In the past week, the Kyiv Post published op-eds highly critical of Mikheil Saakashvili. The authors, Taras Kuzio and Paul Niland, are utterly unfair, however, in their dismissal of Saakashvili’s importance for Ukraine. They greatly exaggerate his weaknesses, which admittedly he has – and do not give sufficient due to what he stands for and wants to sincerely achieve for Ukraine.

Thus Kuzio rhetorically asks how Europeans would react if a guest invited into their house would behave like Saakashvili did in Ukraine. It is a superficial way of arguing, fully overlooking the fact that the house in which Saakashvili was invited is not a normal house: the house rules are not agreed democratically, it is the main owner or
tenant who sets the rules with his cronies and it is that small coterie that decides who break the rules and who is punished. Four years ago the occupants of the house that is Ukraine, the Ukrainian people, overwhelmingly voted for a president and a parliament that would eradicate corruption, free Ukraine from the destructive grip of
oligarchs on the economy and the political system and ensure that their country move irreversibly towards democratic rule of law.

After indeed impressive initial reforms, mostly in non-political areas, it became increasingly clear that the president and his allies in parliament are not interested in reforms that will lead to true democracy. Saakashvili was not the only one to see this, but he was one of the first and one who spoke out loudly, persistently and with great authority thanks to the impressive reforms he had pushed through in his native Georgia (about which the World Bank published some highly positive reports). From the very beginning, Saakashvili stressed that Ukraine only had a limited window of opportunity, a maximum of three years, during which to carry out the most essential reforms.

Kuzio points to Saakashvili’s “poor performance” as governor of Odesa Oblast as proof of not doing real work, but mainly “rhetorics” and “PR.” Such a judgment reveals a worrying lack of understanding of the impossible conditions under which Saakashvili had to operate: any governor in Ukraine has only limited competences, in particular where reforms are concerned; and real political and economic power in Odesa Oblast resides with the corrupt political and criminal clans in Odesa that dominate decision-making. It was clear from the beginning that without strong support from Kyiv, Saakashvili would not be able to accomplish much. In spite of his constant pleas, that
support never materialized. Nevertheless, he produced some real successes and started important initiatives (electronic customs clearing, administrative center where people can obtain documents without bureaucratic hassles, improvements at Odessa airport, efforts to increase low-cost flights, reconstructing the appalling road from
Odessa to the border with Romania).

Kuzio maintains that Saakashvili unreasonably focuses his criticism on President Petro Poroshenko, since he shares power with the parliament. This is also disingenuous. Saakashvili may have criticized the president more strongly, but he certainly never spared the Ukrainian Rada. And it is a simple fact that in the Ukrainian political system
the president is the main state representative, domestically and abroad. It is therefore only logical that criticism of the country’s fundamental policies are first of all addressed to him.

But irrespective of the question of how powerful Poroshenko is in Ukrainian politics, there is simply no excuse for him not to have done more, or to at least not to have shown to have tried more, to put Victor Yanukovych-related big fish and EuroMaidan Revolution killers on trial and to implement true judicial reform. There is no justification whatsoever to have introduced a law for an anti-corruption court that violates the main recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission.

Another dangerous argument advanced by people like Kuzio is that people like Saakashvili push too hard for too rapid reforms at a time of Russian military aggression in Crimea and Donbas. Such an argument risks giving the authorities a blank cheque not to carry out any reforms. And again, not to have at least tried certain fundamental
reforms cannot be excused by Russian aggression. On the contrary, if the Ukrainian people would have seen that their main politicians were at least seriously trying to implement the reforms for which they had been elected, they would have been more supportive of their leaders.

People like Niland appear to apply double standards when accusing Saakashvili of frequently violating Ukrainian laws. His Ukrainian citizenship is being withdrawn in a despicable and illegal manner, some of his supporters are illegally and forcefully deported to Georgia, and then he is expected to behave like an angel? Niland sounds like Poroshenko, who likes to lecture Western audiences that if people like Saakashvili have problems with decisions of the Ukrainian authorities, they just should submit their case to the courts because there is now democratic rule of law.

Really?

Yes, there is rule of law, but it is the small group in power, not independent prosecutors or judges, that decides how laws are applied, who will be prosecuted and who will be convicted. In such a system Saakashvili did not have a chance in his appeal against the decision to withdraw his Ukrainian citizenship.

Ukrainians should be grateful that there is someone of the stature of Saakashvili who does not stop telling loudly and fearlessly that the emperor has no clothes: Ukraine is still in the grip of small groups of corrupt politicians, officials and oligarchs who refuse to implement fundamental democratic reforms. Without reforming the judiciary, the public prosecutor’s office and election laws and without an independent anti-corruption court Ukraine will slide back to Yanukovych times.

Ukrainian reformers do an impressive job, but on their own are not strong enough to force the authorities to change course. Neither will the West exert enough pressure. Therefore the push for fundamental change can only come from massive and persistent demonstrations by the Ukrainian people.