For the last couple of days, the main political topic has been the explosion of protests in Kazakhstan. A popular template for analyzing these events draws direct parallels with the public protests that took place in Belarus and Ukraine. However, in my opinion, this approach to understanding the nature of the current mass riots in Kazakhstan is simplistic.
Kazakhstan’s uniqueness
The President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma once published a book titled “Ukraine is not Russia.” This saying came to be historic. To paraphrase, we can say that
“Kazakhstan is neither Ukraine nor Belarus.“
The sociopolitical differences between these countries are very substantial, and the reasons for the mass protests were also different.
In particular, one should consider the fact that the protests in Ukraine and Belarus happened for political reasons, while those in Kazakhstan were prompted by socio-economic motives (a sharp surge in prices for the liquefied petroleum gas), although later on political slogans also began to emerge.
Similar protests have already taken place there (though not on such a scale). However, the protests are currently developing in the context of the transit of power, and the combination of these two factors is yet another feature of the current political processes in Kazakhstan.
Therefore, according to my forecast, the situation in Kazakhstan is going to develop differently from the situation in Belarus in 2020-2021, and not in the same way as it was in Ukraine at the time.
How does it affect Ukraine?
But another aspect is even more important for our country – how can the events in Kazakhstan affect Ukraine and the international context around it?
We do not know yet how the political situation in Kazakhstan is going to develop. There could be different scenarios. But it is apparent that the political processes in Ukraine and Kazakhstan have had very little to do with each other in the past, and it is unlikely for such a correlation to arise now all of a sudden.
The chain effect of protests, if any, is likely to take place in the neighboring countries that are historically and culturally connected to Kazakhstan. However, even the countries of Central Asia differ among themselves significantly.
In this context, attention should be paid to something else. The protests in Kazakhstan were provoked by a sharp surge in energy prices. This topic is currently relevant for many countries around the globe, including ours.
It is obvious that if energy prices and utility tariffs are set free into the waters of the “free market” – especially when the majority of the population lives on a low income – there will inevitably be a sharp rise in social tensions and, therefore, higher risks of political destabilization.
However, another problem arises here – at what expense and how exactly one can compensate for restraining utility tariffs and energy prices for power-producing companies?
The paradox of the situation is that economically speaking it is inexpedient to restrain prices and tariffs; however, without taking such actions there might be greater political risks (if not social protests, then the dip in popularity of the political forces in power).
This contradiction between the political and the economic expediency remains relevant for us as well – especially since the tariff problem (high utility tariffs combined with low incomes) is one of the main social challenges for the average Ukrainian.
Last autumn, the Ukrainian authorities took certain actions to hold back the increase in energy prices (by restraining the price for gas and electricity tariffs for Ukrainian households). But the Ukrainian economy continues to be pressured by the energy price fever, and the lack of natural gas on the global market, along with the global inflationary trends.
Therefore, ensuring at least relative social and economic stability will be one of the key tasks for the Ukrainian government in 2022.
The Eye of Putin
The second important aspect of the events in Kazakhstan is that they will – at least to some degree – distract Russia’s attention from our country. It is not going to remove the risks of Russian aggression for us, but the Kremlin will have to keep its eyes on the ball of the difficult political processes in Kazakhstan, just in case. After all, this particular Central Asian country is one of the key links in the Eurasian Economic Union.
Besides, Moscow is also afraid that the West – or, even worse, China and Turkey – may increase their influence on Kazakhstan. And on top of that, the “rebellion disease” could also spread to Russia.
The third problem comes with the risks of the transit of power. For the Russian leadership, this topic has been relevant for quite some time now. The situation in Kazakhstan discredits the “Nazarbayev scenario of the transit of power”, so it can only aggravate Putin's paranoia and tendency to preserve his direct rule indefinitely.
Green men in Almaty?
There is a risk that in case of a severe political crisis in Kazakhstan, the Kremlin could do in the northern part of the country the same thing it did in Crimea in 2014 or apply the Donbas scenario.
Some Russian politicians already raised this issue during the elections to the State Duma last year. In this case, yet another acute conflict situation may arise in the post-Soviet area. Even the limited use of the “CSTO peacekeepers” in Kazakhstan (as it has been officially announced) will have ambivalent consequences and may set an extremely dangerous precedent.
We wait to see what will happen in Kazakhstan. The trajectory of the political situation in this Central Asian country may influence certain important geopolitical processes in the entire post-Soviet area.
