchic order” – even though Poroshenko himself has a very similar background, as an oligarch who served under presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, and being a former founder of the former ruling Party of Regions.

Tymoshenko has prided herself as being an electoral machine, and she failed in these elections (perhaps partly as Poroshenko refused to “engage” in her drive for debates and one-to-one skirmishes at which she excels), so presumably may now be considering her political future – many of those close to her had advised her not to run in these elections, and retire after her release from prison. Perhaps she will now heed this advice.

Sergiy Tigipko, the former Regions’ politician, who tried to sell himself as the representative of the east, also did relatively poorly, taking only around 5 percent of the vote, albeit this was without the votes in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk.

Perhaps Tigipko, and Russia, could argue that if voting had been allowed in these regions, Poroshenko would have not taken over 50 percent in the first round, Tigipko would have likely come second, and then forced a run off vote. 

Perhaps, but then this might have only have been credible if Russia had not annexed Crimea – following the annexation of Crimea, it became almost impossible for any Eastern-leaning politician, such as Tyhipko, to win a presidential election.

Extreme nationalists came nowhere in the vote, but the populist nationalist, Oleh Liashko, came from nowhere to take third place with 8.5%, so could well be a figure to watch for the future.

Of note, Vitaly Klitchko, originally one of the three opposition leaders during Maydan, seems to have won a convincing victory in elections for the city of Kyiv, held in parallel with the presidential election. Poroshenko had been somewhat distant from the main leadership during Maydan, and steered clear of joining the first Maydan administration, hence kept his powder dry for the presidential poll, a strategy which seems to have worked.

Shrewdly, Vitali Klitschko backed out of the presidential contest, giving his support to Poroshenko, to concentrate on the battle for the city of Kyiv. Klitschko lacked the political experience to run in the presidency, and quickly saw Poroshenko as the man most likely to win a presidential campaign against Tymoshenko. The tactic of allying with Poroshenko seems to have worked.

Poroshenko’s election now raises some doubt over the future of the current EuroMaidan administration, which is led by Arseniy Yatseniuk, from Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party, and has a weight of members from the revolution — Svoboda, etc., whose candidates performed poorly in the presidential poll.

Under the reintroduced 2004 constitution, the powers of the new president are limited, as power has passed to parliament and the executive.

Parliament is still dominated by former Regions politicians, Fatherland, and business interests. This raises the prospect of power battles within parliament for control of the government and potentially then between the new president and parliament/executive.

Not surprisingly then, Poroshenko has called for early parliamentary elections to be held this year – as soon as possible, which is now likely to be September.

Poroshenko recently formed his own new political party, Solidarity, which has been topping the polls for party support, with a rating around 20 percent.

Presumably Poroshenko will now want to translate his current popular personal standing into strong representation in parliament itself, hence the call for early parliamentary elections. Hence, while the good news is that there is no need for a second-round presidential vote, parliamentary elections still loom and are arguably as important as the presidential vote in determining Ukraine’s future direction.

Poroshenko’s immediate concern will be in dealing with the separatist revolt in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and also working to “normalise” relations with Russia.

Poroshenko promised peace a priority in his election victory speech last night, and indicated that his first trip would be to the Donbass to try and unify the country. This will be difficult given the shear extent of the rebellion there now, and the inability of key business leaders from the region thus far to quell the unrest – including Rinat Akhmetov, who seems to have been branded a traitor now by the separatists in the Donbass, who are still threatening to “nationalise” his assets in the region.

Presumably pacifying the region will involve significant use of “grace and favours” by the new political leadership in Kyiv and by oligarchs such as Akhmetov, if they are to re-establish order, akin perhaps to how Kolomoisky has undermined separatist forces in the neighbouring oblast of Dnipropetrovsk.

Poroshenko is likely to offer a hand of friendship to the east first, on his first visit, but with the threat then of a fist, and a new and more ardent military campaign to clear the East of armed separatists, if the hand of friendship is not accepted. Poroshenko is likely to give separatists a deadline to lay down arms or to face the consequences of a military campaign against them – let’s see how Moscow reacts to this, if there are then large scale casualties on the ground.

Dealing with Moscow will be acutely difficult, under any scenario. Russia has clear strategic objectives in Ukraine, and while its tactics might be evolving, it seems in no mood to compromise on these objectives. To summarise, we would still highlight these as:

— prevent Ukraine’s European Union orientation and NATO membership, the latter of which it views as inevitably part and parcel of any Euro integration process;

— the federalisation of Ukraine, via the adoption of a new constitution in 
Ukraine, to ensure the creation of a government in Ukraine which will deliver on Russian objectives; 
c) perhaps ultimately the big picture game plan is still the creation of a Greater Russia, incorporating large swathes of Ukrainian territory, starting with Crimea. If the latter is not possible, it might still accept Ukraine’s membership of the CIS/Eurasian Union, albeit we would attach zero chance of any administration in Kyiv being willing or able to deliver that in practice.
D) failure of the Maydan administration in Kyiv, so as not to provide a role model of a successful pro-Western market democracy for elsewhere in the former Soviet space and particularly in Russia. 
E) Control of strategic assets, e.g. pipelines, herein it is just possible that Russia could be “bought off” by the sale of key assets, such as the control of energy transit pipelines, albeit my sense is that it wants much more than this now.

In terms of tactics, Russia will make life difficult for any future Ukrainian administration. 

In terms of Ukraine’s European/Western orientation, the line seems to be “if we cannot have Ukraine, we will work to make sure that no one else, read the West, can or will want Ukraine.”

In many respects, after the presidential poll, Russia will be waiting to see how the dust settles, and waiting for Poroshenko to deal, i.e., seeing what he is willing to offer to ensure some kind of normality in terms of the relationship with Russia. Through its actions over the past few months in destabilising Ukraine Moscow will assume that it has made clear that no new administration in Ukraine can succeed without dealing with Russia, and taking into account Russia’s interests.”

Timothy Ash is an analyst with Standard Bank in London.