It’s been interesting to listen to a range of think tanks and talking heads wax lyrical on Belarus in recent days. I guess it’s typical in the world of news 24/7 that everyone seems now to be an expert on Belarus.

What is clear though is that much of the view on Belarus is being seen through the prism of Moscow – either because Western journalists are based out of Moscow or Western experts are primarily Russia specialists who kind of cover Belarus as a sideshow or even afterthought.

Three narratives here are being pushed, the first two I would argue are just plain wrong, and the third is questionable:

The first of these narratives is that Moscow is somehow a spectator in all this and that it is having (even being encouraged to mediate between Alexander Lukashenko and the opposition) to pick up the pieces after this spontaneous revolt against the dictator Lukashenko – as if the Putin regime is somehow more liberal. The line is that Moscow has been taken off guard by these protests and now has limited options – I would argue that Moscow is significantly behind developments in Belarus and has long thought out the various scenarios. Putin has a playbook for Belarus, for sure.

Second, that Moscow will no have truck with military action and that this need not be the case as Belarus is not Ukraine and there is no strong anti-Russian sentiment or desire for European Union or NATO membership in Belarus which would force Moscow to intervene.

And stemming from the above two false narratives the third assumption and narrative then is that the endgame in Belarus will most likely resemble Armenia in 2018 where a pro-Russian leader wins out in the end. The latter outturn might still result but I would argue that the situation in Belarus is still quite different to Armenia in 2018. The outcome might hence still be quite different.

On the first narrative that Moscow is somehow a spectator in all this — this view is just plain wrong.

Moscow has and continues to be deeply engaged in Belarus affairs and I would even contend that Moscow has had a hand in undermining the Lukashenko regime even perhaps cultivating protests by backing various protest leaders. Note in this latter respect that most of the opposition leaders seem to have strong ties into Moscow – one currently being in exile there. Indeed the assumption that Moscow is not deeply engaged in all that is happening is just ridiculous given the strategic importance of Belarus to Russia through its front line position in Russia’s defense in NATO, and given the close engagement between the two states in the Eurasian Union. And while those who see Vladimir Putin as the arch strategist congratulate him for his intervention in Syria they somehow fail to see his hand in Belarus, much closer to home. I would hence argue that if Putin felt the urge to intervene far afield in Syria then there is no chance of him not being “involved” in Belarus. And if he was not already, he absolutely will be going forward.

On this same point it is noticeable that something has changed in the Belarus – Russia and Lukashenko – Putin relationship in the past year or so. The dislike between Lukashenko and Putin is well-known and runs deep. But hitherto Putin had tolerated Lukashenko – a case of “better the devil you know”. But in recent months something changed to significantly deteriorate the relationship sufficient to push Moscow to change the financial support it provided the Lukashenko regime – heaping the economic pressure on the administration and turning the screw. Why would Moscow do this?

I think it relates to Putin’s desire to push the union agenda and bring Belarus ever closer to that Union with Moscow with a common currency, common border and security. And in this latter respect the key for Moscow is control over Belarus’s borders and the ability of Russia to deploy troops to Belarus Western border with NATO and south to Ukraine. What’s changed in recent months I think are prospects for a Biden win in November a more hawkish US administration and then-recent forward deployment of NATO troops to Poland and the Baltic states. Putin wants to get ahead of the game now by changing the strategic position in Belarus to Russia’s advantage.

Lukashenko has so far resisted this pressure for deeper integration, even playing the nationalist card at home against Russia recently – speaking publically for first time in Belorusian – and reaching out to the EU and the US for financial support and trade diversification. What seems evident is that Moscow realized that they needed to put more pressure on Lukashenko to bow to Russia’s will or find another leader who would. And I think what we are currently seeing in Belarus are the results of this campaign by Moscow to draw Belarus closer and erode its sovereignty therein.

So Moscow is actively seeking political change in Belarus – and Lukashenko is resisting as he realizes I think that in a new deeper union with Moscow he might still be surplus to Putin’s requirements.

Second I don’t think one can so easily rule out Russian military intervention in Belarus. Sure, it’s not the optimal scenario for Moscow as it involves higher risks and costs but it remains an option. And Moscow has plenty of form there in Crimea, Donbas, Transdniestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, amongst others.

But what about this line that Belarus is different to Ukraine, nationalism is weaker, that there is less of a desire for EU and NATO membership than Ukraine hence less threat and reason for Russia to intervene militarily. I think this view mischaracterizes the situation in Ukraine in 2013/14, when the EuroMaidan Revolution overthrew President Viktor Yanukovych, overstating the nationalist and EU/NATO threat and likewise understates the same factors now in Belarus.

In Ukraine in 2013/2014 national identity was still weak and nationalism with it. Opinion polls showed support for NATO membership was low – comparable to that in Belarus currently. And likewise, there was only a weak majority for EU membership. Most Ukrainians, as Belarusians today, favored nonaligned status for Ukraine.

There was no groundswell of anti-Russian feeling in 2013 on the eve of EuroMaidan. And I think the EuroMaidan was not really about EU membership for Ukraine which was actually not on offer in tae association agreement and the free-trade agreement signed with the EU in 2013 – and which back then was also an option for Belarus as part of the EU’s neighborhood policy.

What changed was the Russian invasion of Donbas and annexation of Crimea which changed Ukrainian perceptions of Russia and helped build or cement their own feeling of statehood and national identity. Ukrainian nationalism/statehood did not drive Russian intervention – it was the other way around. Putin intervened because he was weak at home, needed a foreign policy win and he had misread Ukraine. And in 2013 remember it was not just about the EU pushing a political and free trade association which as mentioned stopped well short of any actual real EU membership perspective for Ukraine, but Putin was also pressing Yanukovych to sign up Ukraine to join the Russian dominated Eurasian Union. Yanukovych actually initially signed up to join the Eurasian Union and took a $3bn loan from Russia as the carrot – only then did demonstrations in Ukraine explode and the rest is history. EuroMaidan happened because Putin forced Eurasian Union membership on Ukraine.

Now fast-forwarding to Belarus today.

It is true that Belarusians have a generally favorable view towards Russia and Russians – but so did most Ukrainians in 13/14. But I think Belarusians today are more advanced than Ukrainians in 13/14 in terms of support for their own statehood as opposed to union with Russia. Lukashenko has opposed deeper integration with Russia but I think that in this he reflects the majority view in Belarus. And as with the Eurasian Union being the trigger for EuroMaidan in Ukraine in 13/14 forcing union with Russia down Belarusians throats now could be as much of a spark or turning point for Belarusians views of Russia now. And they could critically change the course of demonstrations and the current crisis.

I would also argue that the similarity between EuroMaidan in 13/14, or even the 2014 Orange Revolution that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power and Belarus now is that demonstrators are not demanding EU membership now but they want EU values of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Russian model is quite different. And while people are quick to throw Belarus into the Russian bucket I think the mood in Belarus is quite different from that in Russia. A forced union with Russia would be unworkable and unenforceable without resort to the extreme force by Moscow. By demonstrating in support of democracy, human rights, and rule of law they are showing they want to live by different standards and norms to Russia today. They are different from Russians, that now is evident and perhaps closer to Ukrainians than some would have us believe. In fact, they are Europeans.

So the course of the crisis could easily change, Russian overreaction or policy errors could see the mood change in Minsk, as it did in Ukraine, to being more critical to Moscow, and with this Moscow’s threshold for military intervention could reduce.

Now what about this idea that the crisis in Belarus will just be a re-run of Armenia in 2018, that the demonstrations will be channeled to an end game where a pro Russian leader is chosen.

It is possible but I think the situation in Belarus today is different from that in Armenia in 2018.

First, Lukashenko is still a much stronger force than was Serge Sargsyan, who in any event led by more of a clan-based system. Leadership in Armenia was more collective – balancing a group of clan interests. Whereas in Belarus today, the government is more centralized and I think Lukashenko is more willing/able to use force. The political class in Armenia moved Sargsyan aside for their own survival and put in his place someone who was still an insider. Not sure it’s as easy to see as smooth a transition in Belarus – and Lukashenko looks like he is willing to fight.

Second, Belarus is far more strategic to Russia than Armenia. Belarus is on Russia’s front line with NATO, Armenia has a border with Turkey but Armenians have a reason of their own to defend this – there is little chance of it being lost to NATO given Turkey and Russia are on opposing sides over the disputed issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia already has a large troop presence in Armenia, while Russia already controls Armenia’s borders. And Armenia is reliant on these Russian troops for holding its line in Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan. Belarus has other options – it could align with NATO or Ukraine, whereas Armenia is totally dependent on security in Moscow. Belarus is up for grabs, Armenia is not.

So this point gives Moscow ease to be more flexible in political arrangements in Armenia whereas I think they will want much stronger assurances when it comes to Belarus – and Union commitments will be key there. It’s not just about having a new government in Minsk that is aligned more to Moscow but one which accepts the deepening of the Union agenda.

Third, I guess close proximity to Ukraine will make Moscow much more sensitive to how things play out in Belarus – to ensure the Ukrainian playbook does not ensue.

It’s fine agreeing to a Pashinyan style democratic transfer in Belarus, but then what is next? Will free and fair elections down the line ensure a more pro-Western leader eventually wins out.

And for those that argue that Belarusians are similar to Russians, then does this logic not suggest that Russians might also want similar free choice in elections as their Belarusian counterparts? So this all boils down still to Putin’s aversion to colored revolutions and desire still to avoid such an outcome in Belarus.

The above all tell me that the situation in Belarus is more complex than Armenia in 2018. It might not be Ukraine but there are still strong similarities.

It feels very much that this is a work in progress. The crisis may drag on for months with uncertain outcomes. And while Moscow is undoubtedly involved it can easily miscalculate as it did in Ukraine with uncertain and risk outcomes.