Polish Military in Ukraine?

With all sides in Poland expressing reservations about boots on the ground, no firm declarations can be expected before the presidential elections in June.

Last Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky held a meeting with the British and French military chiefs in Kyiv. Future working meetings are expected to take place regularly. At the helm of the European Coalition of the Willing, which would undertake a peacekeeping mission after the end of hostilities in Ukraine, are the French and the British, but the list of participants is longer. Will Poland be among these countries?

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland’s policy has been hawkish towards Russia, providing clear support to Ukraine in its defense. While Western capitals discussed potential support, Warsaw sent hundreds of tanks, ammunition, and other military equipment. Poland’s stance on this matter has been and remains unequivocal.

However, Polish authorities have been hesitant to declare participation in a peacekeeping military mission, despite the fact that in mid-March 2022, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the ruling PiS (Law and Justice) party, stated in Kyiv that “Ukraine needs a NATO or broader international peacekeeping mission.” This might seem surprising, especially considering Poland’s participation in previous summits dedicated to this issue, and the ongoing EU Presidency from January to July of this year.

Poland’s presidential candidates: No to Polish troops in Ukraine

In the ongoing presidential election campaign, all major candidates and the parties supporting them are firmly saying “no” to sending troops. This stance has been expressed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, as well as by representatives of the main opposition force, PiS.

The position is directly supported by polling data. According to a survey published in March 2025 by United Surveys for Wirtualna Polska, 86.5% of respondents answered “no” to the question of whether Poland should send soldiers to Ukraine (58.5% strongly opposed, 28% somewhat opposed). This is not due to reluctance to continue supporting Ukraine, but mainly due to fear of a potential war with Russia. Opposition to helping in the current form comes from the rising and increasingly pro-Russian Konfederacja party, as well as their presidential candidate, Sławomir Mentzen.

For and against

In the public debate, voices calling for continued support for Ukraine’s fight dominate, but opposition to sending troops remains strong.

The primary concern is the risk of Poland being drawn into the war. There are also frequent calls for continued economic development, with critics arguing that the risk of confrontation and a kinetic conflict with Russia would halt the country’s over 35 years of economic growth, which is seen by many as a major success.

Skeptics also argue that Polish soldiers are more likely than British or French troops to fall victim to a Russian provocation, both conventional kinetic and hybrid. In their view, boots on the ground should only come from countries that do not border Russia.

Supporters of Poland’s involvement in an international military mission in Ukraine argue that it would be a tool for shaping real security policy in the region. According to this logic, a country involved in such a mission would have a better place at the negotiation table and would be more credible to its allies. Otherwise, Poland could be seen as a country that loudly shouts but hides behind the stronger when Russia casts a glance its way.

Another argument is credibility with allies – in a crisis situation, without involvement, it would be difficult to convince allies to deploy forces to Poland.

Today no, tomorrow yes?

Kyiv Post’s ministerial and political sources claim that the situation may change after the presidential election, and both the ruling coalition and the opposition PiS (Law and Justice) might shift their current stance, guided by national interest and alliances.

However, sending troops as part of a mission is not as black-and-white as it might initially seem. Poland is not only a recipient of security but also a provider. It shares borders with both Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast) and Belarus, where hybrid operations targeted at Poland have been ongoing since the summer of 2021. Poland’s support for Ukraine in the fighting has been enormous, and the country is a key logistical hub for aid (Rzeszów-Jasionka airport, rail, road, and border infrastructure) – these are arguments that Warsaw will use during negotiations.

The Polish authorities could condition the deployment of forces, as well as their numbers, on the increased presence of allied troops in Poland, particularly American forces (ongoing discussions were covered here). Sending troops doesn’t necessarily mean boots on the ground literally – it could involve a training mission, Polish air defense over part of Ukrainian airspace, or sending, for example, sapper units (until early 2023, nearly 100 Polish police sappers were on a secret mission in Ukraine). These, as well as the mandate of such a mission, will also remain a matter for negotiation and definition.

Kyiv Post sources from Warsaw also say that Poland would be reluctant to send troops to western Ukraine due to historical issues. This could also fuel Russian propaganda and create social tensions. Sending troops to the Donbas would also be unpopular due to the aforementioned risk of Russian provocations targeting Polish soldiers.

However, due to the presidential election, it is unlikely that Poland’s stance will change before June. A declaration of willingness to send troops as part of an international coalition would merely strengthen the campaign of Sławomir Mentzen, the far-right candidate from the Konfederacja party.

Time will tell how much Poland will want to participate in the future coalition and in shaping the security architecture in Europe, but we can expect a softening of the current position.