A number of factors in my mind suggest that Russia will want to keep the military situation in the Donbas relatively contained for the time being, or at least without a major bout of re-escalation.
First the opinion polls posted this week by the Social Monitoring Centre and the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research must have been encouraging for Moscow, with President Petro Poroshenko trailing Yulia Tymoshenko with 9.5 percent, versus 11.2 percent for Tymoshenko.
Yuriy Boyko, the former minister of energy under ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and the leader of the Opposition Bloc came third with 7.5 percent, and then Vadym Rabinovych with his For Life party also on 7.5 percent. Boyko and Rabinovych are seen as more aligned with Russian interests, and supportive of cutting deals with Moscow.
The populist Oleh Lyashko then polled 6.7 percent and the pro-European Union reform Anatoli Grytsenko had 5.1 percent.
These polls suggest that the pro-EU reform crew might struggle to form a working coalition come elections in 2019. Remember
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a gas deal with Tymoshenko back in 2009 – which eventually put her in jail – and the assumption is that another deal could be cut with Moscow.
In recent months Poroshenko has taken out two reform hopes – Mikheil Sakaashvili, the former Georgian president, and Andriy Sadoviy, the Lviv mayor, and as yet musician Svyatoslav Vakarchuk is keeping his powder dry.
With risks for Moscow from military re-escalation, and perhaps mindful how political events eventually worked against Saakashvili in Georgia, with the emergence of Bidzini Ivanishvilli and the Georgia Dream, a similar strategy may now be the preferred option for Moscow. Keeping the conflict in the Donbas simmering away still creates fissures in Ukrainian domestic politics – plus also it gives some leverage with the U.S., so we won’t see peace, but a continuation of the still relatively high intensity conflict status quo. I think Moscow is also now awaiting the Vladyslav Surkov-Kurt Volker meeting later this month, to see how far the new US administration is willing to trade.
Second, the crisis in US-North Korean relations has created opportunities and potential “leverage” for Moscow. See this FT piece this week:
https://www.ft.com/content/a829149a-8147-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd
Indeed, my sense at this stage is that North Korean President Kim Jong-un trusts Moscow much more than Beijing, reflective in his own travel arrangements. Putin has made clear that he despises the idea of forced regime change, “colored” revolutions, indeed opposition therein is central to his foreign policy ethos, and “sovereign democratic” concept.
But I rather think at this stage that Beijing would not be that averse to political changes at the top in Pyongyang, at least sideways, with a slightly more deferential replacement to Kim emerging from within the existing leadership ranks. Likely Moscow has been signaling its “usefulness” to the U.S. over the crisis in North Korea , and hoping that this secures better leverage in the Great Power summit it now expects with Trump – assuming Trump survives that long.
But importantly, and despite the U.S. congressional Russia sanctions bill, I don’t think that Moscow has given up on President Donald J. Trump as a politician who can deliver to Putin’s agenda. Indeed, Trump’s own agenda increasingly looks close to that of Putin – support for strong man regimes overseas (at least not those posing a nuclear threat to the US), not pushing a Western values agenda (human rights/democracy) overseas (any maybe even not at home), a return to foreign policy based around the nation state rather than working through multilateral agencies (whether Paris Climate Change, or NATO) and America First. Indeed, Russia First has been Putin’s own agenda for some time. I also think that Trump and adviser Steve Bannon’s views around threats from a clash of civilizations, and that Moscow and the U.S. should be aligned in this final battle, are likely quite close.
And hence third, therein there is a desire not to rock the boat for Trump domestically with further tensions/strains with Moscow.
I think also in Moscow there is a desire to wait it out to see how domestic U.S. politics unravels. While there may be some irritation in Moscow over the latest U.S. sanctions bill, as payback for Russian meddling in the U.S. election, there is understanding that this will have a slow burn negative impact on the Russian economy, with no killer punch in the short term.
The bigger goal still is a US-Russia rapprochement under Trump, which might still cast aside the congressional sanctions bill or see limited implementation, even easing, from the Trump executive. And there also be plenty of enjoyment now in Moscow from the political and social upheaval now playing out in the U.S. under Trump – why would Russia feel the need to stir things up, when Americans themselves seem engrossed in tearing their own country apart?
Moscow is hence happy to sit on the sidelines, and perhaps eager not to give the U.S. establishment an easy external target, e.g. with more military aggression in Ukraine – which could rally the Americans again against the external foe. From a Russian perspective – and perhaps also Bannon’s – long-running contradictions/social/political fault lines are now playing out in the US, so why not just watch how these evolve. More a case of “fire in the hole” from a Moscow perspective!
In a best case for Moscow, Trump emerges victorious, stronger and able to cut a Great Power deal then with Moscow, aligning the two around the Clash of Civilisations mantra.
And in a worst case, the U.S .establishment will continue to tear itself apart, weakening it (and the U.S. in the process), and its ability to conduct foreign policy and military endeavors overseas. Indeed, the longer the Trump show continues, the less the US looks like a global power, and global leader, for other to follow, and less able to impose its will and agenda overseas. A weaker USA, all this time, relatively speaking, makes Russia look stronger. So why take risks now in places like Ukraine which still have the potential to backfire, and damage the Putin story this side of presidential elections in March 2018?
I guess a counter argument here might be that Moscow might look to take strategic advantage in Ukraine while the U.S. (and West for that matter) is weak/distracted. Perhaps. But Putin is cautious by nature, and given Ukraine’s greater military capability such an outcome would risk major military casualties before presidential elections. More likely he will want to await to see how events in D.C. with Trump evolve before committing more wholeheartedly to a conflict in/with Ukraine.
