When Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, paid an official visit to Kyiv on Feb. 7, he had only one issue to discuss: whether Ukraine is ready to sign the EU Association Agreement. Though the European Union did not provide any new formal requirements, information on 19 checking points for Ukraine was circulated in the press. It was switfty nicknamed Füle’s List.
It is not an official document; however, both sides agree that it will be used for assessing Ukraine’s progress in implementing sectoral reforms. In particular, Füle’s List provides for monitoring of the strength and efficacy of Ukraine’s anticorruption campaign.
Ukraine’s authorities reacted by decising that 10 of 19 demands are their priorities.
The government has decided it is ready to implement the fourth part of the Füle’s list (consultations and cooperation with Brussels and opposition) and half of the third part, which deals with reforms.
The reform of state finances got the lion’s share of attention. Then comes the system of administration, distribution of international aid, economy and the business community, and preparation for a free trade zone with EU.
The Cabinet also paid some attention to the issue of corruption. However, the list of actions to combat corruption is very short. It only consists of one point: support of a draft law introducing new articles on bribing to be added to the Criminal Code.
How’s that for fighting corruption in a country that, according to the Transparency International, is the most corrupt in Europe and in top 30 of of the world’s most corrupt?
Regular reports from the Ukrainian government claim it’s possible to battle corruption that way. Civil society assessment does not share the optimism, though.
When it comes to fighting corruption, the key trends of the 2012–2013 political season are:
• Inertness of the National Anticorruption Committee.
This institution has the most power to fight corruption and coordinate anticorruption actions of others. Moreover, the Ukrainian side tries to pretend that the National Anticorruption Committee (which is in fact the consultative body under the president) is the only independent anticorruption body aiming to coordinate the state institutions responsible for fighting corruption.
However, even given these conditions, the National Anticorruption Committee hasn’t held a meeting for over a year. The president only produces documents on amendments to the committee membership and updates on its work approaches.
• The state program for combating corruption isn’t worth the paper it was printed on.
The Hr 800 million budget for implementing the anticorruption program has never actually been allocated. As a result, the average score for implementation of the program’s activities is 2.7 of the possible 5.
The program’s planned activities do not always make sense, and the progress indicators are not coordinated with the essence of the activities.
• Changes in legislation on public procurement have driven billions of public money into the shadow.
For instance, in 2012 alone the parliament of Ukraine approved eight bills that considerably changed public procurement regulations in Ukraine. There was a number of gradual exclusions from the tender law that governs over the whole system of state procurements. One of the primary changes was the exclusion of procurements at the expense of state or community-level enterprises, as well as business companies with the state share over 50 percent.
The role of executors of state anticorruption policy was taken up by NGOs, that provide civic control over public procurements. It leads to prevention of theft worth many millions of dollars. Also, NGOs provide legal consultancy for victims of corruption; advocacy of legislative regulations aimed atdeveloping ideas for proper governance in Ukraine, etc.
However, the reactions of relevant government agencies to the facts provided by civic controllers remains extremely unenthusiastic.
Law enforcement agencies are reluctant to open criminal cases based upon civic activists’ and journalists’ reports.
All this means that Ukraine’s implementation of anticorruption demands listed by Füle might remain on paper. For it not to happen, a number of specific steps should be taken.
Here are some suggestions:
• Create a Unified State Register of Persons Called to Account for Corrupt Actions (the so-called list of corrupt persons) publicly available, amend the Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Personal Data”.
• Ensure openness of public servants’ assets, receipts and expenditures though declarations, particularly through their promulgation on official bodies’ websites, by amending the basic anticorruption law.
• Initiate real control over the declaration of public servants’ assets, receipts and expenditures.
• Initiate legislative reform of political parties and election campaign financing, particularly in the abatement of their dependence on private financing and corruption influences.
• The president of Ukraine should finally decide on who will coordinate anticorruption policy and will be politically responsible for its implementation, and increase the authority of this coordinating body.
• Provide real financing for the State Programme for Prevention and Combating Corruption 2011–2015, after revising its priorities.
However, neither Brussels nor Kyiv knows for sure whether this is possible today.
Oleksii Khmara is the President of Transparency International Ukraine.
