The program became official EU policy a year later. 

Fundamental changes in the EU’s foreign relations triggered its creation. They were notably enlargement fatigue and the need for alternative options to existing European integration policies. The shift’s central motto was: Less integration and more cooperation.

The EaP Initiative offers participation in the EU’s internal market without EU membership. The other pillar was the prospect of visa-free travel. Although the idea of the EaP initiative emerged five years ago it is quite difficult to identify its major achievements. Therefore, Lithuania’s EU presidency and its major event, the EU’s Eastern Partnership Summit to be held in November is of special significance. A vital success story is needed. 

Among all EaP countries, Ukraine’s role is central and, for the moment, is facing an immense dilemma. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has chosen a rather controversial strategy at home and abroad:  he aims to centralize presidential power and to strengthen his inner circle and administration-friendly business groups’ economic and political positions, while at the same time he is seeking to proceed with Ukraine’s European integration. However, the EU, being bound to its posture of values, rejects Yanukovych’s way of thinking and refuses to sign the Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade (DCFTA) agreements before Ukraine deals with selective justice and implements electoral and Association Agenda reforms.

The EU position is difficult to alter since the DCFTA contains a so-called human rights clause. However, the EU realizes that EaP countries have at least one more option. The Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union is an emerging geopolitical actor in the region. Lastly, Ukraine’s reluctance and inability to meet strict EU standards and regulations can lead towards its closer cooperation with Russia. 

The other factor threatening Ukraine’s shift towards the Customs Union is if the EU postpones the signing ofthe Association Agreement and DCFTA this November. So, what would such a geopolitical shift mean for Ukraine and the rest of the EaP partner countries? Firstly, by entering the Customs Union, member states are obliged to abolish the independent external trade policy. Customs Union members must not only agree on a common customs tariff, but also develop a joint free-trade regime with third countries. 

Ukraine’s involvement in the Eurasian project would prevent it from entering into a free trade agreement with the EU because any such agreements should become the matter of the whole Customs Union. Therefore, Russia would have leverage to control not only the external policies of Customs Union member states, but also of their relations with the EU. The only scenario that allows balance is the 3+1 format whereby cooperation between the Customs Union and Ukraine is done without complete integration. The proposed scenario would execute a standard free trade regime only without a common external tariff and the harmonization of the standards.  Unfortunately, the proposal was rejected by Russia.

At the same time, a free trade agreement with the EU would conflict with its membership in the Customs Union. Mostly because of the different standards and regulations used by both integration spaces. Ultimately, Ukraine will inevitably have to choose whether to move closer to the EU or the Customs Union. It also means that the traditional multi-vector policy of Ukraine has reached its limits. In other words, signing the two agreements with the EU would be a point of no return. 

On the other hand, signing the agreements with the EU does not guarantee complete adoption of European rules and norms. Ukrainian corporate business groups are seeking not only unlimited access to the European market, but also to preserve their positions on the internal market. This includes keeping existing monopolies in place, economic protectionism, and the current competitive field and public procurement policy. It is very likely that Ukraine would implement all off the rules in its own selective way. 

On the eve of the EaP Summit in Vilnius, the main question is whether a postponement of signing the Association and DCFTA agreements could create a precedent, and could it send a wrong signal to Ukraine’s political elite and also to the rest of the EaP partner countries. Moreover, if the agreements are not to be signed, would the results and achievements of Ukraine’s European integration be jeopardized and could it even endanger the future of the EU’s EaP initiative. Finally, is there any alternative plan which could be offered to Ukraine in case the question of signing the Association and DCFTA agreements remains open?

There are no doubts that the Vilnius Summit will offer a breaking point to the EaP Initiative. If the agreements are not signed in Vilnius there will probably be no major decisions for another two years. Due to the European Parliament elections next year and the following change of the leadership at the European Commission, the bureaucratic apparatus of the EU will stop with very little attention to be left for Ukraine. Simultaneously, Ukraine will hold presidential elections in 2015. Such an anticipated pause in Ukraine’s European integration would only benefit Russia which will continue pressuring Ukraine to join the Customs Union. However, it can be avoided and Ukraine’s leadership is the one which has all the required information and instruments to achieve it. And they still have time, until Nov. 27.

Laurynas Kasciunas, PhD, is the head of the Policy Analysis and Research Division at the Eastern Europe Studies Centre. Dovile Sukyte is a Policy Analyst at the Eastern Europe Studies Centre.