He had been prime minister under Kuchma during the two years preceding the election. A President Yanukovych taking office in 2005 would no doubt have perpetuated the policies of the Kuchma regime, and left most of its personnel in place.
The elites that dominated Ukrainian politics were too powerful, too entrenched and political forces that might have pushed a Yanukovych presidency towards democratic reform were weak and undeveloped in 2005.
Yanukovych came to the presidency in 2010 a much more independent and experienced politician, with a much clearer sense for what needed to be done. And he governs a people who are harder to manipulate and less fearful of standing up to state power.
In fairness to Kuchma, it should be stressed that he was severely constrained by the circumstances under which he had to govern. Kuchma surely did not intend for his administration to end up as it did in 2004.
It is easy to overlook the fact that he started out as a reformer. After election in 1994, Kuchma announced comprehensive economic reforms, including reduced subsidies, lifting of price controls, lower taxes, privatization of industry and agriculture, and reforms in currency regulation and banking. Kuchma was by no means a puppet of Moscow. He insisted that Ukraine needed a "multi-vector" foreign policy balancing Eastern and Western interests. He signed a partnership agreement with NATO and even suggested that Ukraine would join it. Yet, like political leaders everywhere, Kuchma was constrained by the culture and structures of the political system he inherited. He was beholden to the elites that dominated Ukraine, and to those who had brought him to power.
Consider the situation in the Soviet period. The overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens were thoroughly cowed into passivity and obedience. These behavior patterns naturally carried over into the post-Soviet situation. How could one expect such deeply-rooted attitudes and behavior to change easily? When the Soviet Union collapsed, the freedom that came with it meant little to the overwhelming majority of citizens. It was the Soviet elites, the powerful, the connected and the criminal elements who were the main beneficiaries of this new freedom.
Winning an election is a long way from enabling a leader to make profound changes in the political and bureaucratic machinery by which a country is governed.
The 2004 Orange Revolution, bringing Viktor Yushchenko to power as president, showed dramatically that the political situation in Ukraine had changed. Judged by the hopes and expectations it raised, the Orange Revolution was a failure. Yet putting too much emphasis on these failed hopes obscures the profound change that has taken place in the political climate in Ukraine. Whatever principles the Orange Revolution may have advanced, its most important result was the appearance of the Ukrainian public as a political factor that can no longer be ignored. The Orange Revolution brought the Ukrainian people into the picture as a powerful and enduring political force which no leader since that time can ignore.
I am sure Yanukovych understands this very well. As loser of the 2004 election, and subsequently as prime minister and opposition Leader, he had unusual opportunity to experience the consequences of the Orange Revolution from different perspectives. He may even understand the real consequences of the Orange Revolution better than those who triumphantly defeated him in December 2004. The dramatic and powerful popular support for the Orange Revolution made it easy for the Orangists to confuse their own ideological program with the will of the Ukrainian People. But Ukrainian reality isn’t that simple.
To be sure, the act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on Aug. 24, 1991, with 321 votes in favor, 2 votes against and 6 abstentions. The act of Independence was overwhelmingly supported by the Ukrainian electorate in a referendum held on Dec. 8, 1991, with more than 90 percent voting in favor, and 82 percent of the electorate participating.
Yet few thought much about, let alone understood very deeply these aims and objective, let alone their consequences. Moreover, in a referendum held in March 1991, the proposal of “preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics” had been supported by 70.2 percent of Ukrainian voters, with a turnout of 83.5 percent.
Like overwhelming numbers of citizens of the former USSR, most Ukrainians fervently wished to escape the Soviet system. For a substantial part of the Ukrainian electorate, the obvious way to accomplish this was through independence. However, escape from the Soviet Union has turned out to be far more difficult than most anticipated. Ukraine, except perhaps for those parts that were annexed to the USSR after World War II, was just as thoroughly Soviet as was Russia. When Ukraine became independent, it took the Soviet system along with it. That system was deeply rooted in the minds, habits, economies, and social structures of all the republics of the USSR. The Soviet street names that remain in cities throughout Ukraine are food for thought, especially in light of the fact that such names have, for the most part, disappeared in Moscow—the capital of the Soviet Empire.
With some luck, Ukrainian politics may soon begin to develop into the kind of "government and opposition" pattern that is typical of most established democracies. Even with the serious regional divide that plagues Ukrainian politics, each side has come to realize that it needs to attract voters from the other side, and both sides have shown some success in doing so.
Yanukovych, for one, surely knows that he needs broad popular support and a strong parliamentary majority to accomplish his ambitious program, indeed even to remain in power. Fixing elections in Ukraine has become far more difficult since the Orange Revolution. Yanukovych also knows that the attitude of many Ukrainians towards him is negative to hostile, and that he needs to improve his image, and allay widespread fears about his presidency. I am sure he is fully aware that wide-scale repression is not an option, since it easily backfires and, in any case, cannot provide permanent stability. He will have to produce results and allay reservations about him and his party before the next elections, or the voters will dismiss them.
For many reasons, I believe there is much room for optimism about the future of Ukraine.
Fred Eidlin is a visiting professor at University of Tartu in Tartu, Estonia.
