One of the
few clear lessons of history is that all long-term forecasts are wrong.  But if we are obliged to make such forecasts,
the best way to minimize error is to understand that the long-term begins
today. Tomorrow’s world will not be constructed out of abstractions but out of
today’s flawed material.

Several
speakers at this forum have stated that Europe is no longer divided between two
political-military blocs. Maybe so. 

But two
normative jurisdictions have emerged in their place: the one based on rights,
rules and robust institutions; the other held together by patron-client
relationships, the extraction and distribution of rents and the subordination
of law to power. 

These might
not be Cold War dividing lines, but they are lines of friction. Volodymyr
Ogryzko, [Ukraine’s ex-Foreign Minister, has] suggested that they demarcate
different ways of life.  In the words of
Istvan Gyarmati, they demarcate Europe from Eurasia. 

When it
comes to these choices, there is no such thing as a non-bloc policy.  As long as Ukraine pretends to be moving
towards one normative system whilst embedding itself in another, it will be
existentially insecure.

Ukraine’s
current authorities do not see it in this way, and it is important to
understand why. 

Many
contend that President Viktor Yanukovych is establishing a variant of Putinism
in Ukraine.  I would suggest that he is
establishing a variant of Lukashenkizm. 

That is to
say, he has constructed a system of power that not only diverges from, but
defies the EU norm, yet in doing so he is attempting to strengthen Ukraine’s
sovereignty against Ukraine’s neighbors to the east as well as the west.

Whether you
take the view that this enterprise degrades or develops Ukraine’s potential,
there is a logic to it.  And the logic is
stronger than [that of Belarus President Aleksandr] Lukashenka’s because
Ukraine has abundant hydrocarbon resources, and Belarus has none.  As long as those at the apex of power
guarantee protection to those who would develop these resources, they will come
to Ukraine.  Thus, Chevron is coming
here, and Shell is coming here.

But most
important, China is coming here. Whilst China has no particular desire to oust
Russia from its presumptive ‘sphere of privileged interests’, it has no
intention of deferring to it either. 
China will act in Ukraine in accordance with its own calculus of
opportunity and interest.  It is most
unlikely to give something for nothing. 

So
Ukraine’s opening to China will be a challenge as well as an opportunity.  But it will be entirely unlike the challenges
it has dealt with up to now.

Nevertheless,
so long as Yanukovych’s system is in place, the choices for others are highly
restricted.  The EU can do little, NATO
will do little, and Russia will do what it always does:  conspire, suborn, bully and pressure.  But Russia is most unlikely to pose an
orthodox security threat, because according to the Clausewitzian logic it understands,
there is nothing to be gained from doing so.

Where,
then, is the flaw in this design? 

It lies the
internal factor and with it, the far from minute risk that the legitimacy of
the ‘power vertical’ will be called into question.  That ordinary and not-so-ordinary people are
discontented with their lives and distrust the political class (the opposition
and not just the authorities) is no secret. One does not need “spetsinformatsia”
to see that representative institutions represent power rather than people and
that state institutions protect power rather than people.

The
authorities are possibly more aware of these realities than their opponents
perceive.  And some of them provide cause
for comfort.  The perceptions that
elections make no difference, politics makes no difference, I can make no
difference do not, on the face of it, imply that civil unrest is around the
corner.  Neither do the shortcomings of
the opposition.

But this
comfort is likely to prove misplaced. The less visible side of political
cynicism in Ukraine is private resourcefulness and contempt for those who
threaten it. Its repressed side is anger. The absence of credible opposition
leaders, clear political principles and programs and coherent movements means
that when anger does erupt, it is likely to take a more extreme, anarchic and
combustible form than it would otherwise.

The steady
de-professionalization (in ethos and in quality leadership) of the country’s
primary national security institutions – which began in the second half of
Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency – implies that when such outbreaks do occur,
they will not be handled intelligently. 
If this analysis is correct, it points to threats whose probability of
emergence is moderate-to-high, whose warning time is low and whose course and
outcome are uncertain.

Until
Ukraine passes this moment, or addresses the causes of it, long-term thinking
does not make much sense. 

The
starting point for Europe’s thinking about Ukraine must be what is going to
happen here. 

The
starting point for the thinking of Ukrainians must be: what do you want to
happen here?

 The above is a presentation made at the
International Forum: Ukraine’s Non-Bloc Policy in the European Context at
Ukraine’s Diplomatic Academy in Kyiv, on Sept. 12. The author, James Sherr, is
a senior fellow at London-based Chatham House’s Russia & Eurasia Program.