In Ukraine, the tenacity of the dogs
may be the same, but politicians have long dispensed with the carpet.
In other words, speculation on Ukrainian politics and conjecture over
the influence held by different interests require less guesswork than
in Russia.
Predictability is not necessarily a bad
thing. Complete transparency can provide insight into a country’s
stability. It can lead to earning the trust of international
financial agencies and markets. It can even lead to membership in
rewarding institutions such as the EU. Yet, unfortunately this type
of transparency
does not exist in Ukraine. What does exist is a disheartening
predictability which subsequently prevents a successful Ukrainian
foreign policy.
A perfect example is the recent tumult
surrounding the controversial
language bill. This bill highlights politicians stoking publicity
fires to avoid discussing problems of substance. 65%
of Ukrainians see through this and believe the language bill is
pure political gamesmanship. In fact, even though the protests and
demonstrations over the bill were unquestionably earnest, they were
remarkably
small in comparison with the number of people that attended the
recent Elton John and Queen concert.
On July 12, when President Viktor
Yanukovych and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet in Yalta, the
language bill will surely distract from other issues-and for what?
How much Putin even cares about the
bill is debatable. The bill’s passing would do little to abate the
torrent of domestic
problems he currently faces at home. Moreover, what Putin really
desires-Ukrainian membership into the Customs Union and Single
Economic Space-would nullify any hope of Ukraine finalizing the free
trade agreement with the EU. That is a non-starter for Yanukovich.
Even if he suggested a “pause”
in relations with the EU, his overall stated goal remains further
integration.
However, Yanukovych and the Party of
Regions have failed at implementing most reforms connected with the
EU Accession Agreement. The failure is less about a lack of capacity,
though important, than it is about a lack of government effort.
After all, the delays have likely led
Yanukovich to believe he can consistently secure more favorable
energy deals from Russia. Even if this were true, such deals only
increase energy inefficiency in Ukraine by delaying necessary
reforms.
So this policy becomes neither cunning
nor helpful for greater Ukraine. These reforms would have begun to
improve common Ukrainians’ lives and led to greater economic
opportunities in the future. What is also overlooked is that Ukraine
would have actually been in a much stronger negotiating position with
Russia had it already implemented the suggested reforms.
Taken all together, this is not a
productive ‘middle path’ policy for Ukraine-it is a solitary path
towards isolation. If you doubt the direction then consider this: the
President of Ukraine is as unwilling to turn his back on the EU as he
is willing to rankle Europe with uncompromising views towards jailed
opponents. Likewise, he is as unwilling to appease the Kremlin’s
desires as he is willing to upset non-Russian speakers here in
Ukraine with political ploys.
Ukraine does not
need to, nor should it, select a pro-West or pro-Russia position.
However, it does need to form policy based on something more than
stubbornness. The language debacle has proven disheartening
predictability is alive and well in Ukraine. Ukrainian observers, and
foreign politicians, are looking back in dismay observing a dog
barking without any bite.
Ian Hansen is currently an intern at
the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv.
He is pursuing his Master’s in
International Affairs at the George H.W. Bush School of Government
and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
