You're reading: Surkov e-mails show Kremlin’s heavy hand in war against Ukraine

The release of the hacked e-mails of Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin adviser who oversees “separatist affairs” in the former Soviet republics, did not produce any explosive new revelations about Russia’s not-so-covert war on Ukraine.

But it did give a glimpse of the day-to-day workings of a man many believe was deeply involved in destabilizing Ukraine after the EuroMaidan Revolution.

And there were at least three e-mails that link Surkov, a close adviser of Russian President Vladimir Putin, directly to the management of the “separatist republics” set up in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

The overall theme of the communications adds to the growing body of evidence that the Kremlin, despite its denials, has been much more involved in the affairs of its neighbor than it lets on.

The e-mails, which were leaked by Ukrainian hackers on Oct. 24, expose Russia’s influence in Crimea in the run-up to the peninsula’s annexation, paid pro-Russian rallies in eastern Ukraine and the Kremlin’s use of pro-Russian politicians, journalists and bloggers in Ukraine. They also contain evidence that Russian soldiers participated in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine in May 2014.

Exiled Russian businessman Yevgeny Chichvarkin confirmed the authenticity of his correspondence with Surkov, while Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied the authenticity of the e-mails.

Crimea

The e-mails document active contacts between the Kremlin and Crimea in the run-up to the Ukrainian peninsula’s annexation by Russia in March 2014.

Specifically, Surkov and other Russian officials were scheduled to hold a meeting on Dec. 5, 2013 to discuss “Crimea’s social and economic development.” Though the details of the meeting are not clear, the wording of the topic discussed suggests that Russia already treated Crimea as one of its satellites.

Apart from Ukraine, Surkov also supervises relations with two satellites of Russia and breakaway republics of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian parliament and head of the Institute for the Commonwealth of Independent States, regularly informed Surkov about pro-Russian events in Crimea. Specifically, he told him about a forum in Yalta on Feb. 12, 2014 and a Cossack congress on Feb. 5, 2014 in Sevastopol.

Zatulin later played an active role in the annexation of Crimea.

The documents also show that Russia was actively preparing the construction of a bridge linking Kerch with Russia’s Taman Peninsula in January to February 2014. Plans for the bridge’s construction have been discussed for decades, and its construction began in 2015.

Paid-for Russian rallies

While annexing Crimea in March 2014, Russia also started destabilizing eastern Ukraine by promoting anti-Kyiv protests at the same time.

Two emails dated on May 16, 2014, contain a table with the names of 13 organizations, and detail numbers of activists and their travel expenses to places named D and L. These places were most likely the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, where paid protesters are known to have travelled from other Ukrainian cities.

The political organizations included well known parties from the times of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma: the Peasants’ Party, the Liberal Party of Ukraine, and a party called Women for Future, which were ready to “send people to the destination,” according to the e-mails.

In an entry in the table next to a party called Rus United it was written that: “they have representatives in DNR (name for separatist Donetsk People’s Republic) — because of the elections in Kyiv they will send someone.”

Next to an entry “Protestant churches” there was the note: “ready to send up to 100 people to the destination.”

The expenses were not high, varying from just $12 when travelling to Luhansk from neighboring Donetsk, to $58 for travel to Luhansk from Odesa.

Conflict escalates

Some of the emails cover the stage when Kremlin-backed protests turned into active fighting between Ukrainian troops and Russian-separatist forces in April to May 2014.

An e-mail dated May 13, 2014 sent by Alyona Bogomolova from Russian businessman Konstantin Malofeyev’s Marshall Group nominated members of the self-proclaimed separatist “government” who were appointed on May 16 in Donetsk. These include Denis Pushilin, Igor Strelkov, Andrei Purgin and Alexander Zakharchenko.

Alexander Borodai, an advisor to Marshall Group, became the separatist “prime minister” on May 16, while Zakharchenko, who was mentioned by Bogomolova as a potential prime minister in May, replaced him in August.

One email appears to confirm that Russian soldiers from Pskov participated in fighting in eastern Ukraine as early as May 2014. There was a note “Pskov airborne forces” next to the entry for a dead soldier in a list of those killed on May 26, 2014, the first day of fighting for Donetsk airport.

Another killed soldier was noted to be from the “first platoon, Far East, border guard,” indicating the man was a Russian border guard serving in Russia’s Far East.

The list of dead separatist fighters, entitled “Morgue. Rebels+Civilians” contains 67 names in total. Some names had notes such as “Chechen?” and probably refer to soldiers from the Russian Caucasus who were killed in fighting in Donetsk in late May 2014.

The list of wounded separatists in Donetsk hospitals on May 26, 2014 also included two people identified as being from Chechnya.

Novorossiya project

The leaked files also reveal that Surkov was probably involved in the failed plan to unite Luhansk-based and Donetsk-based separatists into a single entity named Novorossiya in 2014-2015.

An email dated in late May 2014 contained plans for the organization of a Novorossiya forum.

An email sent on June 27, 2014 had a project proposal by Russian historian and journalist Nikita Kurkin to promote a concept of a new “Novoros” nation “along with Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians.” Kurkin asked for some $40,000 for organizing roundtables and writing two books on this issue.

But an email dated on Nov. 5, 2014 showed that by that time there was a great deal of disappointment in the progress of the Novorossiya project. A report sent from the office of the Russian writer Aleksandr Prokhanov revealed big problems inside the Russia-created pseudo-states, including demoralization among separatist fighters, the theft of Russian humanitarian aid by separatist commanders, smuggling, the collapse of the local businesses, and poverty.

With the current trends being kept it will “inevitably lead to a serious and likely armed confrontation” between the newly elected leaders of separatist republics and armed separatists, the report said. This report was sent just days after the election of separatist leaders Aleksandr Zakharchenko in Donetsk and Viktor Plotnitsky in Luhansk.

Lists of pro-Russians

The Kremlin also actively kept tabs on pro-Russian opinion leaders outside the Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine, Surkov’s e-mails show.

One of the e-mails, dated May 19, 2014, contained the names of Oleg Kalashnikov, a member of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and one of the leaders of anti-Maidan. Kalashnikov was shot dead in his apartment in Kyiv in April 2015.

Another name in the list was Oleksandr Kiva, who worked as the deputy of his father, the former president and chief constructor of the state owned Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant in Kyiv.

Antonov owns a military airport in Hostomel in the outskirts of Kyiv. The former head of Ukraine’s State Security Service Valentyn Nalyvaichenko reported at a press conference in April 2014 that this airport, as well as Zhuliany airport in Kyiv, was used on Feb. 20, 2014 to fly in military ammunition from Russia. The ammunition was used in the shooting of EuroMaidan protesters, Nalyvaichenko said.

Another email contained the names of 30 pro-Russian opinion leaders, including the pro-Russian journalist Alena Berezovska, former Socialist Party lawmaker Yevhen Filindash, former TV host Dmytro Dzhangirov, and journalist Oleksandr Chalenko, who fled to Moscow after Yanukovych lost power.

Another list, sent in the fall of 2014, includes the name of pro-Russian journalist and writer Oles Buzyna, who was shot dead in April 2015.

Eyes on oligarchs

Surkov was also keeping a close eye over Ukrainian media coverage, receiving several media roundups daily.

Another email contained a proposal to pay more attention to the UMH media group, owned by runaway Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko. The proposal suggested that the Kremlin should pressure UMH’s owners to either ensure there was more pro-Russian coverage, or to sell the group to Russian businessmen.

Meanwhile, Boris Rapoport, a deputy head of the presidential administration’s department for cooperation with ex-Soviet countries, wrote to Surkov on Dec. 26, 2013 about a future visit by Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Pinchuk and his wife Yelena.

Pinchuk’s spokeswoman Natalya Vovk did not respond to a request for comment.

Another email contained information that the SCM Group of oligarch Rinat Akhmetov owed $942 million to the Russian VTB banking group as of late May 2014.