The Kyiv Post reported on Sept. 11 that a statement from
the Batkivshchyna Party demanded that Tymoshenko be examined in
independent clinic for possible poisoning in connection with the death of her
former cellmate in Lukianivska jail.  

It all goes back to the prima facie disaster that was a
collective epochal blunder perpetrated by Ukrainian voters who elected Viktor
Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president in February 2010. Mainly because of a bad
economy, two million fewer voters went to the polls than did on Dec. 26, 2004 when Viktor Yushchenko was elected.  Yanukovych won in 2010 despite common knowledge
of the record and background of both candidates in the runoff election, Tymoshenko andYanukovych.

The election of
Yanukovych was disastrous in its consequences because it means an end to honest
elections in the foreseeable future, unless the risk of a violent confrontation
between the present regime and the opposition becomes acceptable.

It doesn’t do much good to count by what margin Vitali
Klitschko leads Viktor Yanukovych in the polls.  There is no doubt who will win the 2015 elections, by hook or by crook. With all branches of government under his control, Yanukovych is confident of his ability to defeat any opposition candidate. The
only fly in the ointment isTymoshenko, who can still move the crowds and
spur unpredictable outcomes if released from jail.

Yanukovych is not feeling safe even when polls
give Tymoshenko not more than about a 35 percent positive rating. His own numbers
are not better. It is not an exaggeration to stipulate  that the fate of Tymoshenko and the future of
Ukraine appear to be strikingly similar and in a broad sense inseparable.

The consequences  for
Ukraine  cannot be wished away by signing
or not signing an Association Agreement with the European Union come November.
The chance of its ratification in Europe is zero as long as repressive
conditions persist in Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko is in prison.  

A whiff of wishful thinking for signing the
Association Agreement in November can be sensed in Ukraine in the last several
months. Simultaneously, Yanukovych and senior government officials
are releasing optimistic prognoses, implying that it is almost a done deal.  According to most observers, he really prefers
an Association Agreement with the EU rather than joining Russia’s “economic
space.” But not if it means running the risk of losing his almost unlimited
power, one might add.

Would the road to signing an agreement with the EU be easier
for Ukraine’s present government if Tymoshenko faded away? And, even if
her death would have the opposite effect, would it not make the present
regime feel more secure?  

Opposition leaders recently went through the rituals of
declaring support for European association, and have assembled a “national
roundtable” in academia setting to clarify and praise the merits of a European
future. But there is little connection between this activism, the fatalism on
the sidelines in the streets, and government’s arcane contingency plans for
dealing with EU requirements and with Russia’s mounting economic pressure at
the same time.

The West cannot “lose Ukraine,” and neither can Russia.
Unfortunately, Ukraine can lose itself if its ruling elite, in a pinch, decides
to trade independence for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s promises to let them keep their
privatized fiefdoms acquired during the post-Soviet feast. This would mimic a
historic pattern of Ukraine’s submission to foreign domination. Such could be
an ultimate outcome of acquiescence of the people to oligarchic ownership of
their country and to political persecution of Tymoshenko and other
opposition leaders.                                                                                                                                            

A reminder of Tymoshenko’s life in prison can be
gleamed from a recent film, “Who wants to kill Yulia Tymoshenko?”  made by the Coppola group. The film covers most of
her business and political career, and her recent ordeal. It can be found on
Yahoo website. It also shows betrayal of the Orange Revolution – by no other than Yushchenko. “The Orange Revolution is over” was his message
shortly after taking office, as Ukraine continued its slide into the oligarchic
dungeon. Change, the rallying cry at
Maidan in 2004, became a distant sound.                                                                                                                             
 

Yuriy Lutsenko, the former minister of the interior in 2005
and Socialist Party member in the Orange government at that time, articulated again
the need to have “a long-range plan for a new country” and a leader capable of
implementing such a plan, in a news
interview on April 8, one day after his release from prison. For now, Lutsenko
sees  himself as supporting the present
unified opposition and is showing “the highest respect” for Tymoshenko. He
optimistically points out to a growing desire for change across all Ukraine,
east and west, despite regional differences.

 Meanwhile, no one can
predict if Tymoshenko will become a victim of high-tech assassination.
Undetectable amounts of poison can be deadly over time, with almost no risk to
perpetrators, especially when the victim is in detention. If the demand of the
Batkivshchyna Party for an examination of Tymoshenko in independent clinic is
ignored while she is alive, who is to say that it would not be refused in case
of her death in prison?  

Sounds like fantasy? Think again. Ukraine’s intellectual
elite was liquidated by Josef Stalin in the 1920s and 30s. Prominent leaders who escaped
abroad were killed by KGB assassins. For rural masses, the bedrock  of Ukraine, it was Holodomor and ethnographic
makeover for many places like Donbas that changed its face. Not many capable
leaders in the present generation can be found today in Ukraine or outside, and
they become targets when they stand in the way.  For Vyacheslav Chornovil it was an interrupted
car ride on the highway.

For today, Yanukovych says Ukraine has met
requirements for signing agreement with the EU. Actually, nothing was done for
three main requirements: reform of judiciary, reform of election system, and
freedom for Tymoshenko. Reforms in question is an oxymoron under this regime.
And Tymoshenko is taking the brunt of its malice.         

When the people are helpless against such lawlessness, discussions
between the EU and Ukraine’s government about reform move into surreal
atmosphere, and make the speakers appear navigating into make-believe. This
staging makes the persecution of Tymoshenko appear not quite what it is
— the leading edge of Ukraine’s
shackling by crime syndicate. Instead, it is verbalized as “the Tymoshenko
case” or “Tymoshenko issue.” This phraseology catches on like media
commercials. 

Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.