Ukraine is
believed to be one step from joining the Eurasian Customs Union, with President
Viktor Yanukovych reportedly planning to go to Moscow and sign agreements there
on Dec. 18. According to prominent members of Ukrainian civil society, the
European Union is the only thing that can help stop this eastward slide.

All Brussels
has to do, it is said, is sign the Association Agreement that would tie Ukraine
to the European Union and all discussion about Kyiv’s orientation would come to
a halt. When a group of Ukrainian experts sent a letter to EU leaders urging them to sign the agreement, that
is what they implicitly meant. The Association Agreement has become a tool in a
geopolitical fight between Brussels and Moscow, and Brussels will be assigned
the role of the guilty party if Ukraine joins the Customs Union. 

Kyiv has
received invitations to all Moscow-led integration initiatives, including this
one, but has managed to stay at arm’s length from most of them. And its suggestion
of a 3+1 framework for cooperation that would have entailed free trade between
the Customs Union and Ukraine was rejected by Moscow. This time, some Ukrainian
experts suggest, the situation is different. 

There are
many reasons to worry that Ukraine may indeed be moving eastward. The Ukrainian
economy is not doing well, and it may need the money that would come from
external players—and with the International Monetary Fund freezing a standby
loan for Ukraine, Russia is the only provider in town. Ukraine’s oligarchs need
cheaper gas, and Russia promised a discount in return for Kyiv’s membership in
the Customs Union. And Yanukovych and his aides seem to be testing the waters
by talking about closer ties with Moscow. Last week, the Communist Party of
Ukraine suggested holding a referendum on joining the Customs Union. 

The
necessary legal framework for this is in place after a new referendum law was
signed in November. A referendum must be held if at least 3 million signatures
are gathered in support of holding one. With the help of this law, the
administration could easily falsify the signatures and potentially the voting
results as well.

The EU can
do little to help in this situation. It is not and should not be in the
business of regime change or course reorientation. Brussels steps in with
support when there is a need to build something. The Association Agreement is
important because its implementation may help Ukraine finally break free of its
Soviet past. But that transformation can happen only is there is focus on Ukraine
and not on geopolitics.

In this
spirit, only the Ukrainians themselves can help their own country. Long gone is
the Ukraine in which local elites relied on external forces to protect them
from their neighbors. In 2004, in independent Ukraine, the people’s massive
protests during the Orange Revolution stopped former President Leonid Kuchma
from pushing through Yanukovych, who was then prime minister, as president in
falsified elections and discouraged the Kremlin from interfering in Kyiv’s
domestic affairs in 2004. They should not try to put their responsibilities
onto the EU’s shoulders now.

So what can
Ukrainian citizens do to stop their country from joining the Customs Union?

Ukrainians
must begin by viewing their situation less emotionally.

Yanukovych
definitely intends to use the referendum law to bypass parliament on internal
and foreign policy decisions. Yet, the law’s existence is not a sign of
impending Customs Union membership. Yanukovych is likelier to use the law to
grab more power and ensure his (or his protege’s) reelection in 2015 rather
than lose political and economic power by using the law to bring Ukraine into
the Customs Union.

The
oligarchs may push for cheaper gas rather than modernizing their factories and
reducing their dependency on Russia. Yet, while they may get better access to
Russian markets after many trade barriers between Ukraine and the Customs Union
members are eliminated, they will lose in all other markets. Kyiv will have to
adopt the Customs Union’s common external tariff, which is twice and sometimes
three times higher than that of Ukraine. They will also not be immune from
trade wars that still exist within the Customs Union. This will outweigh all
possible benefits from cheaper gas.

An agreement
on joining the Customs Union and the adoption of all other relevant documents
needs to be ratified by parliament. The members of Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions are unlikely to ecstatically vote for such a deal, let alone the
opposition, which has more seats in parliament and is well equipped for the
fight.

Even if the
parliament would ratify Ukraine’s membership in the Customs Union, there would
be two further barriers ahead. The first is the Ukrainian Constitution, which
prohibits surrendering sovereignty to a supranational body. But of course, the
president may use the referendum law to change the Constitution.

If he does
so, Ukraine may be prevented from integrating into the Customs Union with the
help of the World Trade Organization. Membership in the Customs Union will
require the revision of Ukraine’s WTO commitments on customs tariffs. Kyiv’s
recent attempt to raise the tariff ceiling for 371 goods was strongly opposed
by all WTO members. Raising all tariffs may lead to long fights and demands
from WTO members for compensation for their reduced access to the Ukrainian
market.

Despite all
of these barriers, the president may still wish to take Ukraine on a journey to
the Customs Union. To prevent that, Ukrainians must take action. They should
focus on Ukraine and make European integration a domestic issue, not a foreign
policy tool.

Ukrainians
can hit the administration with its own weapon: the referendum law. They should
collect 3 million signatures to launch a referendum on whether Ukraine should
meet the EU’s conditions and sign the Association Agreement. With more than 50
percent of the population supporting European integration, gathering the
necessary signatures should not be a problem. And it is doubtful the
administration would try to rig this one.

To avoid
future abuses, Ukrainians should use the referendum law to fix the deficiencies
of the law itself. They should initiate a referendum on adding public oversight
to the law and reducing the possibility of result manipulation. But Ukrainians
must go further. They have to put issues that really trouble them—from
corruption, to excessive presidential authority, to the tax code—up for
referendum as well.

Ukrainians
will also have to start a massive information campaign. The media proved to be
the best fighter for freedoms this year by pushing the administration to
abandon the libel law that would have imprisoned or heavily fined journalists
found guilty of defamation. This potential should be used to highlight the
benefits of closer integration with the EU. A picture of a farmer in Belarus
contrasted with one in the EU, or a table with financial benefits from trade
with the EU versus losses that Kazakhstan experienced after it raised tariffs
because of Customs Union membership, will beat every nostalgic thought an
ordinary Ukrainian might have about uniting with Russia.

The
opposition in parliament must do its best to block any document that would
reverse Ukraine’s European course, be that the ratification of the Customs
Union membership or any other law that would deviate from the EU or Council of
Europe’s norms.

Last but not
least, Ukrainians can use the EU to fight their own administration. They can
build alliances with Brussels based on mutual interests by, for instance,
condemning the increase of customs tariffs by the Ukrainian administration—both
today’s suggested increases and larger changes if Kyiv joins the Customs
Union—that will be bad for both the Ukrainian economy and the EU. By defending
their country’s interests and showing some empathy by addressing the EU’s
concerns, Ukrainians can get much further than they imagine.

Olga Shumylo-Tapiola is a visiting scholar at
Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where her research focuses on EU and Russian
policy toward Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.
Editor’s Note: This opinion was
originally published on the Carnegie Europe website here http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50388
and is reprinted with permission.