Presidential elections are looming in Ukraine at the end of March. the first round vote is slated to be held on March 31, with a likely runoff vote some two weeks later assuming no candidate secures 50 percent plus one vote in the first round.
As of Feb. 1, 28 candidates had registered to participate, with registrations closing on Feb. 9, so more are likely to run.
Opinion polls shows a wide dispersion of votes, with no one candidate expected to get 50 percent plus 1 in the first round vote – as incumbent Petro Poroshenko did (54 percent) in the May 2014 presidential election.
Reviewing the average of the last four opinion polls published this year, the field is currently led by the political novice, and comedian Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is polling around 20.4 percent followed by former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on 18.3 percent, and then incumbent Poroshenko with around 14.5 percent. Former energy minister under former President Viktor Yanukovych, Yuriy Boiko, is polling just over 10 percent. Boiko heads the Opposition Bloc party, seen as favoring a policy of re-engagement with Russia.
Tymoshenko has long been ahead in the polls – for most of the past two years polling twice her nearest contender. Her lead has recently been eclipsed by Zelenskiy who only signaled his intention to run only a few months back, but is now playing on widespread popular revulsion with the political establishment in Ukraine and his own fresh-face appeal.
Poroshenko has long languished in the polls but in recent weeks has just seen his ratings begin to show some momentum – as expected securing support for winning autocephalous, or independent, status for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church over the turn of the year.
At this stage it looks set to be a second round runoff vote between Zelenskiy and Tymoshenko, albeit many argue that Poroshenko will be able to deploy “administrative means” to ensure he gets into any second vote. Opinion polls though suggest Poroshenko would lose any run off against Zelenskiy or Tymoshenko – that said, again the power of “administrative means” in Ukraine should not be underestimated. And herein opponents of Poroshenko would highlight the recent firing of the head of Suspilne TV, a public TV network as marking a worrying trend as the station had spearheaded investigative reporting of corruption.
On the one part, the fact that there is a such a large field, and the outcome of the election is so uncertain, is a positive – it shows the vibrancy of democracy in Ukraine. The contrast with “managed” democracy in Russia is stark.
A concern perhaps is that people still talk about the power of “administrative means” in winning elections in Ukraine – and I worry somewhat if Poroshenko suddenly pulls off a remarkable election win, against the polls, whether this will see popular protest as in 2004/05 as to the fairness of the polls. In such a scenario it is likely that candidates like Zelensky and Tymoshenko will challenge any such result and a situation which will likely be exploited by other opposition forces (the Opposition Bloc) and also Moscow.
At this stage it might be useful for Poroshenko to declare that he will spurn such administrative means, and that candidates such as Tymoshenko and Zelenskiy will accept the result – and augur against the use of street protests. Some greater Western oversight over elections would be useful therein.
The problem there is that the West seems to be allying behind Poroshenko as the candidate who offers the best chance of continuity – note the recent (pointed reference to Poroshenko’s “leadership” in the statement that came from International Monetary Fund managing director Christine Lagarde in support of Poroshenko from the World Economic Forum in Davos. This stood in contrast to the fact that the previous IMF lending program had been off track for 18 months)
The West has never been particularly good at playing Ukrainian politics – neither has Moscow, for that matter. I remember back in 2004 the U.S. had initially backed Viktor Yanukovych to succeed President Leonid Kuchma, in part due to the support given by Ukraine under Kuchma to the U.S. war in Iraq. That strategy backfired in the 2004 Orange Revolution, which led to President Viktor Yushchenko’s election, albeit the U.S. quickly switched sides when by late 2004 it was clear the momentum was behind Yushchenko and the initial vote was stolen by Yanukovych. But putting all its eggs in Poroshenko’s basket would seem high risk at this stage – albeit perhaps this reflects unease over Tymoshenko’s likely economic policy impulses, and concern as to whether former PrivatBank owner Ihor Kolomoisky is backing both Tymoshenko and Zelenskiy for that matter.
While much is known about Tymoshenko – from her past periods in office as prime minister and then as the most prominent opposition leader for the past 20 years – little is known about Zelenskiy. The media is currently all over his alleged business links to Moscow, and that could easily weigh on his poll ratings as elections near. At this stage, while it’s clear Tymoshenko’s political orientation is West – it’s really difficult to pin any real political/policy orientation to Zelenskiy. This is quite worrying – especially given that he polls well in the east of Ukraine – and any attempt to roll out a more Eastern-leaning orientation as president would be met with fervent opposition from the Ukrainian political mainstream. Remember here that opinion polls still suggests two thirds of the population support a continued Western political orientation with only 10-15 percent supporting an orientation back east towards Russia.
Conclusion: Uncertain outcome to elections. And uncertain policy orientation under the current poll leader Zelenskiy. And the chances of any election result being challenged via street protests cannot be ruled out – after-all Ukraine has seen two bouts of street protest in the Orange Revolution and then the EuroMaidan Revolution a decade later. Poroshenko and Tymoshenko likely would maintain cooperation with the IMF – albeit for Tymoshenko it might need a bit of initial market pressure to push her back to the negotiating table (Kolomoisky and Privatbank could be deal breakers) with the IMF. For Zelenskiy, it’s a blank piece of paper in terms of economic policy – no one has a clue what he stands for on the economy front albeit he has been a successful businessman. And, irrespective of the result of the presidential election, Ukraine goes back to the polls in the autumn, for equally important parliamentary elections – Tymoshenko is talking about introducing constitutional reform if she wins the presidency to move more power back to parliament.
