Clark, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, said that Ukrainians he spoke with are predicting a renewed Russian military offensive after Orthodox Easter on April 12 and possibly before the 70th anniversary of Victory Day, which is celebrated on May 9. He said Russian President Vladimir Putin is clearly the military commander of the war against Ukraine.

Another Russian attack would mark the third distinct military offensive — the first from April 2014 through August, ending in the massacre of Ukrainian troops at Ilovaisk and prompting the September Minsk I peace agreement. The second offensive came in January and led to Ukraine’s surrender of the Donetsk airport that month and, in February, its surrender of the Donetsk Oblast city of Debaltseve after the Minsk II peace agreement on Feb. 15.

A third Russian military offensive, Clark predicted, would be the “tipping point” in changing U.S. policy to more actively support Ukraine financially and militarily, including providing lethal defensive weapons. Clark favors what he calls “a comprehensive package” of U.S. military and financial assistance to Ukraine.

Here are some highlights of the talk:

Retired U.S. General Wesley Clark speaks before the Atlantic Council on March 30 after his recent trip to Ukraine

On Russia’s mindset

“If it’s not theirs, they want it. And if its ours, it’s hurting them. They view the world that way. We don’t.”

On Russia’s attitude towards Ukraine

“In 1999, I came to the (President Leonid) Kuchma inauguration. Putin said words to the effect of ‘Ukraine and Russia are more than brothers. We are in each other’s souls.’ Shortly after this, I was contacted by one of the high representatives of Poland who said this is code language for Putin attempting to trying to take over Ukraine. This conflict in Ukraine goes back a long, long way. This is not something that emerged after (President Viktor) Yanukovych fled 14 months ago. This is a long process that’s unfolding. It’s had one single focus – to bring Ukraine back into the Russian orbit, either directly or indirectly.”

On Ukraine’s early war mistakes

During Russia’s invasion of Crimea, a Ukrainian official told Clark that about the capture of 12 Russian spetsnaz (military special operations) teams in mainland Ukraine. “I asked ‘What did you do with the Russian spetsnaz teams?’ (The answer was) ‘we didn’t want to be provocative, so we let them go.’ That was a year ago. Since then it’s unfolded in nightmare-like fashion.”

Russia’s war plan

“There are four phases: 1. terrorism; 2. irregular forces; 3. Russian peacekeeping forces and then 4. a de-escalatory phase.”

Russian control

“Today the separatist organizations are 75-80 percent manned by Russians – Russian mercenaries, Russian thugs who have been let out of prison and Russian ‘volunteers’ who are their on leaves of absence from the armed forces.”

On Russian hit lists

“When they started, it was the separatists under GRU (Russian intelligence service) leadership and there were a lot of independent organizations in there. There was a Russian hit list put out. They eliminated some of the separatist leaders by liquidation, I’m told, and now the Russians are moving into the separatist organizations from top to bottom, in positions of authority. So they are strengthening the ability of separatists to operate effectively.”

U.S. General Wesley Clark speaks during the 11th Yalta Annual Meeting of YES on Sept. 12 in Kyiv. Clark said on March 30 that America should provide a comprehensive package of military and financial aid to Ukraine before Russia launches its next military

U.S. General Wesley Clark speaks during the 11th Yalta Annual Meeting of YES on Sept. 12 in Kyiv. Clark said on March 30 that America should provide a comprehensive package of military and financial aid to Ukraine before Russia launches its next military offensive, which many believe will come after Orthodox Easter Sunday. (YES/Sergei Illin)

On Russian military prowess

“Russians have proved very adaptive in their tactics. They’re rotating commanders through the battlefield. It’s not only a battlefield but a great training opportunity. They are innovating against us.”

On Putin’s role in war

“Based on all the information we have received, he is involved in the battlefield direction. Putin himself directed the focus in Debaltseve and in conversations with Ukrainian leaders was threatening them with destruction for their armed forces in Debaltseve and bragging about it in a very demeaning way…He’s definitely the military commander.”

On Putin’s objective

“Putin’s objective would be much broader than Ukraine. It would be to shatter the sense of wellbeing and confidence among the nations of Eastern Europe in NATO’S protection and ideally to drive a permanent wedge between United States and European allies, have governments in Bulgaria and the Baltic states and some of the central European states collapse, quaking in fear, anxious to be on the winning side of history as they saw lack of resolute will from the West and implacable force from the East. They’ve all seen this movie before. They know what can happen. We make a serious mistake if we think Putin’s interests are only limited to the geography of Ukraine.”

On OSCE’s ineffectiveness

“The border with Russia is totally open. There are only a couple of OSCE observation points. This is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is designed to monitor situations such as this. But unfortunately they cannot monitor the whole border. More than half of the makeup of the OSCE were Russian military who are free to go up to the Ukrainian positions and look and their disposition and their specific locations. They are on the honor code not to pass it back to Russian forces, if that, and maybe not even on the honor code. OSCE is essentially non-functional there. A couple of the OSCE drones were shot down by Russian anti-aircraft systems that were directed high-power electronic systems that brought down these drones. So the overhead imagery wasn’t there…There’s very limited overwatch by OSCE. What there is is compromised.”

On Russian spring offensive

“What is happening now is preparations for a renewed offensive from the east. Every source we talked to cited the examples of it: the constant probing and harassment attacks along the lines and (Russian) spetsnaz trying to penetrate Ukrainian positions and seize Ukrainian bridges and road intersections. These are big spaces along the 400 kilometer front…

“Ukrainians believe that if you look at the statement made by the separatists from Putin on down and look at the geographic anomaly and realize you cannot hold without controlling electric power and a (land) connection to Crimea. You then look at the previous pattern, you can predict the next Russian offensive. They are citing it as following Orthodox Easter and most probably before Victory in Europe Day on May 9 – maybe it’s after VE Day– it is all political.”

On need for urgent assistance

“We should be giving assistance to Ukraine now. This is the time they need the assistance. We should provide that assistance because a strong reliable defense to prevent a successful Russian military operation is the the key to making the Minsk II agreement work. It’s not provocative. It’s stablizing and that’s why we should execute it.”

On why he favors arming Ukraine

“I am in favor of changing the policy (against providing lethal weapons). If you cannot change it, at least you can have a package and promise it and promote and explain it and use it in deterrence. The fact that the Unted States is coming to the rescue will go like a shot of adrenaline from top to bottom of the Ukrainian armed forces at every level. They feel they are fighting what they consider to be the battle for Western civilization. They are fighting for us, for democracy, human rights, for freedom, for Western values. The U.S. has given them strong verbal support and is pushing to give them financial assistance. But we we haven’t given them sufficient quantities of military assistance, even of the non-lethal kinds of assistance that they need…It should get into the field quickly.”

On degree of military aid

“The more comprehensive package we can give them, the better.”

On Ukraine’s military leaders

“I felt like they had a lot of credibility. They have been up against front-line Russian forces as well as the separatists. They’ve survived engagements in 21st century warfare, jamming that is unheard for American forces, overhead observation from UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) that we don’t have awareness of and a lot of other high technology weapons that we haven’t ourselves and our forces haven’t faced in the Middle East. There is a lot going on in this battlefield. It seems that a renewal of a broader conflict there is imminent.”

On Ukraine’s soldiers

“They are well-educated, technically competent, literate, educated soldiers, highly motivated..You’ve got people who are pretty well-trained but they lack the equipment…I promise you that the soldiers on front line could shoot (Javelin missiles) with minimalistic training.”

On NATO’S role

“The impact of Putin’s actions in Ukraine have already been felt in Eastern Europe. Nations there feel the hybrid warfare model directed against them. They see the Russian propaganda. They see the overflights. They see what’s coming. Simply allowing Ukraine to do its best and start fresh after Ukraine fails is a fallacious assumption. You won’t start fresh. You will start in a deep, deep hole.

“The real key to NATO’s strategy in the Cold War was that of deterrence…We called it incalculability. We could match their escalation at every level. They understand that should they attack it could easily go strategic nuclear very quickly. Since the end of the Cold War, the logic, the politics of that has dissipated from the collective memories of NATO and from the mindset of the leadership of NATO. There are many things to be done there to put deterrence back in place.”

On NATO’s threat

“NATO is a good bogeyman if you’re the Russsian leader. You can say NATO’s a threat, but you can’t say it seriously. NATO has never ever had a plan to attack, not at any level, at the tactical level, not at the operation level.”

On role of sanctions

“There’s a limit to how far you can go with sanctions. For sure, some companies and individuals have been hurt but the Russian economy is doing just fine and Putin is doing just fine. Putin probably likes it when Russian businesses come to him and say, ‘Vladimir we can’t get the credit we need in London; can you help me? He says ‘I’m sure we can help you. He likes it because it gives him a greater grip on the economy…You need a balanced approach (to) strengthen the ability of Ukrainians to resist, to drive this back into the diplomatic channel and keep it it there.”

On Europe’s energy dependence

“It’s better for Europe to have an energy policy that is not connected to Russian political whim…they haven’t yet…Germany has lost their energy policy gets rid of nuclear energy, burns coal, can’t afford solar, says we’ve done enough on wind…they’ve gone in the reverse direction.”

On investing in Ukraine

“The stronger you can tie the economy to the West, the more interest there is, the better. If I had the resources I would find the right things to invest in Ukraine. There are a lot of opportunities in Ukraine from landing LNG (liquified natural gas) to prospecting shale and energy, electronics and IT opportunities in Ukraine. I’m a believer in Ukraine and I’m betting on its survival and future.”

On prospect for total war

“Poroshenko has to keep democracy going. He has to get rid of corruption. He has to work with parliament. He has to please the Europeans in terms of making economic progress to get the funding. There’s a lot of constraint. He’s not going to a total-war scenario; that opens up a vulnerability in the specter of conflict. I hope Putin is smart enough not to take it. I hope he will recognize that where he is right now is the best place to stop and call off this crazy offensive. I don’t think he will, but I hope he will.”

On Germany’s policy

“As far as half-meaures, I would rather see full assistance. But I think when something happens, if we the United States have been self-deterred from helping Ukraine by encouraging Germany to take the lead, then I think the next round of the offensive invalidates the German analysis. (German Chancellor) Angela Merkel is a fine political leader and she can say again and again there’s no military solution, but a third round of a Russian offensive means that at least Putin sees a miltiary solution.”

On comparison to 1990s Balkans

“The conflict in the Balkans was manufactured by outside forces, just the same way the conflict in Ukraine has been manufactured by outside forces.”

On consequences for United States

“This is a real, highly significant, live foreign policy issue that has tremendous impact on the future of the United States. How we handle this over the next two months, four months, six months will determine a lot about our future relationships with Russia, Europe and the rest of the world. I hope we can make progress through the administration’s efforts.”

Kyiv Post chief editor Brian Bonner can be reached at [email protected]