A swift ceasefire in the Israel-Iran War came as a relief to a global public bracing for a wider regional conflagration. Yet for one actor – Russia –the brief war offered a timely opportunity to advance its military and geopolitical aims elsewhere. With the international spotlight fixated on the Middle East, the Kremlin expanded both its overt aggression in Ukraine and its creeping reassertion of influence in the South Caucasus.
For nearly two weeks, the Israel-Iran conflict dominated international media. Rightly so: the world’s attention turned to the immediate risks of escalation, and the longer-term consequences remain under debate.
Nonetheless, a rough consensus has emerged that Iran’s nuclear program suffered a substantial setback – pushed back by many months (at the very least) or years – and that its air defenses, ballistic missile infrastructure, and aviation capacity endured punishing blows. Iran’s military capability, regional standing, and deterrent posture have all diminished compared to their pre-war levels.
Russia’s credibility as a strategic partner also emerged from the episode, significantly diminished. During Iran’s critical 12-day ordeal, its apparent ally offered little beyond rhetorical support. This failure to materially assist a supposed partner in its moment of need has weakened the already-fragile axis between Moscow and Tehran.
From a long-term perspective, this weakening of Iran – militarily, diplomatically, and psychologically – represents a strategic loss for Russia as well. One of its key regional partners is not only less capable but also less trusting. Iran is left disillusioned with Moscow’s failure to meet its expectations.
Still, those are the long-term effects. In the short term, Russia has found the Israel-Iran war to be a useful distraction – one that has enabled it to reap several immediate, tactical advantages.
Exploiting the distraction
First, the Kremlin capitalized on the world’s diverted attention to step up its military operations in Ukraine. Russia has escalated both its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its bombardment of civilian areas. It is now seeking to seize parts of Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk – regions it has previously recognized as Ukrainian. Despite ignoring a one-month ceasefire proposal championed by the United States and supported by European nations and Ukraine, Moscow has faced little criticism. The global media cycle, consumed by developments in the Middle East, has largely ignored Russia’s continued aggression.
Second, the Israel-Iran war conferred short-term military advantages on Russia by depriving Ukraine of urgently needed weaponry. American-produced missiles designed to counter drones – originally intended for Ukraine – were diverted to protect US bases in the Middle East. In this way, Israel’s war with Iran inadvertently handed Moscow a heightened military edge on the battlefield.
Third, the Kremlin profited economically. The conflict prompted a short-term spike in global oil prices, boosting Russia’s revenues. Moreover, the twelve-day war contributed to delaying the G7’s efforts to impose a new $45-per-barrel price cap on Russian oil. Discussions in the U.S. Senate over a stringent sanctions package against Russia were also indefinitely postponed.
Moscow has simultaneously intensified its campaign to restore its sphere of influence over the South Caucasus, taking advantage of the geopolitical vacuum created by the Middle East conflict.
Georgia: authoritarian drift under Russian auspices.
Russia, which occupies 20% of Georgian territory, faces limits to direct intervention inside Georgia. Instead, it exerts influence through the ruling Georgian Dream party, a political vehicle it supports. The Georgian government has escalated its crackdown on civil society activists and democratic opposition parties advocating for integration with the European Union.
In a troubling development, the government has introduced a “foreign agents” law – modeled on Russia’s own FARA (Foreign Agents Registration Act) legislation – to target non-governmental organizations and independent media. Arrests of opposition leaders have also begun. In recent days, Nika Melia, Irakli Okruashvili, and Zurab Japaridze have been detained and sentenced to seven or eight months in prison through expedited court processes. Observers warn these arrests may be only the beginning, as Georgia drifts further into authoritarianism – along a trajectory resembling that of neighboring Azerbaijan.
Armenia: Russia’s pressure mounts.
Russia has adopted an even more confrontational posture in Armenia. The Kremlin appears intent on achieving an unambiguous strategic breakthrough in the region by bringing Yerevan firmly into its fold. Pressure and sabotage against the pro-European government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan are increasing.
The Armenian Apostolic Church, historically aligned with Moscow, has joined the opposition. Russia continues to expand the anti-Pashinyan bloc. One prominent figure who has switched sides is billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who owns Armenia’s energy grid and maintains vast business interests across both Russia and Armenia. Karapetyan was arrested after reportedly threatening to overthrow the government. His detention has further infuriated the Kremlin.
Vladimir Solovyov, one of President Vladimir Putin’s chief propagandists, took to Russian state television to deliver a stinging rebuke of Pashinyan’s government, labelling them traitors and accusing them of selling out “Artsakh” – the Armenian term for Nagorno-Karabakh – to Azerbaijan.
Yet Armenia’s government, led by Nikol Pashinyan, appears determined to resist Russia’s hybrid threats. The prime minister has announced that the country’s law-enforcement agencies have thwarted an alleged attempt by “criminal, oligarchic clerics” to disrupt public order and carry out a coup d’état.
The main target of the investigation is Bagrat Galstanyan, a priest and head of a movement calling itself “Sacred Struggle.” He is one of 14 individuals arrested, according to the authorities. Leaked details from the inquiry suggest that the accused conspirators had planned to seize power by force over the summer. Their plan, allegedly, involved assembling 250 separate units of 25 men each – mostly composed of former soldiers, police officers and athletes.
More than a thousand people, it is claimed, had already been recruited into these groups.
Despite the pre-emptive arrests, officials believe that efforts to subvert the state may continue. Even after this latest round of detentions, it is thought likely that actors backed by Russia are likely to persist in their attempts to usurp power through violent means.
This worrying development may have additional regional implications because Russia’s so-called fifth column in Armenia is not merely opposed to Pashinyan, but also deeply hostile to any prospect of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Revanchist rhetoric is gaining momentum. These actors now openly declare that if they return to power, they will reignite war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
In this context, Moscow appears to be preparing a decisive strike on the South Caucasus front through Armenia. By manipulating Armenia’s democratic system and rallying opposition forces, large businesses, media outlets, and the Church, Russia hopes to topple the Pashinyan government, derail peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, and establish a client regime in Yerevan from which to exert pressure on Baku.
Azerbaijan: control without regime change.
Azerbaijan presents a different challenge for the Kremlin. First, the country lacks meaningful political competition or democratic infrastructure, rendering it difficult for Russia to cultivate a local fifth column. Second, Azerbaijan’s opposition, civil society, and independent press have already been weakened by years of sustained repression under President Ilham Aliyev. What remains of the democratic opposition – chiefly the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (PFPA) and its ally, the National Council – are firmly pro-European and unambiguously opposed to Russian imperialism.
As a result, Moscow’s strategy in Azerbaijan does not revolve around regime change but rather on forcing the current regime to acquiesce to Russian terms. Among the country’s political elite, Ilham Aliyev alone shares Moscow’s strategic goals: obstructing democratic reform and blocking integration of the South Caucasus with Europe.
Yet even this apparent convergence has its limits. Aliyev has constructed a highly personalized and centralized power structure. He is disinclined to share his authority over Azerbaijan’s politics and economy – not even with Russia. For this reason, he has sought to balance Russian influence with ties to Turkey, the European Union, the United States, and China.
Structural weakness within
Nonetheless, Azerbaijan suffers from a critical vulnerability: the very tools that have enabled Aliyev to consolidate power – repression and institutional erosion – have also undermined the state’s resilience. The regime has effectively dismantled the country’s democratic institutions and crippled the civic immune system that defends national sovereignty. For countries like Russia, which pursue foreign policy through raw coercion, such fragility represents an opening. The example of Belarus serves as a cautionary tale: personalist regimes can be more easily subdued and manipulated by stronger imperial neighbors.
It is for this reason that the development of democratic institutions in countries bordering Russia is not merely a normative concern. In Georgia and Azerbaijan, democracy is also a matter of national security. It is the institutional bulwark that guards against imperial encroachment and foreign subjugation.
History suggests that empires most easily subjugate regimes where power is concentrated in the hands of one man. The authoritarian regimes now entrenched in Azerbaijan and emerging in Georgia pose not only a challenge to civil liberties but a direct threat to national independence.
The West must now return to the core agenda: containing Russia
The ceasefire in the Israel-Iran War is a welcome development. But the international community must now refocus on its core agenda: safeguarding Ukraine from Russian occupation, preventing Moscow’s domination of the South Caucasus, and supporting the region’s fragile democracies.
In this context, the defense of human rights, political freedoms, and democratic governance in the Caucasus must be seen not merely as moral imperatives but as strategic necessities. For the United States and Europe’s genuinely democratic forces, resisting Russian imperialism and enabling democratic resilience in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan should remain a top geopolitical priority.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.