Belarus might seem peripheral to many, but I think what is happening now in Belarus could have significant implications for the region, and perhaps global contagion risks in terms of US – Russia relations.

The Aug. 9 presidential election is widely believed to have been stolen by incumbent President Alexander Lukashenko, who has ruled with an iron fist since 1994. Demonstrations resulted and he reacted with a brutal crackdown on the opposition, with more than 7,000 arrested, hundreds beaten up, and at least two people killed.

By Aug. 11 it appeared that the use of brutal force, and arrest of opposition leaders, and their flight to asylum in Lithuania and Moscow, might have worked for Lukashenko. However, the demonstrations have continued unabated. Critically calls for a nationwide strike now appear to be gaining traction with workers at key huge state-owned industrial concerns walking out in protest today. Workers at these large SOEs have been the mainstay of support for Lukashenko as his economic/political model was to more or less guarantee the population full employment through the SOEs. We are now seeing members of the administration, security forces switch sides.

It now feels like Ukraine in February 2014 – President Viktor Yanukovych used excessive force, killed 100+ demonstrators and within days he was forced to flee by helicopter to Moscow.

You might say, all well and good, Lukashenko goes, elections are held and Belarus benefits from a Ukraine style pro-European Union/NATO reform govt.

That sounds fine, but the key player here is Russia.

Belarus is mega-strategic to Moscow – it’s a loyal member of the Eurasian Union, and a vote was held for a Union between Belarus and Russia, albeit that has never really been implemented in full. Russian troops operate radar stations in Belarus, and Russia has air bases in Belarus. Moscow sees it as its front line with NATO. I just cannot believe that Moscow would permit Belarus to drift off West – and remember herein that Moscow annexed Crimea and invaded Donbas in 2014-15 when Ukraine tried something similar. I think Moscow would, without a doubt, do exactly the same if it feared the loss, to the West of Belarus.

So what is Moscow thinking now?

It’s weird but Moscow, which has traditionally backed Lukashenko (Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko hate each other, but ultimately I think Putin has seen Lukashenko as the better the devil you know), now seems to be swinging both ways. Putin congratulated Lukashenko on his election win, but the Russian media and also members of the Russian State Duma have been kicking Lukashenko for stealing the election and beating demonstrators (it seems fine for Russian security forces to beat Russian demonstrators). Remember also that weeks before the election, Russian Wagner mercenaries were arrested in Minsk and Lukashenko claimed a foreign (aka Russian) plot to remove him.

It is clear that Moscow is unhappy with Lukashenko. This relates to Putin’s desire to deepen the integration between Belarus and Russia, as per the Union agreement, which Lukashenko has resisted. In recent years, Lukashenko has played the nationalist card against Moscow to rally domestic support against this integration process. Lukashenko hates the integration agenda as he thinks he will end up as Putin’s poodle, and eventually, Putin will just remove him.

Why the new urgency from Moscow to press the integration agenda?

Maybe it relates to the new constitution in Russia, Putin’s new supreme role, and his desire to cement his place in Russian history.

It might relate to Russian concerns over developments in Ukraine, NATO forward deployment of troops from Germany to Poland and the Baltics, and Russia wants to re-inforce its positions in Belarus. Interestingly, Lukashenko has resisted Russian calls to allow Russian troops to be located on the border with Ukraine.

Putin might see all this in the light of the US elections – if he is going to move against Belarus, then the timing is great, while Donald J. Trump is still in power, weak, lacking focus and leadership, and before the Russian hawks around Biden come back in. Meanwhile, the EU is weak and divided on foreign policy issues. Maybe he thinks he can take Belarus at this stage without much Western reaction?

Thinking through Russia’s options/strategy:

Scenario A: Lukashenko stays in power but is weakened, the West sanctions him and he becomes more dependent on Russia, and less able to fend off Putin’s calls for greater integration with Russia, and the troop deployments.

Scenario B: Lukashenko falls, and elections yield a new pro-Russian leadership in Minsk, who can be manipulated to push the integration agenda. Note most of the opposition leaders have some link into Moscow – one is in political asylum in Moscow, one used to work for a bank partly owned by Gazprom. This scenario is akin to Armenia in 2018 and the demos/election win of Pashinyan and some might even say Zelensky’s win in Ukraine in 2019, albeit not first through demonstrations.

Scenario C: Lukashenko falls, early elections happen and a pro-Western leader emerges. If there is a risk of this, I don’t think Putin waits, and the tanks roll. The tanks might roll anyway, in scenarios A-C

The West does not know how to play all this – and the Kremlin line that the West is divided and has no policy response is fair. Interestingly, recently the US has been getting close to Lukashenko – Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was there in March, met Lukashenko, and was talking about selling liquified natural gas and oil. I think the US thinks that backing Lukashenko screws Moscow, but now they don’t quite know what to do about the demonstrations. The WH has been muted around the elections/violence and the US response has been weak/confused which I guess reflects the reality on the ground in DC these days. But it has been suggested to me that the US gave the nod to Lukashenko over the presence of Wagner guys in Belarus last week.

The Ukrainians are very concerned, they think that the Russians game plan is take over Belarus, roll tanks up to the border with Ukraine and then max pressure on Ukraine from the North and East. So the Zelensky administration has been muted in support for the demonstrators and actually was pushing to get the extradition of the Wagner guys to Ukraine – as some are Ukrainian and fought in Donbas.

Conclusion – risks of the situation in Belarus deteriorating are significant in my view. This likely gets worse before it gets better. Lukashenko might double down on violence against demonstrators, and there is a significant risk that Moscow militarily intervenes in Belarus – either for or against Lukashenko, but generally with the pretext of restoring order. Obviously Russian troops have a track record of intervening elsewhere in the FSU, where Russian interests are perceived to be at risk – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, et al.

Hard to see all this being good for the region – Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania who are all at risk of being dragged into something bigger.