Even without this (and many other) warnings, the living experience
under two governments of Viktor Yanukovych – in 2002-2004 and 2006-2007 –
should have been sufficient to understand what his ultimate victory
would mean for the country. Sapienti sat, but Ukrainians seem to
be incurable optimists. This might seem paradoxical in view of all the
ordeals they suffered throughout their history. But maybe some resilient
optimism is exactly what they need most to survive under unfavorable
circumstances.
Even today, three years after Yanukovych’s victory and the complete
destruction of state institutions, any warnings about the most probable
steps to be undertaken by his devious team usually fall on deaf ears.
Even seasoned experts typically respond: “No, they would not go that
far!”
But they do. And there are no signs they are going to stop anywhere
due to some legal, or moral, or merely technical reasons. If any rule,
or law, or even the constitution restrain the usurpers, they easily
change them, bypass, misinterpret, or ignore. This is how they created
the illegitimate government, reshuffled the Constitutional Court,
abandoned the Constitution, changed the electoral law, falsified local
and, then, national parliamentary elections, imprisoned political
opponents, subordinated the entire judiciary to the unconstitutional
body called the Supreme Council of Justice, a mere handmaiden of the
presidential administration, and more http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2013/03/25/6986377/.
Until recently, very few people imagined the tame courts could be
used, four months after the elections, to withdraw mandates from a
couple of disobedient deputies on the dubious legal ground of some
alleged electoral violations. No Ukrainian law stipulates such an odd
procedure but the goal of the legal novelty is clear: to send a message
to all MPs that any of them could lose their mandate at any point,
depending on the president’s whim and his team’s calculations. If the
MPs refuse to accept carrots in a form of six-digit bribes, they should
be ready to face the sticks http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/8/6983167/.
Sehiy Vlasenko, Yulia Tymoshenko’s legal adviser, became the latest
victim of Ukraine’s notorious selective justice when the Supreme
Administrative Court stripped him of his MP’s mandate on the grounds
that he could not combine the activity of a professional attorney and
work in the legislature. Despite the fact that all the evidence
indicated that he did not represent Tymoshenko in court as an attorney
but merely assisted her as a consultant (which is not forbidden by law),
the judges adhered to their decision http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/03/6/6985032/.
Now, the Ukrainian optimists have got one more field to perfect their
positive thinking. As the crucial presidential elections in 2015 loom
large and the incumbent has virtually no chance to win them fairly, the
possible tricks are pondered, ranging from possible changes of the
constitution that would enable the election of the president by the
(domesticated) parliament to a more sophisticated manipulation of the
electoral process that would secure an easy victory for the incumbent
against the radical rival in the second round. The first scenario was
put in doubt after the parliamentary elections did not bring the Party
of Regions the needed majority it needed to change the constitution at
some later point. The second scenario was questioned recently by an
opinion poll, which revealed that Yanukovych might lose the second round
not only to Vitali Klitschko (30% to 49%), Arseniy Yatseniuk (33 to 40)
or Yulia Tymoshenko (33 to 36), but even to Oleh Tiahnybok, a radical
nationalist, who was considered easy prey for the incumbent and
therefore the most preferable sparring partner in the second round. Now,
Tiahnybok lags only one per cent behind Viktor Yanukovych (32 to 33)
and, as time passes and the situation deteriorates, may overrun the
incumbent as a lesser evil in the eyes of the electorate http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14049/.
Therefore, Ukrainian authorities are musing over a new ploy: to
conduct the presidential elections in a single round, that is to employ
the first-past-the-post system, which largely helped them to win
parliamentary elections last year. This does not require any changes to
the constitution, other than to amend the law on elections to that of a
simple majority. And once again, the Ukrainian optimists contend that
the Regionals would not go so far. They argue that such presidential
elections would not be internationally accepted and that the legitimacy
of such a president would be very low. But there are no proofs that
Ukrainian rulers care much about international practice, legality and
legitimacy. Occasionally, they make some concessions to public opinion
and international policy-makers but only to a degree that would not
threaten their monopoly on power.
Their general approach to all the boring legal principles and
procedures was aphoristically expressed by Mykhaylo Chechetov, the Party
of Regions band-master who conducts the “right” voting of his party
fellows in the parliament by raising the hand (that means “yes”) or
waving it (that means “no”). Last year, after his faction brazenly
violated all the procedural requirements to push through the parliament a
highly controversial law on languages, he boasted cynically to
journalists: “Just realize the elegancy of our play! We tricked them
(the opposition) like kittens!”
The meaning of “elegancy” of their play is perfectly characterized by
a leading member of the Party of Regions who, back in 2004, headed the
shadow, i.e. real electoral headquarters of Viktor Yanukovych,
responsible for all electoral manipulations, contrary to the official
headquarters, assigned the role of a show-window. According to Taras
Chornovil, who worked at the time for Yanukovych, all his attempts to
discourage colleagues from blatant falsifications encountered a typical
response from the headquarters’ chief: “Why worry? Everything is under
[our] control!” (Ne boysya! Vse skhvacheno”—the word “skhvacheno” comes
from criminal jargon and means literally “is captured!”).
There are an increasing number of experts who believe that Yanukovych
has already passed the point of no return and will now stay in power at
any cost. Many Ukrainians used to have the same feeling about Leonid
Kuchma after his alleged involvement in Heorhiy Gongadze’s murder. But,
as Mykhaylo Dubyniansky argues, Kuchma had some internal restraints that
are completely missing in Yanukovych. Kuchma was prone to bargain for
security guarantees and retreat peacefully. Yanukovych would not trust
in any guarantees since he destroyed the non-aggression pact among the
elites himself. “He does not stand upon ceremony with the Constitution,
does not stand with MPs, and would definitely not stand with protesters,
however many of them go into the streets. Any attempt to dismiss
Yanukovych – real, not farcical – would end up with violence. If anybody
had cherished rosy illusions, they should have faded away last fall. We
saw a bloody battle in Pervomaysk [during the elections], and tear gas
in Kyiv, even though there was nothing particularly valuable to fight
for. In two years, the stakes will be much higher – the personal
security of Viktor Yanukovych, his family assets, and his beloved
Mezhyhirya residence. Coercion would grow proportionally to the price of
defeat”: http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2013/03/21/6986081/.
These gloomy predictions might contrast dramatically with some
optimists’ views. A leading Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak
believes that “Ukraine has never had such a weak regime. To dismiss it
is an easy and even joyful task” http://gazeta.ua/articles/grycak-jaroslav/_mudrist/415453.
Oksana Zabuzhko, a prominent Ukrainian writer, argues that: “by all
indications, they are short-term rulers… And, when they—like teenagers
who encourage themselves—cry threateningly that they have come to power
‘for a long time,’ it sounds ridiculous” http://unian.net/ukr/news/news-385145.html. Yulia Mostova, the editor of the reputable Dzerkalo tyzhnia
weekly, contends that “today’s authorities are weaker than ever before”
because they are not able to “withstand the challenges that our nation
encounters” http://gazeta.dt.ua/POLITICS/slabkist_silnih.html.
And Alexander Motyl, one of the most perceptive observers of current
Ukrainian politics, is confident that Yanukovych’s deeply dysfunctional
system “will collapse under its own dead weight. Most probably, that
collapse will come in 2015, during the next presidential elections, or
in 2020, after Yanukovych finishes his second term” http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/yanukovych-ruin-and-its-aftermath-part-1.
What both the optimists and the pessimists have in common is a
profound concern about the regime’s succession.
Indeed, whether the
regime’s collapse occurs sooner or later, peacefully or violently, the
new authorities, in any case, would have to solve an enormously
difficult task of complete reconstruction of state institutions, from
top to bottom.
And, as Mykhaylo Dubyniansky aptly remarks, the tougher
an authoritarian regime, the more likely its opponents-cum-successors
would be very similar, as we have witnessed in Libya, Syria, and quite a
few African states. In other words, Klitschko may easily win an
election against Viktor Yanukovych if it is free and fair. But if it
were not conducted democratically, it would likely not be Klitschko who
orchestrates the dismissal of the usurper. Suffice it to recall the
dismissal of Ceausescu, Qaddafi, or Assad to understand the challenges
Ukraine is approaching.
Mykola Riabchuk is a Ukrainian author and journalist. This article
is reprinted with the author’s permission. It originally appeared in Current Politics in Ukraine, Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.
